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THE AFORD PLEA WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY STRONG EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO COMMIT GRAND LARCENY, THE PLEA WAS VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department vacated defendant’s Alford plea finding that the record lacked the requisite strong evidence of actual guilt. The defendant and two codefendants were seen by a security guard heading toward the exit of a store with unpaid merchandise in a cart. They abandoned the merchandise near the exit, got in a car, and led the police on a high speed chase resulting in two accidents and injury to a police officer. The Alford plea issue was not preserved but the Fourth Department reviewed it in the interest of justice. The Fourth Department found the evidence of intent to commit grand larceny lacking:

We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in accepting his Alford plea because the record lacks the requisite strong evidence of his actual guilt … . Although defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review by moving to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction … , and this case does not fall within the rare exception to the preservation requirement set forth in People v Lopez (71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]…), we exercise our power to review defendant’s unpreserved contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]…).

The record, which includes sworn grand jury testimony, sufficiently establishes that defendant “exercised dominion and control over the property for a period of time, however temporary, in a manner wholly inconsistent with the owner’s continued rights” … , and that the value of such property exceeded one thousand dollars… . We conclude, however, that the record lacks strong evidence that defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate the property to himself or to a third person … . Thus, inasmuch as the record lacks strong evidence that defendant acted with the intent to commit grand larceny in the fourth degree, the record also lacks strong evidence that defendant caused injury to a person in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of that crime or during the immediate flight therefrom … . People v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 08802, Fourth Dept 12-21-18

 

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LEGAL SENTENCE FOR A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO A MOTION FOR A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS BASED UPON APPELLATE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO CONTEND THE SENTENCING COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department drastically reduced defendant’s sentence pursuant to a motion for a writ of coram nobis based on appellate counsel’s failure to to contend that the sentencing court abused its discretion in finding defendant to be a persistent felony contender. The Fourth Department found that the sentencing court  was not erroneous as a matter of law because it did not act arbitrarily or irrationally. However, the Fourth Department noted that it has the authority to vacate a harsh or severe persistent felony offender finding pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 470.20 (6) and did so. Defendant’s 15 to life sentence was reduced to an aggregate sentence of 5 1/2 to 11:

Although defendant has a lengthy criminal history, almost all of his offenses stem from him stealing from stores to get money to support his long-standing drug habit. It does not appear from the presentence report that defendant has ever inflicted violence on anyone, and he certainly did not physically harm anyone in this case.

We note that the People never requested that defendant be adjudicated a persistent felony offender; instead, the court sua sponte ordered the persistent felony offender hearing. As noted, the People, in a pretrial plea bargain, offered defendant a sentence of concurrent indeterminate terms of incarceration of 2 to 4 years. Moreover, the judge who initially handled this case transferred it to Drug Treatment Court, which rejected defendant due to his extended period of sobriety—he had been in jail for more than a year at the time awaiting trial. Defendant thus went from having his case transferred to Drug Treatment Court, where successful completion may have resulted in reduction of the felony charges to misdemeanors, to being sentenced to 20 years to life, on the same charges [reduced to 15 to life on a prior appeal]. Such a disparity between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence militates in favor of a sentence reduction, especially for a nonviolent offender such as defendant. People v Ellison, 2018 NY Slip Op 08833, Fourth Dept 12-21-18

 

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ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTOR WAS GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S REMARKS AND REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE WAS NOT WARRANTED, TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the prosecutor had exceeded the bounds of the propriety but the prosecutorial misconduct, which was not preserved for appeal by objection, did not warrant reversal. Two dissenting justices argued the misconduct warranted reversal:

We agree with defendant, however, that the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of propriety by cross-examining a defense witness regarding an uncharged crime that defendant allegedly committed and by placing his own credibility in issue while doing so. “A prosecutor may not refer to matters not in evidence or call upon the jury to draw conclusions that cannot fairly be inferred from the evidence” … and, in this case, the prosecutor strayed outside ” the four corners of the evidence’ ” when he implied that defendant committed different crimes … . Nevertheless, reversal is unwarranted where a prosecutor’s error has not substantially prejudiced a defendant’s trial … and, although the dissent is correct that we have previously admonished this prosecutor, the instant trial occurred before that admonition. Therefore, although we strongly condemn the prosecutor’s conduct during cross-examination, we conclude that it does not warrant reversal here … .

From the Dissent: We agree with defendant that the prosecutor caused him substantial prejudice during the cross-examination of a defense witness. ” It is fundamental that evidence concerning a defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only to demonstrate that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime charged’ ” … . …

We further agree with defendant that remarks in the prosecutor’s summation were inflammatory and prejudicial. The prosecutor referred to defendant’s witnesses as “liars,” compounding the prejudicial effect of his improper cross-examination … . More egregiously, the prosecutor referred to defendant as a “monster” four times. People v Fick, 2018 NY Slip Op 08788, Fourth Dept 12-21-18

 

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THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD DID NOT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION FOR DISQUALIFYING CLAIMANT FROM FUTURE WAGE REPLACEMENT BENEFITS, MATTER REMITTED SO THAT ASPECT OF THE PENALTY CAN BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, remitting the matter to the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the Board must provide some explanation of the discretionary sanction against claimant disqualifying him from future benefits. The Board had found that claimant misrepresented his physical condition, based upon video surveillance evidence. The Third Department held there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding on the misrepresentation claim before it, but an explanation for prohibiting future claims was required before that aspect of the penalty could be reviewed on appeal:

Claimant also challenges the Board’s imposition of the discretionary sanction disqualifying him from receiving future wage replacement benefits. By not providing any reason for its imposition of this discretionary penalty, the Board failed to satisfy its obligation to “provide some basis for appellate review” … . Accordingly, the matter must be remitted so that the Board can fulfill its obligation and “provide some explanation for its determination in this regard” … . Matter of Papadakis v Fresh Meadow Power NE LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 08728, Third Dept 12-29-18

 

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NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FILED BY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY WAIVED ANY SUBSEQUENT OBJECTION TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, ISSUE HEARD ON APPEAL ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court on a ground not raised below, determined that defendant’s attorney’s notice of appearance waived any objection to personal jurisdiction over defendant:

“The filing of a notice of appearance in an action by a party’s counsel serves as a waiver of any objection to personal jurisdiction in the absence of either the service of an answer which raises a jurisdictional objection, or a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) for lack of personal jurisdiction” … . Here, in November 2014, the defendant’s attorney appeared in the action on her behalf by filing a notice of appearance dated October 31, 2014, and did not move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction at that time, or assert lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading… . The defendant did not move to dismiss the complaint until September 2015, 10 months after filing a notice of appearance. Under those circumstances, the defendant waived any claim that the Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her in this action … .

Although the plaintiff raises this issue for the first time on appeal, it involves a question of law that appears on the face of the record, and could not have been avoided if brought to the attention of the Supreme Court … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Vu, 2018 NY Slip Op 08629, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CHANGED WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED PEOPLE V PAYNE, BEFORE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BECAME FINAL, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE HEARD DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE CONVICTION AND SHOULD HAVE REVERSED THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION AND DISMISSED THE COUNT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the law on the proof requirements for depraved indifference murder changed when People v Payne (3 NY2d 266) was decided, not later when People v Feingold (7 NY3d 288) was decided; (2) defendant’s judgment of conviction did not become final until after People v Payne was decided; (3) therefore defendant’s motion to vacate his judgment of conviction should have been heard on the merits; and (4) the evidence of depraved indifference murder was not sufficient to support the verdict:

As noted, the motion court determined that the law regarding depraved indifference murder did not change until People v Feingold, and that the defendant is therefore not entitled to any benefit under the new law … . However, in People v Wilkens (126 AD3d 1293) and People v Baptiste (51 AD3d 184), the [3rd] and [4th] Departments of the Appellate Division each held that the law changed on October 19, 2004, when the Court of Appeals decided People v Payne. We agree with the [3rd] and [4th] Departments that People v Payne signaled the change in the law of depraved indifference murder. …

Under the unique circumstances of this case, where the cases here relied upon … had not yet been decided at the time that the direct appeal was perfected, we find that the failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal was justified. …

… [T]he trial evidence was not legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilt of depraved indifference murder … . People v Hernandez, 2018 NY Slip Op 08690, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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DEFENDANT CANNOT PLEAD GUILTY TO A VIOLATION OF A STATUTE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFECT IS JURISDICTIONAL AND SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department held that sexual abuse first degree charge in the superior court information (SCI) was based on a statute which had not yet been enacted at the time of the offense. The defect was jurisdictional and survived the waiver of appeal:

Initially, defendant contends that the waiver of indictment and the SCI are jurisdictionally defective with respect to the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree under Penal Law § 130.65 (4) because this provision of the Penal Law was not in effect in 2009 when the alleged criminal conduct occurred. Preliminarily, we note that defendant is not precluded by her unchallenged waiver of the right to appeal from raising this jurisdictional challenge … . The People concede that a jurisdictional defect exists inasmuch as the relevant Penal Law provision did not become effective until November 1, 2011 … , and a defendant may not be charged with a crime that does not exist at the time that the act was committed … . Consequently, defendant’s plea of guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree must be vacated and count 2 of the SCI charging her with this crime must be dismissed. People v Gannon, 2018 NY Slip Op 08582, Thrid Dept 12-13-18

 

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WHETHER A JUVENILE’S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED JUVENILES SHOULD NOT BE INTERROGATED OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THEIR ADULT LEGAL GUARDIANS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge dissent, determined the finding that a juvenile’s statement to police was voluntarily given presented a mixed question of law fact which is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. The dissenters argued juveniles should not be interrogated outside the presence of their adult guardians. Matter of Luis P., 2018 NY Slip Op 08427, CtApp 12-11-18

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction under New York’s terrorism statute, applying a weight of the evidence review, determined that, although the defendant threatened to kill a judge in letters to his wife, there was no proof the threat was made to influence or affect the policy or conduct of a unit of government:

As relevant here, “[a] person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when[,] with intent to . . . influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or she threatens to commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and thereby causes a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such offense”… .

… [C]ritically missing is evidence demonstrating that defendant intended to influence a policy of a governmental unit by intimidation or coercion or affect the conduct of a governmental unit — a necessary element of the crime of making a terroristic threat … . …

… [T]he letters here do not indicate that defendant, by threatening violent acts, intended to influence the judge’s policy or conduct. Indeed, the record reflects that, in the time between when the two letters were written, defendant was granted visitation by the subject judge. In our view, they reflect defendant’s vented anger towards those individuals involved in his Family Court proceedings … . … [V]iewing the evidence in a neutral light, it cannot be concluded that defendant intended by his actions to influence a governmental policy or affect a governmental unit and, therefore, the verdict finding defendant guilty of making a terroristic threat is against the weight of the evidence … . People v Richardson, 2018 NY Slip Op 08368, Thirid Dept 12-6-18

CRIMINAL LAW (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/TERRORISM (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THREATENED TO KILL A JUDGE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORISM CONVICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE THREAT WAS MADE TO INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE POLICY OR CONDUCT OF A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT READY FOR TRIAL AND REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A ‘SUBSTITUTE EXPERT,’ DISMISSAL WAS NOT ON THE MERITS AND THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ‘WITH PREJUDICE,’ ALTHOUGH NO APPEAL LIES FROM A JUDGMENT ENTERED UPON DEFAULT, THE UNDERLYING ISSUES MAY BE REVIEWED (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department determined; (1) although no appeal lies from a judgment entered by default against the appealing party the contested issues may be reviewed; (2) Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because plaintiff was not ready to proceed; (3) Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to present a “substitute expert” when the noticed expert could not appear at trial; (4) Supreme Court should not have dismissed the action with prejudice because the dismissal was not on the merits:

Although no appeal lies from a judgment entered upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511), an appeal from such a judgment brings up for review ” those matters which were the subject of contest before the Supreme Court'” … . …

“Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27(b), a court has the discretion to direct dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff fails to appear or is not ready to proceed” … . Here, the plaintiff was not ready to proceed to trial due to the unavailability of her expert. …

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), “where a party for good cause shown retains an expert an insufficient period of time before the commencement of trial to give appropriate notice thereof, the party shall not thereupon be precluded from introducing the expert’s testimony at the trial solely on grounds of noncompliance with this paragraph” … . “A determination regarding whether to preclude a party from introducing the testimony of an expert witness at trial based on the party’s failure to comply with CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) is left to the sound discretion of the court” … . Here, since the plaintiff offered only a vague excuse for the unavailability of the intended expert, without offering any details as to when the plaintiff learned of that expert’s unavailability, she failed to establish good cause to offer the testimony of the “substitute expert” … . Moreover, the plaintiff had previously been unprepared to proceed with trial due to, inter alia, the unavailability of experts … .

… “[S]ince dismissal of an action for a default pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 does not constitute a determination on the merits,” the dismissal should have been without prejudice … . Geffner v Mercy Med. Ctr., 2018 NY Slip Op 08280, Second Dept 12-5-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT READY FOR TRIAL AND REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A ‘SUBSTITUTE EXPERT,’ DISMISSAL WAS NOT ON THE MERITS AND THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ‘WITH PREJUDICE,’ ALTHOUGH NO APPEAL LIES FROM A JUDGMENT ENTERED UPON DEFAULT, THE UNDERLYING ISSUES MAY BE REVIEWED (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT READY FOR TRIAL AND REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A ‘SUBSTITUTE EXPERT,’ DISMISSAL WAS NOT ON THE MERITS AND THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ‘WITH PREJUDICE,’ ALTHOUGH NO APPEAL LIES FROM A JUDGMENT ENTERED UPON DEFAULT, THE UNDERLYING ISSUES MAY BE REVIEWED (FIRST DEPT))