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PRIOR RULINGS ON APPEAL CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT RULING TO THE CONTRARY REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

 

The Second Department determined the contested matters had already been ruled upon in a prior appeal and therefore constituted the law of the case which must be followed. The contrary ruling by Supreme Court was reversed:

“An appellate court’s resolution of an issue on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case and is binding on the Supreme Court, as well as on the appellate court . . . [and] operates to foreclose reexamination of [the] question absent a showing of subsequent evidence or change of law” … . On the prior appeal, this Court considered, and rejected, the arguments that Pascuitti [a resondent] was no longer a proper party to this proceeding and that the petitioner could not seek relief against the individual movants in the contempt motion … . The Town and the individuals movants have failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant reexamination of these issues… . Accordingly, based on the law of the case doctrine, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination granting the motion … . Matter of Norton v Town of Islip, 2018 NY Slip Op 08308, Second Dept 12-5-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (APPEALS, LAW OF THE CASE, PRIOR RULINGS ON APPEAL CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT RULING TO THE CONTRARY REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (LAW OF THE CASE, LAW OF THE CASE, PRIOR RULINGS ON APPEAL CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT RULING TO THE CONTRARY REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/LAW OF THE CASE (PRIOR RULINGS ON APPEAL CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT RULING TO THE CONTRARY REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (LAW OF THE CASE, LAW OF THE CASE, PRIOR RULINGS ON APPEAL CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT RULING TO THE CONTRARY REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILD RETURNED AFTER TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILD HAD BEEN RETURNED AT THE TIME OF THE APPEAL, THE ISSUE IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVAL OF A CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s petition to have her child returned after removal should have been granted. The child had been removed because of concern the home was not safety-proofed. Mother demonstrated she had taken adequate steps to safety-proof the home. The court noted that, although the child had been returned, the appeal was not academic because of the stigma associated with removing the child:

“An application pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028(a) for the return of a child who has been temporarily removed shall be granted unless the court finds that the return presents an imminent risk to the child’s life or health'”… . The court must “weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal” … . “The court must balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and it must determine factually which course is in the child’s best interests'”… .

Here, the record fails to provide a sound and substantial basis for the Family Court’s determination… . Any concerns that the parents’ substantial efforts to safety-proof their home were inadequate and subjected the child to possible risk of ingesting harmful substances did not amount to an imminent risk to the child’s life or health that could not have been mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. This is especially so under the circumstances of this case, where the petitioner had been directed to assist the family in safety-proofing the home and failed to do so … . Additionally, the mother presented evidence at the hearing establishing that she had taken substantial measures to safety-proof the home after the child was removed, and had taken the child to the doctor and dentist. Therefore, the evidence did not establish that the return of the child posed an imminent risk to his life or health, since the offending circumstances had been remedied … . Matter of Saad A. (Umda M.), 2018 NY Slip Op 08292, Second Dept 12-5-18

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILD RETURNED AFTER TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILD HAD BEEN RETURNED AT THE TIME OF THE APPEAL, THE ISSUE IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVAL OF A CHILD (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT (MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILD RETURNED AFTER TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILD HAD BEEN RETURNED AT THE TIME OF THE APPEAL, THE ISSUE IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVAL OF A CHILD (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILD RETURNED AFTER TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILD HAD BEEN RETURNED AT THE TIME OF THE APPEAL, THE ISSUE IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVAL OF A CHILD (SECOND DEPT))

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EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply and the Department of Health’s (DOH’s) motion to dismiss causes of action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act should have been granted. The underlying action was brought by disabled residents of an adult-care facility which was being closed. The matter settled and the facility closed rendering further proceedings academic. Supreme Court had held that the state claims were moot, but the federal claims were viable under an exception to the mootness doctrine:

The exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here. That exception permits a court to pass on moot issues when there exists: “(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues” … . If one or more of these elements is missing, the exception does not apply… .

Here, there is no likelihood of repetition because the issues are fact-specific … . Furthermore, because the issues are fact-specific, they are not substantial and novel … .

The plaintiffs contend that their federal law causes of action are not fact-specific, in that they challenge the validity of the regulations pursuant to which the DOH approves of any closure plan for an assisted living residence … . The plaintiffs contend that the regulations themselves violate the mandate in the ADA and Rehabilitation Act that services be administered in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the resident … . However, this facial challenge to the DOH’s closure regulations is time-barred … .

The issues presented here also do not typically evade review… . An injunction maintaining the status quo was an effective procedure here and would be in a future case raising similar issues. The issues here only became moot when the plaintiffs voluntarily opted to settle their claims against the LLC … . Berger v Prospect Park Residence, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 08110, Second Dept 11-28-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT)

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BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the NYC Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly upheld the termination of  the petitioner correction officers for using excessive force against an inmate. The court noted that, because the petitioners chose to appeal the determination of the administrative law judge to the CSC, instead of bringing an Article 78, the court’s review powers are extremely limited:

Civil Service Law § 76(1) permits a person whose civil service employment has been terminated to “appeal from such determination either by an application to the state or municipal commission having jurisdiction, or by an application to the court in accordance with [article 78].” If the former option is chosen, “[t]he decision of such civil service commission shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to further review in any court” … . The Court of Appeals has clarified that, despite the plain language in the statute, judicial review is not completely foreclosed … . Rather, the article 78 court, instead of being guided by the substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious standards of review, is limited to reviewing whether “the agency has acted illegally, unconstitutionally, or in excess of its jurisdiction” … .

Petitioners argue that CSC acted unconstitutionally because it relied on the statements of the inmates, who never testified, thus depriving petitioners of any chance to cross-examine them. However, this point is unpreserved. Petitioners fail to point to anything in the record showing that they ever sought to cross-examine or call the inmates and were denied that opportunity. More importantly, they never protested that their constitutional rights were being violated. This Court has “no discretionary authority” to “reach[] an unpreserved issue in the interest of justice” in an article 78 proceeding challenging an administrative determination … , including issues touching on due process … and evidentiary challenges … . Matter of Almanzar v City of New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 08062, First Dept 11-27-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))

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DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY DEFENDANT NEGATED AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME AND THE COURT DID NOT CONDUCT FURTHER INQUIRY, THE ERROR NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s plea, determined that the court should have conducted further inquiry after defendant, during the plea colloquy, made a statement about the age of the victim which negated an element of the crime. The error triggered the narrow exception to the preservation requirement:

Defendant contends that the plea must be vacated because he negated an essential element of the crime at sentencing. Although the record does not reflect that defendant made an appropriate postallocution motion in order to preserve this issue for our review, we find that a statement made by defendant at sentencing cast doubt upon his guilt and, therefore, triggered “the narrow exception to the preservation requirement and impos[ed] a duty upon County Court ‘to inquire further to ensure that defendant’s guilty plea [was] knowing and voluntary'” … . “[S]tatements made by a defendant that negate an element of the crime to which a plea has been entered . . . or otherwise suggest an involuntary plea require[s] the trial court to then conduct a further inquiry or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea” … .

At sentencing, defendant stated that the sexual conduct started when the victim was 13 years old, not 12 years old. Such statement by defendant negated the element of predatory sexual assault against a child in the first degree that requires that the victim be under the age of 13 (see Penal Law § 130.96). Notwithstanding defendant’s statement, County Court did not make any further inquiry or give defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea prior to proceeding to sentencing. People v Brassard, 2018 NY Slip Op 07978, Third Dept 11-21-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY DEFENDANT NEGATED AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME AND THE COURT DID NOT CONDUCT FURTHER INQUIRY, THE ERROR NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY DEFENDANT NEGATED AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME AND THE COURT DID NOT CONDUCT FURTHER INQUIRY, THE ERROR NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))/PLEA COLLOQUY  (DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY DEFENDANT NEGATED AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME AND THE COURT DID NOT CONDUCT FURTHER INQUIRY, THE ERROR NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT))

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TESTIMONY OF SOLE EYEWITNESS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s manslaughter conviction under a weight of the evidence analysis, determined that the testimony of the sole eyewitness, Geroulakis, was incredible and unreliable:

On cross-examination, Geroulakis’s testimony was incredible and unreliable. Geroulakis denied that, at the first trial, he had identified the defendant as the shorter man at the souvlaki stand. When Geroulakis was confronted with his testimony from the first trial, he responded, “I remember they told me who is who, who stabbed me and who stabbed Jimmy.” Significantly, investigating detective Robert W. Henning testified that Geroulakis told him that he had argued with the shorter man, that they pushed and shoved each other, that the man “pulled out a knife” and stabbed Geroulakis “in the right thigh area” and then walked over to the car, reached in, and “stabbed [Zisimopoulos] in the abdomen.” After reading his interview notes, Henning confirmed that Geroulakis stated that the same person stabbed both Geroulakis and Zisimopoulos. Furthermore, on cross-examination, Geroulakis testified that he did not remember what the man whom he identified as the defendant was wearing and denied previously describing the man as wearing a long-sleeved black shirt. Geroulakis recalled telling a detective only that “some were wearing black and one was wearing long sleeves.” Geroulakis acknowledged that, in 2009, he had testified that the taller man wore a black shirt with long sleeves. A video-still from one of the clubs that the defendant visited in the early morning of the day of the incident revealed that the defendant was wearing a light-colored shirt with horizontal stripes and sleeves to the elbows. In addition, Detective Constantine Papadopoulos testified that the defendant had the same tattoo on his right arm at the time of trial that he had at the lineup, and Detective David Beutel testified that the defendant had tattoos on both of his arms. Geroulakis, however, testified that the arms of the two men who allegedly stabbed Zisimopoulos were bare and that he did not observe any tattoos.

Moreover, Geroulakis’s motive to identify the defendant as one of the people who stabbed Zisimopoulos is apparent from his exaggerated testimony at the second trial. It was only at second trial, nine years after the incident, that Geroulakis testified that he had observed the defendant, the taller of the two men, twice: once at the souvlaki stand and once by the car at the time of the stabbings. On cross-examination, however, Geroulakis admitted that, at the first trial, he stated that he recognized only the shorter man from the souvlaki stand, not the defendant. Despite this admission, Geroulakis continued to insist at the second trial that both the defendant and the shorter man were at the souvlaki stand.

Based on the weight of the credible evidence, we find that the jury was not justified in finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt … . People v Andujar, 2018 NY Slip Op 08028, Second Dept 11-21-18

CRIMINAL LAW (TESTIMONY OF SOLE EYEWITNESS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, TESTIMONY OF SOLE EYEWITNESS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, TESTIMONY OF SOLE EYEWITNESS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (SECOND DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, TESTIMONY OF SOLE EYEWITNESS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE, CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (SECOND DEPT))

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APPEAL RENDERED MOOT BY THE RETURN OF THE CHILD IN THIS CHILD NEGLECT – TEMPORARY REMOVAL PROCEEDING AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED A NOVEL ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED CONCERNING CONSENT TO THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE WAS APPLICABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the appeal in this child neglect/temporary matter removal had been rendered moot by a disposition which returned the child and the exception to the mootness doctrine, which would allow consideration on appeal, did not apply. The dissent argued that the exception to the mootness doctrine was applicable:

Family Court … rejected respondent’s offer to consent to the continued removal without also admitting that the removal was “necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health”… . Family Court made such a finding at the conclusion of the hearing and issued an order continuing the temporary removal. …

Following the issuance of the appealed-from order, respondent agreed to a resolution in which the violation petition was withdrawn, the neglect petition was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal and the child returned to respondent’s care. Contrary to her contention, these developments rendered her appeal moot…  She further argues that this case presents an issue that is “likely to recur, typically evades review, and raises a substantial and novel question” so as to fall within the exception to the mootness doctrine, pointing to Family Court’s refusal to allow her to waive the removal hearing and consent to the continued removal absent an admission of imminent risk … . Appeals from temporary removal orders are often rendered moot when the petition is disposed of before an appeal on the temporary order is decided … , but issues arising from such orders need not evade review considering the preference available for appeals from orders issued under Family Ct Act article 10 …  More importantly, the law is clear that any order of temporary removal must include a finding that removal “is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health” … . The contention that this requirement can be waived at respondent’s convenience is not “sufficiently substantial to warrant [invoking] the exception to the mootness doctrine” … .

From the dissent:

While we agree with the majority that this appeal is moot, we find that the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The substantive issue presented is whether a respondent in a proceeding under Family Ct Act article 10, part 2 may consent to the temporary removal of his or her child. The record shows that Family Court interpreted both Family Court §§ 1022 and 1027 as requiring the court to make a factual finding that a child is in imminent danger before issuing a temporary removal order. That is certainly the case in a contested proceeding… . The distinct question here, however, is whether a parent may consent to the temporary removal, obviating the need for either an admission of wrongdoing or a hearing eliciting facts of imminent risk as required by Family Court. Given the court’s position, it is evident that the issue will readily recur in proceedings before that court. Moreover, appeals from temporary removal orders are routinely found to be moot because a disposition is reached before an appeal is decided … . Because the procedures surrounding the removal of children from their parents are manifestly of public importance, we consider the consent issue important to resolve. It also appears to be novel. As such, we are persuaded that the exception to the mootness doctrine should be applied … . Matter of Tyrell FF. (Jaquasisa GG.), 2018 NY Slip Op 07985, Third Dept 11-21-18

FAMILY LAW (APPEAL RENDERED MOOT BY THE RETURN OF THE CHILD IN THIS CHILD NEGLECT – TEMPORARY REMOVAL PROCEEDING AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED A NOVEL ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED CONCERNING CONSENT TO THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE WAS APPLICABLE (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, APPEAL RENDERED MOOT BY THE RETURN OF THE CHILD IN THIS CHILD NEGLECT – TEMPORARY REMOVAL PROCEEDING AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED A NOVEL ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED CONCERNING CONSENT TO THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE WAS APPLICABLE (THIRD DEPT))/MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, EXCEPTION TO (APPEALS, FAMILY LAW, APPEAL RENDERED MOOT BY THE RETURN OF THE CHILD IN THIS CHILD NEGLECT – TEMPORARY REMOVAL PROCEEDING AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED A NOVEL ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED CONCERNING CONSENT TO THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL AND THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE WAS APPLICABLE (THIRD DEPT))

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RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s resisting arrest conviction, determined that the trial evidence rendered the resisting arrest count of the indictment duplicitous. At trial evidence of two separate circumstance where defendant was alleged to have resisted arrest, involving different police officers, was presented. Although the error was not preserved, the court considered the issue under its interest of justice jurisdiction:

“Even if a count facially charges one criminal act, that count is duplicitous if the evidence makes plain that multiple criminal acts occurred during the relevant time period, rendering it nearly impossible to determine the particular act upon which the jury reached its verdict” … . The indictment charged defendant with one count of resisting arrest. According to the record evidence, however, the jury was presented with two instances where defendant resisted an officer’s arrest — one involving the victim that turned violent and the other involving the officers who discovered him in the dumpster. We also note that, during deliberation, the jury asked whether it could consider the incident at the dumpster with respect to the resisting arrest charge or solely defendant’s encounter with the victim. In our view, Supreme Court’s response in rereading count 5 of the indictment failed to dispel any confusion by the jury… . Although this argument is unpreserved for review, we take corrective action in the interest of justice by dismissing count 5 of the indictment with leave to the People to re-present any appropriate charges to a new grand jury … . People v Hilton. 2018 NY Slip Op 07981, Third Dept 11-21-18

CRIMINAL LAW (RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/INDICTMENTS (RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/DUPLICITOUS (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

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EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge dissent, determined the evidence of serious physical injury in this first degree assault case met the “legally sufficient evidence” standard of appellate review. The victim was shot in the leg and bullet fragments remain in his body:

The victim testified that he can still “feel [the bullet] poking out,” and that he continues to endure the effects “of the metal inside [his] leg.” Even four years after the shooting, the victim noted that the injury still “disturbs” him at times, and that “something is wrong with [his] leg.” The victim stated that, because the bullet “didn’t come out of [his] leg,” his “life” had been “tampered with.” For instance, he can no longer participate in competitive sports, as the injury would present a “very, very, very, very big risk.” The medical expert further testified that there are “many repercussions” of the type of muscle damage that the victim sustained: “Muscle damage can cause long-term injuries to the kidneys from leakage of chemicals from the muscle, toxic to the kidneys, can cause pain and weakness, difficulty walking.”

As the dissent notes, there is certainly record evidence favorable to the defense that, when viewed in isolation, might have presented an issue of fact for the jury. That said, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as our legal sufficiency standard requires, we have no trouble concluding that the jury acted rationally in finding that the victim’s gunshot wound constituted a “serious physical injury” … . People v Garland, 2018 NY Slip Op 07927, CtApp 11-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY (CRIMINAL LAW, ASSAULT, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/ASSAULT (EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))

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THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge concurrence, determined the defendant’s argument that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was impaired by the prosecution’s failure to call a witness requested by the defendant did not raise a constitutional issue and therefore was precluded by defendant’s guilty plea:

Defendant does not contend that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to support the indictment. Instead, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s conduct impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and argues his motion to dismiss the indictment for defective grand jury proceedings on that ground is not forfeited by his guilty plea. …

… [W]e have explained that even after entering a valid guilty plea, “a defendant may not forfeit a claim of a constitutional [*2]defect implicating the integrity of the process” …  and we have recognized that certain claimed defects in a grand jury proceeding rise to this level … .

Defendant’s claim in this case rests on the purported exclusion of a witness, the substance of whose testimony was contained in an affidavit provided to the courts below. That proffered testimony was largely inadmissible and, in any event, would have inculpated him by establishing that he had a relationship with the complainant and had been in her presence in violation of an order of protection. The exclusion of such testimony before the grand jury does not present “a constitutional defect implicating the integrity of the process”…  and accordingly the claimed violation in this case did not survive defendant’s guilty plea.  People v Manragh, 2018 NY Slip Op 07924, CtApp 11-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/GUILTY PLEA (APPEALS, HE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/GRAND JURY (APPEALS, GUILTY PLEA, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))