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THE VICTIM IN THIS KIDNAPPING CASE ASKED THE DEFENDANT IF SHE COULD GO WITH HIM TO FLORIDA; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT THE INTENT TO VIOLATE OR ABUSE THE VICTIM MUST HAVE EXISTED FOR MORE THAN 12 HOURS, A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED ON THAT GROUND; BOTH THE CONCURRENCE AND THE DISSENT ARGUED THERE HAD BEEN NO RESTRAINT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a concurrence and a dissent, determined the jury instruction on the intent element of kidnapping was wrong requiring reversal. Defendant, who was over 21, drove to Florida with the victim, who was 14, and had sex with her during the trip. The victim asked defendant if she could come with him and snuck out of the house without her mother’s knowledge. The concurrence argued the restraint element of kidnapping was not proven, but agreed with the majority because that element had been conceded by the defense. The dissent would have reversed and dismissed the indictment, finding the conviction was against the weight of the evidence:

… [T]he weight of the evidence supports a determination that defendant did not innocently acquiesce to the mere request of a 14-year-old acquaintance to drive her to Florida, but rather took advantage of a 14-year-old child’s age and inexperience, by driving the victim across multiple state lines, away from her family, in order to engage in an unlawful sexual relationship with a child. * * *

We interpret the statute to mean that kidnapping in the first degree requires that a defendant both restrain a victim for more than 12 hours and possess, for more than 12 hours during the period of restraint, the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually. Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “intent does not require advanced planning, nor is it necessary that the intent be in the person’s mind for any particular period of time.” … [W]e conclude that the instruction was erroneous inasmuch as it permitted the jury to find that the element of intent pursuant to section 135.25 (2) (a) had been established even if the jury did not find that the intent existed for more than 12 hours during a period of over 12 hours of restraint.  * * *

FROM THE DISSENT: Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that defendant either “secreted” or “held” the victim in his car, or that he intended to prevent her “liberation.” She was there voluntarily and of her own accord, which is the very antithesis of being “secreted” or “held” somewhere. People v Vail, 2019 NY Slip Op 05848, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED RELIEF NOT REQUESTED BY A PARTY, HERE THE ABILITY FOR UNLIMITED AMENDMENT OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN FILED; SUA SPONTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE; LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED AS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that Supreme Court should not, sua sponte, have granted relief which was not requested by a party. Petitioner allegedly was injured trying to board a subway train. Before filing a notice of claim petitioner commenced a CPLR 3102 (c) proceeding to obtain discovery before starting the action. The court granted the petition and, sua sponte, gave the petitioner permission to amend the notice of claim, which had not yet been filed, within 30 days of filing the note of issue. The Second Department noted that a sua sponte order is not appealable and exercised its discretion to grant leave to appeal (CPLR 5701[a][2]; [c]):

Turning to the merits, “[p]ursuant to CPLR 2214(a), an order to show cause must state the relief demanded and the grounds therefor'” . “However, the court may grant relief that is warranted by the…  facts plainly appearing on the papers on both sides, if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party'” … .

Here, the Supreme Court strayed from this principle when, in addition to granting, in effect, that branch of the petition which was for an order preserving material related to the accident, it also sua sponte granted a nearly unlimited prospective right to the petitioner to amend a notice of claim that had not yet been served. This sua sponte relief was dramatically different from the pre-action discovery that was the subject of the petition … . Furthermore, the papers before the court did not support the award of such additional relief, since the absence of a notice of claim rendered it impossible to determine whether the future notice of claim or any amendments thereto would be in compliance with General Municipal Law § 50-e. We also agree with the appellants that they were prejudiced insofar as the court set a permissive timeline for amending the notice of claim that potentially could be, inter alia, beyond the statute of limitations and after the completion of discovery. Matter of Velez v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 05781, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF AN APPEAL FROM A JURY VERDICT (AS OPPOSED TO A GUILTY PLEA) WAS VALID (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, determined a defendant may validly waive an appeal from a jury verdict:

… “[A] defendant may waive his or her right to appeal from a jury verdict” … . The People set forth the terms of the postverdict agreement on the record, including that defendant would waive his right to appeal for a sentencing commitment of time served. County Court then engaged in a thorough colloquy with defendant, during which defendant acknowledged that he had discussed the agreement with counsel to his satisfaction and understood it. County Court explained the right to appeal from the conviction and eventual sentence, distinguished it from the trial rights that defendant had exercised and made clear that defendant was being asked to give it up as part of the agreement. Defendant confirmed that he understood all of this and orally waived his right to appeal. He further executed a written waiver that was handed up prior to sentencing, a document that included assurances that it had been signed by defendant in open court after consulting with defense counsel. We are satisfied from the foregoing that, notwithstanding isolated uses of language more appropriate for a waiver executed as part of a plea agreement, defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal … . People v Shanks, 2019 NY Slip Op 05724, Third Dept 7-18-19

 

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STATEMENTS POSTED ON AN ELECTION-RELATED FACEBOOK PAGE ABOUT THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE ARE NOT SHIELDED BY IMMUNITY AND ARE ACTIONABLE IN THIS DEFAMATION CASE; TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF A COMPLAINT A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE MADE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined statements posted on an election-related Facebook page by defendant, a Sheriff running for County Executive, concerning plaintiff, a Deputy County Executive also running for County Executive, were actionable in this defamation case. The court noted that the defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint (CPLR 3024) was not before the court because a motion for leave to appeal had not been made (CPLR 5701 [b] [3]):

… [W]e reject defendant’s contention that he is shielded from liability due to absolute immunity. This immunity protects government officials, such as defendant, “with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties” … . As such, plaintiff cannot maintain a defamation claim against defendant based upon statements “emanating from official reports and communications” … . Although defendant was commenting about an investigation being conducted by his office, as well as responding to attacks on the credibility of his office, the documentary evidence in the record establishes that the challenged statements were not posted on the official site of the Chemung County Sheriff. Rather, they were posted on defendant’s campaign Facebook page and another Internet website. Under these circumstances, defendant cannot rely on absolute immunity … .

… The statement that plaintiff was “pilfering free gas from taxpayers” is “susceptible to a defamatory meaning, inasmuch as [it] convey[s], at a minimum, serious impropriety and, at worst, criminal behavior” … . Such statement also “has a precise meaning that is capable of being proven true or false” … . …

The complaint alleged that defendant published the false statements and that they “were made in bad faith, with reckless disregard for the truth” and “tend[ed] to subject plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, and disgrace.” In view of these allegations, as well as the specific statements at issue, we are satisfied that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded malice … . Krusen v Moss, 2019 NY Slip Op 05733, Third Dept 7-18-19

 

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WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; ALREADY COMPLETED SENTENCE REDUCED BECAUSE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE; MATTER CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing the defendant’s already completed sentence in the interest of justice, determined the waiver of appeal was invalid and the immigration consequences of defendant’s sentence warranted a reduction to 364 days:

Given the defendant’s age of 20 years, that he had dropped out of high school in the 11th grade, that he had documented mental health issues, and his limited experience in the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court’s terse colloquy regarding the appeal waiver was insufficient  … . A written appeal waiver, such as the one signed by the defendant, is “not a complete substitute for an on-the-record explanation of the nature of the right to appeal” … . It is not “sufficient for the trial court to defer to the defendant’s off-the-record conversations with defense counsel by merely confirming with defense counsel that he or she has discussed the waiver of the right to appeal with the defendant” … . Thus, the appeal waiver does not preclude review of the defendant’s excessive sentence claim.

Although the defendant has served his respective sentences, the question of whether the sentences imposed should be reduced is not academic, because those sentences may have potential immigration consequences … .

Considering all of the relevant circumstances of this case, including the potential immigration consequences to the defendant, his sentences should be reduced to concurrent definite terms of imprisonment of 364 days … . People v Bakayoko, 2019 NY Slip Op 05677, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

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THE INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC) APPLIES ONLY TO OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION OR FOSTER CARE, NOT TO THE PLACEMENT OF A CHILD WITH AN OUT-OF-STATE PARENT; QUESTION CONSIDERED ON APPEAL AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE; REGULATION RELIED ON TO APPLY THE ICPC CONFLICTS WITH THE CONTROLLING STATUTE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, in a matter of first impression, and refusing to follow the 2nd Department, determined that the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) applies only to children to be adopted or placed in foster care in another state, not, as here, to the placement of a child with the father in another state. The issue was considered on appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine because it is likely to reoccur. The First Department held that the controlling statute, Social Services Law 374-a,  clearly states that the ICPC applies only to out of state foster care or adoption, and the regulation which states otherwise (Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. AAICPC, Regulation 3) improperly expands the statutory language:

There is no dispute that the ICPC was intended to provide children in need of foster and adoptive families with more possible placements across state lines. The purpose of the statute was twofold: to assure the placement would be in a child’s best interests, and to preclude the “sending State from exporting its foster care responsibilities to a receiving State” … . Thus the ICPC was enacted to provide children in need of foster and adoptive families with more options, while still paying heed to concerns about the children’s welfare.

There is also nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history to indicate that the ICPC was ever intended to address any individual other than an out-of-state foster or adoptive parent. The language explicitly limits its applicability to out-of-state placements in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption … . The limitation reflects the ICPC’s purpose which was to provide “a uniform legislative framework for the placement of children across state lines in foster and/or adoptive homes” … . Matter of Emmanuel B. (Lynette J.), 2019 NY Slip Op 05640, First Dept 7-18-19

 

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GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, COLLOQUY DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF ALL THE RIGHTS SHE WAS GIVING UP (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court and vacating defendant’s guilty plea, over a two-justice concurrence and a dissent, exercised its interest of justice appellate jurisdiction because defendant was not fully informed of the rights she was giving up by entering a guilty plea. The concurrence argued that the potential consequences of the relief granted by an appellate court should not be part of the equation in exercising the interest of justice jurisdiction. The majority noted that defendant had already served her sentence and will now face the original charges. The dissent argued this was not an appropriate case for invoking the interest of justice appellate jurisdiction:

In a notably brief plea colloquy, County Court advised defendant that, by pleading guilty, she would forever relinquish “the right to go to trial, the right to testify, to call witnesses, [and to] cross-examine the People’s witness[es].” There was no discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to be tried by a jury, nor was there any inquiry into whether defendant had conferred with counsel and understood the constitutional rights that she was automatically waiving by pleading guilty … . “While there is no mandatory catechism required of a pleading defendant, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant waived his or her constitutional rights” … . As this record contains no such showing, the guilty plea is invalid … . People v Glover, 2019 NY Slip Op 05587, Third Dept 7-11-19

 

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO LIMIT THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PLAINTIFF COULD OFFER AT TRIAL DID NOT LIMIT THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED; THEREFORE ANY APPEAL MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined defendant doctor could not appeal the denial of defendant’s motion to limit the expert testimony which plaintiff could offer at trial in this medical malpractice action. The motion court’s ruling did not limit the issues to be tried. Therefore an appeal must be brought after trial:

It is well settled that “an order which merely determines the admissibility of evidence, even when made in advance of trial on motion papers, constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission” … . Here, Supreme Court’s decision merely permits the infant to offer various testimony of his expert witnesses and does not limit the scope of issues to be tried … . Therefore, appellate review of the court’s ruling “must await the conclusion of a trial so that the relevance of the proffered evidence, and the effect of [the court’s] ruling with respect thereto, can be assessed in the context of the record as a whole” … . Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed … . C.H. v Dolkart, 2019 NY Slip Op 05614, Third Dept 7-11-19

 

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ARTICLE 78 ACTION SEEKING TO PROHIBIT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE FROM EXCLUDING TESTIMONY AS PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DISMISSED AS INAPPROPRIATE; MATTER CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Article 78 proceeding brought by the district attorney against the trial judge in a criminal case seeking prohibition should have been dismissed. The trial judge had ruled that the conversations between an attorney and the defendant at the scene of the crime were protected by attorney-client privilege. The Article 78 action sought to prohibit the trial judge from adhering to that ruling. At the time of this Article 78 proceeding the criminal trial was over and defendant had been convicted. The matter was considered as an exception to the mootness doctrine:

Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and, in cases involving the exercise of judicial authority, “is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court . . . acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers” … . Respondent had jurisdiction over the criminal action against Mercer … and was empowered to preclude Doyle from testifying about matters protected by the attorney-client privilege … . Petitioner’s core complaint is that respondent erred in determining the scope of that privilege, and she may be correct … . Nevertheless, “prohibition will not lie as a means of seeking collateral review of mere trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however egregious the error may be, and however cleverly the error may be characterized by counsel as an excess of jurisdiction or power” … . To allow review of such matters would have an array of negative impacts, encouraging gamesmanship, “erect[ing] an additional avenue of judicial scrutiny in a collateral proceeding and . . . frustrat[ing] the statutory or even constitutional limits on review” … . Thus, inasmuch as petitioner does not point to “an unlawful use or abuse of the entire action or proceeding,” but rather “an unlawful procedure or error in the action or proceeding itself related to the proper purpose of the action or proceeding,” prohibition will not lie … . Matter of Heggen v Sise, 2019 NY Slip Op 05620, Third Dept 7-10-19

 

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EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the judge’s intervention usurped the roles of the attorneys and deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defense counsel did not object but the issue was considered on appeal in the interest of justice:

“[W]hile a trial judge may intervene in a trial to clarify confusing testimony and facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial, the court may not take on the function or appearance of an advocate'” … . “The principle restraining the court’s discretion is that a trial judge’s function is to protect the record, not to make it'”… . Hence, “when the trial judge interjects often and indulges in an extended questioning of witnesses, even where those questions would be proper if they came from trial counsel, the trial judge’s participation presents significant risks of prejudicial unfairness” … .

In this case, the Supreme Court engaged in extensive questioning of witnesses, usurped the roles of the attorneys, elicited and assisted in developing facts damaging to the defense on direct examination of the People’s witnesses, bolstered the witnesses’ credibility, interrupted cross-examination, and generally created the impression that it was an advocate on behalf of the People. People v Ramsey, 2019 NY Slip Op 05571, Second Dept 7-10-19