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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea should not have been denied without a hearing. Defendant alleged he was incorrectly told by his attorney that he would not be deported as a result of the plea. Defendant’s papers were sufficient to raise a question whether defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel under the federal standard (which is explained in the decision). The court noted that the claim defendant was not informed of the risk of deportation at sentencing was properly rejected because there was a sufficient record to have raised that argument on appeal:

Under the federal standard for asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” … . Although Padilla v Kentucky (559 US 356) is inapplicable to this case because the defendant’s conviction became final before Padilla was decided  … , even prior to Padilla, the Court of Appeals had held that “inaccurate advice about a guilty plea’s immigration consequences” fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, so as to satisfy the first prong of the standard set forth in Strickland [466 US 668].

Here, the defendant alleged that his counsel incorrectly advised him that he would not be subject to deportation as a consequence of his plea of guilty to reckless endangerment in the first degree. The defendant affirmed that he was initially offered a plea agreement that included a period of incarceration and carried the risk of deportation and, in consultation with his counsel, the defendant rejected that plea offer because of the deportation risks. It was only after a second plea offer was made, for a length of probation conditioned upon the successful completion of a program, along with the representation that such a plea would not result in the defendant’s deportation, that the defendant chose to plead guilty. …

In addition to demonstrating that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant making a federal constitutional claim must also show, in order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard, that there was ” a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial'” … .

Here, the defendant’s affidavit raised sufficient questions of fact as to whether it was reasonably probable that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been correctly advised as to the deportation consequences of the plea, given the fact that the defendant had already once rejected a plea offer that was objectively favorable to him, in favor of going to trial, because of the risk of deportation, and based upon his specific affirmation that, had he known the risk of deportation, he would not have pleaded guilty … . People v Malik, 2018 NY Slip Op 07452, Second Dept 11-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO  (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING, THE PAPERS SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND WHETHER THAT FAILURE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES WAS REJECTED BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT RECORD TO HAVE RAISED THAT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))

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IN A CLOSE CASE THE SECOND DEPT HELD DEFENDANT VALIDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, THE COMPREHENSIVE OPINIONS BY TWO CONCURRING JUSTICES AIM TO INSTRUCT TRIAL JUDGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID WAIVER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, with a concurring opinion by Justice Scheinkman (joined by all of the justices), determined that defendant validly waived his right to appeal. The comprehensive opinions aim to instruct trial judges on what is required for a valid waiver:

Although we hold that the defendant validly waived his right to appeal, precluding review of his contention that the sentence imposed was excessive, we take the opportunity to respectfully urge our trial courts to give greater attention to the colloquy used in taking a waiver of the right to appeal. * * *

The defendant answered in the affirmative when the Supreme Court asked, “Do you understand that one of the terms of this plea agreement is that you will not exercise your right to appeal.” The court’s phrasing served to differentiate the rights the defendant gave up by pleading guilty from the right to appeal the defendant gave up as part of this plea agreement. The defendant also answered in the affirmative when the court later asked, “By waiving your right to appeal, you will be foreclosed forever from complaining about any errors that may have occurred in this proceeding. Do you realize that?” This question provided some explanation of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it, and was met with an affirmative response. Additionally, the defendant acknowledged signing the written waiver form, and answered that he discussed it with his attorney before he signed it, that he understood all those discussions, that he was satisfied with those discussions, and that he signed it of his own free will. Granted, whether the appeal waiver is valid in this case presents a very close question given, inter alia, that the on-the-record explanation of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it was terse and included no reference to a higher court or the Appellate Division; the defendant had a limited education, having stopped attending school in the eighth grade; and he had minimal prior experience with the criminal justice system, having been adjudicated a youthful offender but not having been convicted of a felony previously. Nonetheless, the record before us, consisting of the oral colloquy and the detailed written waiver, sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal. People v Batista, 2018 NY Slip Op 07445, Second Dept 11-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, WAIVER, IN A CLOSE CASE THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD DEFENDANT VALIDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, THE COMPREHENSIVE OPINIONS BY TWO CONCURRING JUSTICES AIM TO INSTRUCT TRIAL JUDGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER, IN A CLOSE CASE THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD DEFENDANT VALIDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, THE COMPREHENSIVE OPINIONS BY TWO CONCURRING JUSTICES AIM TO INSTRUCT TRIAL JUDGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))/WAIVER OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, IN A CLOSE CASE THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD DEFENDANT VALIDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, THE COMPREHENSIVE OPINIONS BY TWO CONCURRING JUSTICES AIM TO INSTRUCT TRIAL JUDGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID WAIVER (SECOND DEPT))

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GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO SHOWING DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RIGHTS HE WAS WAIVING BY ENTERING THE PLEA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, considering the validity of the plea in the interest of justice because the error was not preserved, determined there was no showing defendant understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty:

Defendant’s contention on appeal, however, is unpreserved for our review because, although defendant made a postplea motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see CPL 220.60 [3]), his motion was not premised upon the grounds now asserted — to wit, County Court’s alleged failure to adequately inform him of the constitutional rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty …  We nonetheless exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to take corrective action and reverse the judgment (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]…).

“When a defendant opts to plead guilty, he [or she] must waive certain constitutional rights — the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to a jury trial and to be confronted by witnesses”… . “While there is no mandatory catechism required of a pleading defendant, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant waived his or her constitutional rights” … . During the plea proceedings, County Court engaged in an abbreviated colloquy during which it made only a passing reference to certain rights that defendant was forfeiting by pleading guilty. Although defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial, the court did not mention the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to be confronted by witnesses… . The court also failed to establish adequately that defendant had consulted with his counsel specifically about his relinquishment of trial-related rights or the consequences of his guilty plea, “instead making a vague inquiry into whether defendant had spoken to defense counsel” …  about “the indictment, . . . the drug charge, and anything else that [was] important to [him]” … . With no affirmative showing on the record before us that defendant understood and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights at the time he entered his guilty plea, the plea was invalid and must be vacated … . People v Simon, 2018 NY Slip Op 07370, Third Dept 11-1-18

CRIMINAL LAW (GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO SHOWING DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RIGHTS HE WAS WAIVING BY ENTERING THE PLEA (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO SHOWING DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RIGHTS HE WAS WAIVING BY ENTERING THE PLEA (THIRD DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA (GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO SHOWING DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RIGHTS HE WAS WAIVING BY ENTERING THE PLEA (THIRD DEPT))

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EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined (1) defendant should have been allowed to present expert evidence of the cross-race effect on the ability of a witness to identify a defendant, and (2) the request to instruct the jury on the cross-race effect should have been granted. The First Department further held that the new (2017) cross-racial identification rule should be applied cases like this one, where the rule was announced while the direct appeal was pending:

The court should have permitted defendant to introduce expert testimony to the effect that witnesses are less likely to accurately identify persons of other racial groups than persons of their own race … . The case turned on the accuracy of the victim’s cross-racial identification of defendant, and there was no corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the identification did not render it so reliable as to justify precluding expert testimony. The expert testimony produced during the Frye hearing sufficiently established that the cross-race effect has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The People do not dispute that this phenomenon applies to identifications of certain racial groups. Moreover it can be deduced from the expert testimony that the cross-race effect applies to all racial groups.

The court should also have granted defendant’s explicit request for a jury instruction on cross-racial identification. Initially, we reject the People’s argument that defendant failed to preserve this issue.

People v Boone (30 NY3d 521, 535-536 [2017]), which requires that a jury charge on the cross-race effect be given on request, should be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. Boone plainly announces a new rule, and that rule is plainly based on state rather than federal law. Accordingly, its application to cases pending on appeal is not automatic, but depends on a balancing of the three factors set forth in the Mitchell-Pepper test … .

As to the first factor (the purpose of the rule), “standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence will be applied retroactively, but decisions which are only collateral to or relatively far removed from the fact-finding process at trial apply prospectively only” … . Here, cross-racial identification instructions go to the fact-finding process, and are essential to a reliable determination of guilt or innocence… . Thus, the first factor favors retroactive application.

As to the second factor (extent of reliance on the old rule), the People cite a number of cases showing that courts have relied on the pre-Boone rule in declining to give a charge on cross-racial identification, in the exercise of discretion. This favors prospective application of the rule, but we do not find that it outweighs the other factors.

As to the third factor (effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application), retroactive application of Boone would not significantly affect the administration of justice. A limited number of cases turn on the accuracy of single-witness, cross-racial identifications, and the particular evidence could render a failure to give a cross-racial identification charge harmless. Moreover, the rule in Boone is expressly limited to cases where the charge has been requested … , and the fact that Boone had not yet been decided at the time of a particular trial would not provide an exemption from the requirement of a timely request … . Thus, contrary to the People’s contention, it is unlikely that retroactive application of Boone would result in wholesale reversals and burden trial courts with unnecessary retrials … . People v Crovador, 2018 NY Slip Op 07273, First Dept 10-30-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IDENTIFICATION, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/EXPERT EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IDENTIFICATION, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW RULING, (EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/RETROACTIVE APPLICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))

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PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS NONJURY ASSAULT TRIAL, EXERCISING ITS FACTUAL REVIEW POWER THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s assault and criminal possession of a weapon convictions, determined that the People did not disprove the justification defense in this nonjury trial:

At sentencing, County Court stated that it rejected defendant’s justification defense because it found that defense to be inconsistent with the multiple wounds on the victim’s face, neck and body. However, “independently assess[ing] all of the proof” and considering the correctness of the court’s factual determinations in the role of a second factfinder, as we must, we do not agree that these injuries are inconsistent with defendant’s assertion that he had to swing the knife repeatedly to defend himself, as the victim continued to attack and punch him … . More significantly, the severity of the victim’s injuries does not provide the missing proof that defendant could have retreated with complete safety before he used deadly physical force or even during the knife fight, when he and the victim both testified that the victim continued to throw punches. It was the People’s burden to prove “to the same degree as any element of the crime charged” that defendant’s actions were not justified … . Exercising our factual review power and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the People did not do so … . People v Hernandez, 2018 NY Slip Op 07196, Second Dept 10-24-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS NONJURY ASSAULT TRIAL, EXERCISING ITS FACTUAL REVIEW POWER THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, JUSTIFICATION, PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS NONJURY ASSAULT TRIAL, EXERCISING ITS FACTUAL REVIEW POWER THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT))/JUSTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS NONJURY ASSAULT TRIAL, EXERCISING ITS FACTUAL REVIEW POWER THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, NONJURY TRIAL, PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS NONJURY ASSAULT TRIAL, EXERCISING ITS FACTUAL REVIEW POWER THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT))

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MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a two judge dissent, determined that missing the deadline for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals does not deprive defendant of his or her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or due process. Therefore the defendant is not entitled to a writ of error coram nobis or an exception to the time limits in Criminal Procedure Law 460.30:

In People v Andrews (23 NY3d 605, 616 [2014]), we held that counsel’s failure to file a timely criminal leave application (CLA) to this Court within the thirty-day statutory time frame provided by CPL 460.10 (5) (a), or move pursuant to CPL 460.30 within the one-year grace period for an extension to cure the error, does not deprive a defendant of a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel or due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In the absence of a constitutional violation, a defendant cannot resort to coram nobis to abrogate the one-year time limitation on the remedy provided in CPL 460.30 for the improper conduct of his or her attorney in failing to file a timely CLA. We left open the question of whether a more protective rule should be recognized under the New York State Constitution (id. at 616). Today, we hold the same rule applies under article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution. Thus, defendant is not entitled to a writ of error coram nobis to bypass the limitation set by the legislature in CPL 460.30 in which to file a CLA seeking leave to appeal to this Court. * * *

Given our history paralleling our jurisprudence with that of the federal courts in affording defendants meaningful review on appeals, and without any reason to deviate from that tradition today, we hold that there is no state constitutional right to legal representation on an application for leave to appeal to this Court. People v Grimes, 2018 NY Slip Op 07038, CtApp 10-23-18

CRIMINAL LAW (MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/CORAM NOBIS (MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).

he First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s petition requesting a de novo jury trial on whether defendant is mentally ill should have been granted. The First Department held that the exception to the mootness doctrine applied to allow appeal, the denial of the petition was appealable as of right, and the remarks of defense counsel and the testimony of the defense expert at the hearing to the effect defendant is mentally ill did not waive defendant’s right to a trial de novo:

This case satisfies the exception to the mootness doctrine because there is “(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues” … . Commitment and retention proceedings generally involve orders of short duration, which typically evade review … . Moreover, the issue before us is substantial, as it requires us to decide whether statements by defendant’s counsel and his expert could operate to deprive a defendant of his statutory right to demand a jury trial de novo on the “basic liberty issue” of whether he can be confined … . …

… [T]there can be no serious dispute that the order of the motion court, which denied defendant the opportunity to present his case before a jury, as provided for under CPL 330.20(16), affected a substantial right. * * * Since the motion court’s order affected a substantial right of defendant, we hold that his appeal is properly before us as one taken as of right under CPLR 5701(a)(2)(v). * * *

Here, defendant timely expressed his dissatisfaction with a recommitment order that was based on a threshold finding that he had a mental illness. Once defendant met those core requirements, he was entitled to a de novo trial at which a jury would decide whether he was mentally ill based on the evidence then existing. Matter of New York State Off. of Mental Health v Marco G., 2018 NY Slip Op 06998, First Dept 10-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))

, , , ,

REVERSING SUPREME COURT THE THIRD DEPT NOTED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE AWARDED ON THE BASIS OF AN UNPLEADED CAUSE OF ACTION AND DID SO IN FAVOR OF THE TOWN IN THIS ZONING AND BUILDING CODE VIOLATION CASE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this zoning and building code violation case should not have been dismissed by the court sua sponte, and the court should not have awarded summary judgment to the defendant property owner. The Third Department noted that summary judgment may be awarded on an upleaded cause of action in the absence of prejudice and awarded summary judgment in favor of the town (plaintiff):

… [P]laintiff established the material facts through an affidavit by its Code and Zoning Enforcement Officer, who detailed the zoning and building code violations found on defendant’s property and averred that defendant had not remedied them after being served with orders to do so. The statements in the affidavit were corroborated by documentary and photographic evidence, and defendant submitted no opposition that might have raised material questions of fact. Supreme Court correctly observed that the complaint did not name a cause of action or identify the legal basis for the relief requested, and plaintiff’s motion papers suffered from the same problem. Plaintiff now points to authority for the relief sought by it (see Executive Law § 382 [3]; Village Law § 7-714 …), however, and summary judgment may be granted on an unpleaded cause of action “where the proof supports such a cause of action and the opposing party has not been misled to its prejudice” … . The evidence substantiates plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief sought — relief that plaintiff has consistently sought and was narrowed in its notice of motion for summary judgment — and there is no indication that defendant was prejudiced by the failure to identify the statutes authorizing it sooner. Thus, we grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remit so that Supreme Court may fashion an appropriate remedial order. Village of Sharon Springs v Barr, 2018 NY Slip Op 07022, Third Dept 10-18-19

 

, ,

FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT).

The Second Department held that a hearing was necessary to determine whether the maternal grandparents had standing to seek visitation and whether such visitation would be in the child’s best interests. Family Court, based on prior proceedings that were not part of the record, had found that the maternal grandparents had standing but visitation would not be in the best interests of the child:

A grandparent may establish a statutory right to visitation where “circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene” … . To determine whether visitation is appropriate, a court must first decide whether the grandparent has standing to seek visitation before deciding whether visitation is in the child’s best interests … . Standing is established where the grandparent demonstrates that there is “a sufficient existing relationship with the[] grandchild . . . [or] a sufficient effort to establish one, so that the court perceives it as one deserving the court’s intervention”… . The sufficiency of the grandparent’s efforts in this regard “must always be measured against what [he or she] could reasonably have done under the circumstances” … . If standing is established, the court’s best interests determination “requires evaluation of a variety of factors, including the nature and extent of the existing relationship between the grandparent and child, the basis and reasonableness of the parent’s objections, the grandparent’s nurturing skills and attitude toward the parent[], the attorney for the child’s assessment and the child’s wishes” … . Matter of Ferguson v Weaver, 2018 NY Slip Op 07005, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (VISITATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, VISITATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, VISITATION,  FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/VISITATION (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))

,

THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for resentencing, determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender because the People did not demonstrate the equivalency of the California robbery statute. The court noted that illegal sentence would survive a waiver of appeal and the issue would be reached in the interest of justice:

Penal Law § 70.04 requires the imposition of enhanced sentences for those found to be predicate violent felons … . “Subdivision (1)(b)(i) of that section provides, in pertinent part, that a prior out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate violent felony conviction if it involved all of the essential elements of any [violent] felony for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year . . . was authorized and is authorized in this state'”… .

In this context, the Court of Appeals has “applied a strict equivalency standard that examines the elements of the foreign conviction to determine whether the crime corresponds to a New York [violent] felony, usually without reference to the facts giving rise to that conviction” … . “As a general rule, this inquiry is limited to a comparison of the crimes' elements as they are respectively defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes” … . However, “the strict equivalency test [also] allows a reviewing court to examine . . . any foreign statute or case law that informs the interpretation of a foreign code breached by the defendant” … .

The People have the burden of establishing that the defendant was convicted of an offense in a foreign jurisdiction that is equivalent to a violent felony in New York … . “When a statute-to-statute comparison reveals differences in the elements such that it is possible to violate the foreign statute without engaging in conduct that is a [violent] felony in New York, the foreign statute may not serve as a predicate” … .

Here, the People failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that the defendant was convicted of an offense in a foreign jurisdiction that is equivalent to a violent felony in New York …. The People failed to demonstrate that the California offense of robbery in the first degree … is equivalent to a New York criminal offense designated as a violent felony … . People v Salako, 2018 NY Slip Op 06770, Second Dept 10-10-18

CRIMINAL LAW (THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING  (THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT))/SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND WILL BE HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SHOW THE EQUIVALENCY OF THE CALIFORNIA ROBBERY CONVICTION, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT))

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