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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISON ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY, THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE COUNTY HAD NOTICE OF A SOCIAL SERVICES CASEWORKER’S SEXUAL ABUSE OR PROPENSITY FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal of this Child Victims Act suit against the county, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a comprehensive dissenting opinion, determined the plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about whether the county had actual or constructive notice that a Department of Social Services caseworker (Hoch) […]

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WHERE, AS HERE, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE THE CONTESTED SALES TAX STATUTE IS “WHOLLY INAPPLICABLE” TO THEM, AND PLAINTIFFS SEEK A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO THAT EFFECT, THE “EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES” REQUIREMENT IS NOT RELEVANT (THRID DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined some of the plaintiffs had not failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in this action contesting the imposition of sales tax on the construction and demolition inspection services provided by plaintiffs. There is an exception to the “exhaustion of administrative remedies” requirement where, as here, plaintiffs claim […]

MARKETING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS WHICH IS SUBSEQUENTLY INCLUDED IN REPORTS SOLD TO OTHERS IS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a comprehensive two-judge dissent, affirming the appellate division, determined the Tax Appeals Tribunal properly held that petitioner’s (Dynamic’s) information service was subject to sales tax: Dynamic markets products to help clients measure the effectiveness of their advertising campaigns. At issue here is one […]

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OVERRULING A 2006 OPINION, A PLAINTIFF IN A DOG-BITE ACTION CAN NOW SUE IN STRICT LIABILITY AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division in this dog-bite case, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, reinstating the strict liability and common-law negligence causes of action, overruled the 2006 Court of Appeals case holding that there is no common-law liability for injury caused by a domestic animal: Plaintiff Rebecca Flanders, a postal […]

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ONLY THE COURT CHARGED WITH EMPANELING THE GRAND JURY CAN ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES; IN ORANGE COUNTY THE COURT CHARGED WITH EMPANELING GRAND JURIES IS COUNTY COURT; THEREFORE THE PETITON FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROHIBITING A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE FROM ORDERING THE RELEASE OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department granted a petition for a writ of prohibition to prohibit a Supreme Court justice from ordering the release of grand jury minutes to the plaintiff in a civil action. Only the court charged with empaneling the grand jury, in this case County Court, can order release of the minutes: The orders … […]

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PLAINTIFF INSURER CAN SUE, AS A SUBROGEE, THE CLUB WHICH SERVED ALCOHOL TO ITS INSUREDS, WHO WERE VISIBLY INTOXICATED, PURSUANT TO THE DRAM SHOP ACT; THE INSUREDS WERE INJURED IN A SINGLE CAR ACCIDENT AND THE INSURER PAID OUT MORE THAN $500,000 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Love, affirming Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff insurance company, Drive Insurance, could stand in the shoes of its insureds (as a subrogee) and sue the defendant club, Atlantis, pursuant to the Dram Shop  Act. Plaintiff alleged defendant served alcohol to the visibly intoxicated insureds who were […]

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DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE DID NOT PROVE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED; THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION AND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES IS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant in this slip and fall did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the flower petals on the floor which caused plaintiff to slip and fall. Therefore defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. A lack of constructive notice can be demonstrated by proof the […]

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SECOND DEGREE AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM ARE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS; THE CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM CONVICTION WAS VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating the criminal possession of a firearm conviction, determined criminal possession of a weapon second degree and criminal possession of a firearm are inclusory concurrent counts: CPL 300.30(4) provides that “[c]oncurrent counts are ‘inclusory’ when the offense charged in one is greater than any of those charged in the others and when […]

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THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT RAISE A DEFECT IN SERVICE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE SUA SPONTE AND DISMISSED THE PROCEEDING ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, raised the propriety of service issue and dismissed the proceeding on that ground: The Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the proceeding/action on the ground of a defect in service. Lack of personal jurisdiction is an affirmative defense that […]

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HOME DEPOT RENTED A TRUCK TO A MAN WHO DROVE THE TRUCK INTO A CROWD OF PEDESTRIANS AND BICYCLISTS; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT; THE MOTION COURT IMPROPERLY TREATED THE MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ALTHOUGH THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT ARE DEEMED TRUE FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS, HERE THOSE ALLEGATIONS WERE PROPERLY REFUTED BY AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS SUBMITTED BY HOME DEPOT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs did not state a cause of action for negligent entrustment against defendant Home Depot, which rented a truck to Saipov, referred to in the decision as a “terrorist,”  who drove the truck into a crowd of pedestrians and bicyclists. The First Department noted that the motion court […]

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