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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add the names of police officers originally sued a John Does should not have been granted: The motion court erred in granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint and substitute the officers’ names under the relation back doctrine, because the officers […]

PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff can be accompanied by a nonlegal representative at a defense physical examination: Defendants concede that, under this Court’s recent decision in Santana v Johnson (154 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2017]), they can no longer argue that plaintiff was required to show “special and unusual circumstances” to be permitted to have […]

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CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined several distinct issues (not all summarized here) that arose from a lawsuit alleging the defendant doctors and hospital performed a c-section birth against plaintiff’s wishes. The cause of action based upon defendants’ performing an unwanted procedure alleged an intentional tort and, based upon the one-year statute of limitations, was untimely. The Public Health […]

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DISTRIBUTING A LETTER WHICH DEALT WITH RELIGIOUS (NATION OF ISLAM) INFORMATION DID NOT VIOLATE ANY PRISON GUIDELINES OR POLICIES, MISBEHAVIOR DETERMINATION ANNULLED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department annulled the misbehavior (smuggling) determination. Petitioner was accused of smuggling a letter. But part of petitioner’s duties was sending out religious information (Nation of Islam). The letter was religious in nature. The charges did not allege the violation of any particular guideline or policy which was violated: The charges against the petitioner […]

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USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court did not have the power to find provisions of loan agreements usurious. Defendant defaulted in the action to enforce the loan agreements. Usury is an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised by a defendant: Pursuant to CPLR 3215, a plaintiff may seek a default […]

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ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT A PRIOR ROBBERY WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PENDING APPEAL WAS ERROR, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the trial court’s allowing Sandoval evidence of a prior robbery which was the subject of a pending appeal was error, and the error was not harmless under the facts: We … reverse the judgment of conviction because of an erroneous Sandoval ruling made by the Supreme Court … . At […]

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DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY IN ANOTHER COUNTY TO POSSESSION OF THE SAME WEAPON USED IN THE INSTANT ROBBERY, CONVICTION VIOLATED THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY, EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER MOLINEUX (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s conviction for possession of a weapon violated the protection against double jeopardy. Defendant had pled guilty to possession of the same weapon in a different county. However, proof the conviction was admissible in the trial under Molineux criteria: Prior to the defendant’s trial in this case, the defendant pleaded guilty in Nassau […]

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DESIGNATING ATTORNEY AS STANDBY COUNSEL WAS INSUFFICIENT, DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL WHO APPEARED FOR SENTENCING REQUIRED THE COURT TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO BE SURE THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESENTING HIMSELF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the case for a new second violent felony offender determination and resentencing, held that the sentencing judge should have made a searching inquiry concerning defendant’s wish to proceed pro se. Defendant’s attorney was sick and defendant did not want to be represented by the attorney who appeared to represent him (Klein). […]

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CONTRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE DESPITE PARTIES’ EXPECTATION A MORE FORMAL CONTRACT WOULD BE EXECUTED LATER, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CONFORM THE COMPLAINT TO THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined an enforceable real estate purchase contract had been formed and plaintiff’s motion to conform the complaint to the proof at trial should have been granted. The court noted that the parties’ expectation that a more formal contract will be executed later is not really relevant: Although Berger [defendant’s […]

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FAILURE TO LIST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT IN A BANKRUPTCY SCHEDULE OF ASSETS PRECLUDED SUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO INCLUDE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s (Hurst’s) motion to amend her answer and her motion to dismiss on judicial estoppel grounds were properly granted. Plaintiff had failed to list a cause of action against defendant in her bankruptcy proceeding. Judicial estoppel therefore precluded plaintiff’s action against defendant: In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the […]

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