The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s employment discrimination claim should not have been dismissed without a hearing by the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR): SDHR is free to dismiss a complaint without conducting a formal hearing where it finds no probable cause to conclude that an employer engaged in discriminatory practices, and […]
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s jumping out of a stalled elevator was an unforeseeable consequence of the elevator malfunction: Plaintiff was injured when she attempted to exit a service elevator in the building where she worked after the elevator stalled near the top floor of the building. A coworker testified that […]
The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the criteria for the doctrine of economic duress to void a contract were not met by the defendants. The defendants had entered an agreement to purchase four McDonald’s restaurants from plaintiffs. The defendants alleged they agreed to an amendment of the contract because of the actions […]
The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have jurisdiction over father, a Kentucky resident, in this divorce action. The couple had last lived in New York in 1995 and had resided in Kentucky from 2003 to 2015: Assuming, without deciding, that the wife established one of the predicates for jurisdiction under […]
The First Department, vacating defendant’s conviction, determined the charged crime was a legal impossibility: “[A]ttempted gang assault in the second degree is a legal impossibility for trial purposes” … . “One cannot attempt to create an unintended result” … . People v Delacruz, 2019 NY Slip Op 08498, First Dept 11-21-19
The Third Department, reversing Supreme, determined that a person who was not named as a borrower on the note and mortgage was not entitled to notice of the foreclosure action pursuant to RPAPL 1304. The plaintiff mortgage company’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted: The record contains correspondence that reveals that a representative […]
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the trial judge should not have refused to consider a late response to the defense motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30): Clearly, trial courts have considerable discretion in administering litigation and managing their dockets … . We agree with the dissent […]
The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant’s (Maldonaldo’s) trial should have been severed from the co-defendant’s trial; … [W]e agree with defendant that his motion for a separate trial should have been granted (see CPL 200.40 [1]). “[S]everance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and […]
The Court of Appeals, in a brief memorandum with no discussion of the facts, over a dissent, determined the landlord’s (NYC Housing Authority’s) motion for summary judgment in this third-party assault case was properly granted. The dissenter argued the Housing Authority did not demonstrate the assailant was not an intruder: … [T]he New York City […]
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it reviewed the collateral for a bail bond which had been posted by an insurer and found the collateral insufficient: “Following the posting of a bail bond,” CPL 520.30 (1) permits […]
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