The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant was not given the opportunity to object to the procedure used in finding that he violated probation and did not freely waive his right to a hearing. Preservation of the error was not required for appellate review:

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Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s contention that the County Court erred in finding that he violated the conditions of his probation without holding a hearing is not subject to the preservation requirement … . The transcript of the resentencing proceeding confirms that the defendant had no reasonable opportunity to object to the court’s procedure before the finding of probation violation was made, and the defendant was resentenced immediately thereafter.

Contrary to the People’s contention, the record contains no evidence that the defendant freely admitted to the violation of probation. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant waived his right to a revocation hearing pursuant to CPL 410.70. Rather, the County Court, without conducting any hearing, found “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation. This was error … . People v Montenegro, 2017 NY Slip Op 05973, Second Dept 8-2-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PROBATION VIOLATION, APPEALS, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE RE AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A HEARING, APPELLATE REVIEW APPROPRIATE IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION (SECOND DEPT))/PROBATION VIOLATION (DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE RE AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A HEARING, APPELLATE REVIEW APPROPRIATE IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROBATION VIOLATION, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE RE AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A HEARING, APPELLATE REVIEW APPROPRIATE IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION (SECOND DEPT))

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea in the interest of justice, determined the judge did not adequately ensure defendant was aware of the rights he was giving up:

Defendant … contends that his guilty plea to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and violating his probation was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because County Court failed to inform him of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Although this contention is unpreserved for our review, inasmuch as he failed to make an appropriate postallocution motion … , we find that the error warrants reversal of the judgment in the interest of justice … .

“While there is no mandatory catechism required of a pleading defendant, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant waived his or her constitutional rights”… . During the plea allocution, County Court merely asked whether defendant understood “what the attorneys have told me about you waiving your rights and entering pleas of guilty to a felony, violation of probation and all of that stuff” and whether defendant had “[a]ny questions at all regarding you giving up your rights to a jury trial, your rights to presumption of innocence, your rights to a violation of probation hearing, anything like that.” County Court further failed to ascertain whether defendant had discussed with counsel the trial-related rights being waiving by a guilty plea or its constitutional consequences. Rather, County Court simply inquired whether defendant “[had] the time, and did you talk to [counsel] regarding this case, the disposition, and anything else that is important to you, with respect to these charges” … . Additionally, County Court did not advise defendant of his rights or the consequences regarding an admission to violating probation … , including that he understood that he was entitled to a hearing on the issue and that he was waiving that right … . “With no affirmative showing on the record that defendant understood and waived his constitutional rights when he entered the guilty plea, the plea was invalid and must be vacated” … . People v Aubain, 2017 NY Slip Op 05632, 3rd Dept 7-13-17

CRIMINAL LAW (COUNTY COURT DID NOT ENSURE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 3RD DEPT)/APPEALS (INTEREST OF JUSTICE JURISDICTION, COUNTY COURT DID NOT ENSURE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 3RD DEPT)/GUILTY PLEA (COUNTY COURT DID NOT ENSURE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 3RD DEPT)

Although the issue was not raised on appeal, the Fourth Department determined the failure to follow the procedure for sentencing a second felony offender required resentencing:

We address the illegality of “the sentence . . . despite defendant’s failure to raise the issue in the trial court or on appeal” … . The presentence report available to the court and uncontested by the parties at sentencing indicates that defendant had been convicted of a prior felony for which he may have been sentenced within the 10-year period preceding commission of the first count of CSCS in the third degree, as tolled by Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (v) and excluding from that statutory period the time during which defendant was incarcerated on the prior felony … . Where, as here, “information available to the court or to the [P]eople prior to sentencing for a felony indicate[d] that . . . defendant may have previously been subjected to a predicate felony conviction” … , “the People were required to file a second felony offender statement in accordance with CPL 400.21 and, if appropriate, the court was then required to sentence defendant as a second felony offender” …  The People nevertheless failed to file a second felony offender statement herein, and the court illegally sentenced defendant, a known predicate felon, as a first felony drug offender … . Moreover, as the People correctly concede, if defendant was properly sentenced as a first felony drug offender, the imposition of three years of postrelease supervision is illegal because the applicable period for such an offender upon conviction of a class B felony is “not less than one year and no more than two years” … . Inasmuch as we cannot allow an illegal sentence to stand, we modify the judgment by vacating the sentence imposed, and we remit the matter to County Court for the filing of a predicate felony offender statement and resentencing in accordance with the law. People v Mattice, 2017 NY Slip Op 05558, 4th Dept 7-7-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING, SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR SENTENCING A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RENDERED THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL, SENTENCE CANNOT STAND DESPITE FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 4TH DEPT)/APPEALS (SENTENCING, SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR SENTENCING A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RENDERED THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL, SENTENCE CANNOT STAND DESPITE FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 4TH DEPT)/SENTENCING (SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR SENTENCING A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RENDERED THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL, SENTENCE CANNOT STAND DESPITE FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 4TH DEPT)/SECOND FELONY OFFENDERS (FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR SENTENCING A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RENDERED THE SENTENCE ILLEGAL, SENTENCE CANNOT STAND DESPITE FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 4TH DEPT)

The Fourth Department determined that the town’s attempt obtain an injunction requiring respondents to tear down structures which violated the zoning code was invalid. The action was brought by an order to show cause, but no summons or complaint had been filed. Therefore the courts did not have jurisdiction over the matter:

“[T]he valid commencement of an action is a condition precedent to [Supreme Court’s] acquiring the jurisdiction even to entertain an application for a[n] . . . injunction”… . Here, however, there is no action supporting the application for an injunction. Indeed, the order to show cause and supporting papers themselves constitute the only request for an injunction. While ” courts are empowered and indeed directed to convert a civil judicial proceeding not brought in the proper form into one which would be in proper form, rather than to grant a dismissal’ “… , more than improper form is involved here … . Converting the order to show cause and supporting papers into a summons and complaint in these circumstances would effectively permit the Town to seek an injunction by motion, a result that is at odds with the well-established principle that “[t]he pendency of an action is an indispensable prerequisite to the granting of a[n] . . . injunction” … . We thus conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Town’s request … . Without an underlying action the order putatively on appeal does not constitute an appealable paper… . The appeal must therefore be dismissed. Matter of Town of Cicero v Lakeshore Estates, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 05524, 4th Dept 7-7-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ACTION SEEKING INJUNCTION WAS NOT STARTED WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, COURTS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER, THE PAPERS WERE NOT APPEALABLE 4TH DEPT)/APPEALS (ACTION SEEKING INJUNCTION WAS NOT STARTED WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, COURTS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER, THE PAPERS WERE NOT APPEALABLE 4TH DEPT)/INJUNCTIONS (ACTION SEEKING INJUNCTION WAS NOT STARTED WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, COURTS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER, THE PAPERS WERE NOT APPEALABLE 4TH DEPT)/JURISDICTION (SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, ACTION SEEKING INJUNCTION WAS NOT STARTED WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, COURTS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER, THE PAPERS WERE NOT APPEALABLE 4TH DEPT)

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted. Defendant was told he could appeal the court’s ruling that the grand jury minutes constituted legally sufficient evidence of the charges in the indictment. However the denial of a motion to dismiss arguing the insufficiency or inadmissibility of the grand jury evidence is not appealable after a guilty plea:

We agree with defendant … that the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. “A trial court is constitutionally required to ensure that a defendant, before entering a guilty plea, has a full understanding of what the plea entails and its consequences” … . It is nevertheless well established that a guilty plea is not invalid merely because the court “failed to specifically enumerate all the rights to which the defendant was entitled and to elicit from him or her a list of detailed waivers before accepting the guilty plea” … . Where the record establishes, however, that the court incorrectly advised the defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea, the resulting plea “must be vacated because it was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered” … .

Here, the court incorrectly advised defendant with respect to the rights that defendant was forfeiting in pleading guilty. It is well established that a defendant who pleads guilty may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency or the admissibility of the evidence before the grand jury … . The record establishes, however, that defendant asked to be assured that he could raise those issues on appeal from a judgment entered upon his plea of guilty, and the court assured him that he could do so. Given those assurances, which ended up being false, defendant accepted the plea deal, and entered a guilty plea. When defendant learned that he would not be able to raise on appeal the above grand jury issues, he made a motion to withdraw his plea, which the court denied. Under the circumstances, that was error. People v Colon, 2017 NY Slip Op 05343, 4th Dept 6-30-17

 

The Fourth Department, in the interest of justice, determined several counts of the sex offense indictment were multiplicitous and therefore must be dismissed. The defendant was charged with two counts for single uninterrupted events, touching the victim’s vagina while simultaneously having the victim touch his penis:

An indictment is multiplicitous “when a single offense is charged in more than one count”… . A person commits the criminal offense of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she subjects a person under 11 years old to sexual contact … . Nevertheless, a defendant may not be charged with separate counts of sexual abuse in the first degree for each instance of unlawful sexual contact where the instances of sexual contact constitute “a single, uninterrupted criminal act”  … . Here, for each instance of defendant touching a victim’s vagina, defendant was properly charged with a single and distinct count. By contrast, for each instance of defendant compelling a victim to touch his penis while defendant was simultaneously touching that victim’s vagina, defendant was charged with two separate counts. Charging two separate counts under those facts was improper inasmuch as the actions alleged in each pair of counts constituted a single, uninterrupted criminal act. We thus conclude that the indictment was multiplicitous, and we therefore dismiss counts 2, 5, 13 through 17, and 25 through 28 of indictment No. 5548 … . People v Sprague, 2017 NY Slip Op 05347, 4th dept 6-30-17

 

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds was properly denied because the issue could have been appealed. Defendant pled guilty to three counts charging robbery second. However the underlying factual allegations for two of the counts only supported robbery third. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive five year terms of imprisonment, one for each robbery second count. The issue was not raised on appeal and a writ of error coram nobis was denied:

FROM THE DISSENT:

I understand that we are constrained by CPL 440.10(2)(2), which provides that a court must deny a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction where the ground or issue raised upon the motion could have been raised on a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and the defendant unjustifiably failed to do so … . Here, the defendant, although represented by appellate counsel, failed to raise, on his direct appeal, the meritorious issues he now raises on his CPL 440.10 motion … . The defendant filed an application for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues. However, that application was summarily denied … . Under these unique circumstances, where the defendant has no other apparent avenue of relief in the New York State court system, it would be fundamentally unfair and unjust to apply the procedural bar set forth in CPL 440.10 to his claims.

Accordingly, while I understand the reasoning the majority applies in reaching its determination, I cannot join it, and must respectfully dissent. People v McKenzie, 2017 NY Slip Op 05243, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

The First Department determined the seizure of a knife from the defendant was not the result of a valid search incident to arrest. Because the People also argued the seizure was justified for officer safety, but the suppression court did not rule on that issue, the matter was remitted:

Although the record supports a finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for assault based on reliable information from the assault victim, the People failed to meet their burden … of demonstrating that the officer intended to arrest defendant for the assault at the time he recovered the knife … . The officer’s testimony, viewed as a whole, indicates that, when he noticed the knife upon approaching defendant and retrieved it from defendant’s pocket, the officer’s intent was to inquire about the assault in order to verify that defendant was indeed the man who had assaulted the victim. Further, it was not until after the officer had retrieved the knife and confirmed that it was a gravity knife that he asked about the assault.

The People argue, in the alternative, as they did at the hearing, that the officer’s act of taking the knife from defendant’s pocket, where the handle of the knife and its clip were in plain view, was permissible as a self-protective minimal intrusion … . . However, as the hearing court did not rule on this issue in denying the suppression motion, and therefore did not rule adversely against defendant on this point, we may not reach it on this appeal … . People v Simmons, 2017 NY Slip Op 05179, 1st Dept 6-27-17

 

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, in the absence of preservation of the error, determined the plea colloquy negated an essential element of the crime. Unlawful possession of a weapon requires an intent to use the weapon unlawfully. Although such intent can be presumed, here defendant expressly negated it:

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This is a “rare case” where the preservation requirement for challenges to guilty pleas does not apply because “defendant’s factual recitation negate[d] an essential element of the crime pleaded to” and the court “accept[ed] the plea without making further inquiry to ensure that defendant underst[ood] the nature of the charge and that the plea [was] intelligently entered” .. . The crime of attempted possession of a weapon in the second degree requires that a defendant intend to use the weapon unlawfully against another. However, during the plea colloquy, defendant explicitly, repeatedly and consistently denied any intent to use the weapon against anyone, lawfully or otherwise, at the time the police recovered it or at any other time. The court asked followup questions, but they were ineffectual because defendant’s responses only reconfirmed that he expressly denied having the requisite intent. Although an express admission of unlawful intent may not have been necessary in the first place, particularly because such intent is presumed (see Penal Law § 265.15[4]), defendant expressly negated that intent. People v Medina-Feliz, 2017 NY Slip Op 05053, 1st Dept 6-20-17

CRIMINAL LAW (GUILTY PLEA, DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY DENIED THE INTENT ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY, THE JUDGE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE, CONVICTION REVERSED DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)/APPEALS, (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY DENIED THE INTENT ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY, THE JUDGE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE, CONVICTION REVERSED DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)/GUILTY PLEA (DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY DENIED THE INTENT ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY, THE JUDGE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE, CONVICTION REVERSED DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR)/WEAPON POSSESSION (UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON REQUIRES AN INTENT TO USE THE WEAPON UNLAWFULLY, EXPRESS DENIAL OF THAT ELEMENT REQUIRED REVERSAL OF GUILTY PLEA)

The Fourth Department determined defendant was not accorded the opportunity to contest the constitutionality of a prior conviction. Therefore the sentence as a second felony offender was vacated even though the error was not preserved for review (interest of justice). Defendant was not provided with a statement of conviction. The fact that the prior conviction was an element of the charged offense in a special information did not obviate the need for a statement of conviction:

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…[D]defendant contends that the People failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CPL 400.15 in seeking to have him sentenced as a second violent felony offender inasmuch as they did not file a predicate felony offender statement as required by CPL 400.15 (2). Although that contention is not preserved for our review… , we nonetheless exercise our discretion to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice … . Contrary to the assertion of the prosecutor at sentencing, “the need for a predicate felony offender statement was not obviated by defendant’s pretrial admission to a special information setting forth his prior felony conviction as an element of a count charging criminal possession of a weapon. The special information did not permit defendant to raise constitutional challenges to his prior conviction, as he had the right to do before being sentenced as a second felony offender” … . We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence, and we remit the matter to County Court for the filing of a predicate felony offender statement pursuant to CPL 400.15 and resentencing. People v Edwards, 2017 NY Slip Op 04983, 4th Dept 6-16-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING, SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, FAILURE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A STATEMENT OF CONVICTION REQUIRED VACATION OF HIS SENTENCE AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER)/STATEMENT OF CONVICTION (SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, FAILURE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A STATEMENT OF CONVICTION REQUIRED VACATION OF HIS SENTENCE AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER)/SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (SENTENCING, FAILURE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A STATEMENT OF CONVICTION REQUIRED VACATION OF HIS SENTENCE AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FAILURE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A STATEMENT OF CONVICTION REQUIRED VACATION OF HIS SENTENCE AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER)