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JUDGE DID NOT RULE ON DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE, MATTER REMITTED FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL AND A RULING ON THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department held the appeal in abeyance because the defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea was not ruled on. The matter was sent back for a ruling after defendant was assigned new counsel: … [T]he County Court erred in failing to consider the defendant’s oral pro se application at the resentence proceeding […]

JUDGE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE INCLUDED A PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, PLEA VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s plea, determined the judge did not make clear the sentence included a period of postrelease supervision: A trial court has the constitutional duty to advise a defendant, before pleading guilty, of the direct consequences of a plea of guilty, including any period of postrelease supervision… . Although the court is […]

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AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that an action against a not for profit corporation (here a yacht club) for breach of a fiduciary duty must allege the failure to act in good faith on behalf of the corporation or its members, not the failure to act in good faith in a member’s (plaintiff’s) personal best interest. The […]

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AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING DEFENDANT MOVED ITS OFFICE AND FAILED TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF STATE (AND THEREFORE DID NOT RECEIVE THE SUMMONS) WAS DEEMED INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW IT TO DEFEND AN ACTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 317, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion to defend an action pursuant to CPLR 317 should not have been granted. The affidavit alleging defendant moved its office and failed to notify the secretary of state of the move (and therefore did not receive the summons) was deemed insufficient: CPLR 317 provides that […]

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CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED, PLAINTIFF HAD NO CONTROL OVER WHEN THE DEFENDANT COULD TAKE AN ACTION WHICH BREACHED THE CONTRACT, HERE THE ALLEGED BREACH BY DEFENDANT DIDN’T TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, under the facts, the contractual provision creating a one year statute of limitations for a breach of contract action was not fair and should not have been enforced. It was not the duration of the limitations period that was deemed unfair, rather it was the defendant’s lack […]

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FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A CONSENT TO CHANGE ATTORNEY DID NOT JUSTIFY THE DENIAL OF A MOTION BROUGHT BY THE NEW ATTORNEY, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE PROCESS SERVER WAS UNABLE TO PRODUCE HIS LOG BOOK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the failure to file a consent to change attorney form was not a reason to deny the motion brought by new counsel, and the motion to vacate plaintiff’s default should have been granted because the process server was not able to produce his log book: CPLR 321(b)(1) […]

ONE YEAR SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER’S DRIVER’S LICENSE SHOCKED ONE’S SENSE OF FAIRNESS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED, MATTER REMITTED TO THE COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES FOR IMPOSITION OF A 60 DAY SUSPENSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a one year suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license shocked one’s sense of fairness and remitted the matter to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to impose a 60 day suspension (the facts were not described): “An administrative penalty must be upheld unless it is so disproportionate to the […]

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OWNERS-OCCUPIERS OF A BUILDING UNDER CONSTRUCTION ARE LIABLE FOR A FALLING OBJECT INJURY TO A SIDEWALK PEDESTRIAN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether the owner of a building could be liable for injury to a sidewalk pedestrian caused by an object that fell from the building (which was under construction): Plaintiff Joseph Kosakowski was a pedestrian on the sidewalk adjacent to a building owned and occupied by […]

PLAINTIFF, WHO FELL FROM AN UNSECURED LADDER, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CLAIM, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ALLEGED THE LADDER SLIPPED ON A WET FLOOR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, who fell from an unsecured ladder, was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) claim. The court further found there was an issue of fact on plaintiff’s Labor law 241(6) claim because of evidence the ladder slipped on a wet floor: Plaintiff established prima facie […]

CHARACTER IN A MOVIE BASED UPON A SHORT STORY WAS IDENTIFIABLE AS PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION AGAINST THE MAKERS OF THE MOVIE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the complaint by plaintiff, the ex-husband of the writer, Katha Pollitt, stated causes of action for defamation and the movie defendants’ motion to dismiss was properly granted. The short story, written by Katha Pollitt, on which defendants’ movie was based, referred to Pollitt’s lover as a philanderer and womanizer, but described Pollitt’s […]

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