You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

, ,

FATHER DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING RESULTING IN HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE MONTHS IN JAIL; NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father did not receive effective assistance of counsel in this child support proceeding which committed father to three months in jail for violation of the child support order: We agree with the father that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at a hearing on the […]

, , ,

PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT SIGNATORIES TO CONTRACTS WHICH REQUIRED ARBITRATION OF WAGE-UNDERPAYMENT ALLEGATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXPLOIT THE BENEFITS OF THE CONTRACTS; THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the plaintiffs in this putative class action alleging wage-underpayment in violation of Labor Law article 6 could not be compelled to arbitrate. Plaintiffs were not parties to the contracts with defendants which compelled arbitration and did not seek to exploit the benefits of those contracts: … [U]nder limited circumstances nonsignatories may […]

,

SUPPORT MAGISTRATE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO VACATE MAINTENANCE ARREARS; THE FORMER HUSBAND DEMONSTRATED THE FORMER WIFE WAIVED HER RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS 16 YEARS BEFORE THE PETITION WAS BROUGHT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the former husband’s (appellant’s) objection to the support magistrate’s order that appellant pay maintenance arrears should have been granted. The support magistrate had terminated the former wife’s (respondent’s) right to maintenance payments but held she did not have the authority to vacate the arrears. The Second Department held […]

,

ALTHOUGH THE CHILD WAS 17 AND HAD A LONG STANDING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP WITH MOTHER’S HUSBAND, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR GENETIC MARKER TESTING TO DETERMINE PATERNITY; THE CHILD WAS AWARE FROM A YOUNG AGE THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER WAS THE CHILD’S BIOLOGICAL FATHER AND THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE PATERNITY PETITION WAS NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not have been applied to dismiss mother’s petition for a genetic marker test to determined paternity. The petition was brought when the child was 17 and the child was aware at a young age that the putative father was in fact the […]

,

EVIDENCE SUPPORTED DERIVATIVE NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the evidence supported Family Court’s derivative neglect finding: … [T]he evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing established that the mother’s verbal abuse of Hannah due to an untreated mental illness demonstrated such an impaired level of parental judgment as to create a substantial risk of harm to Samuel. Hannah testified that […]

, ,

SENTENCE WHICH INCLUDED BOTH JAIL TIME AND PROBATION FOR VIOLATION OF A CHILD SUPPORT ORDER IS ILLEGAL; AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE IS APPEALABLE WITHOUT PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the imposition of a jail sentence and probation for father’s failure to pay support in violation of a court order was illegal. An illegal sentence is appealable without preservation of the error: Although the father failed to preserve his challenge to the legality of his sentence, a challenge […]

, ,

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. Plaintiff did not demonstrate it had standing to bring the action: … [T]he plaintiff failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that it had standing to commence the action. In support […]

,

NEITHER NEW YORK NOR PENNSYLVANIA IS THE HOME STATE OF THE CHILD IN THIS CUSTODY CASE; NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF THE CHILD’S CONNECTIONS TO THE STATE; FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined neither New York nor Pennsylvania was the “home state” of the child under the statutes and, under the circumstances, New York has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination: … [A]lthough the child was living in New York for six consecutive months immediately before this proceeding was commenced, […]

, , , ,

THE TIP OF PLAINTIFF THIRD-GRADER’S FINGER WAS SEVERED WHEN A DOOR IN THE SCHOOL BUILDING SLAMMED SHUT; THE DEFENDANT-SCHOOL’S (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S [DOE’S]) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED; THE DOOR WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, THE SCHOOL HAD NO NOTICE OF A PROBLEM WITH THE DOOR, SUPERVISION COULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE ACCIDENT, AND NYC IS NOT LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT ON SCHOOL (DOE) PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant school (NYC Department of Education [DOE]) was entitled to summary judgment in this premises liability and negligent supervision action. Plaintiff third-grader alleged a door closed on his finger, severing the tip. The school demonstrated it had no notice of any problems with the door and that supervision could not have prevented […]

, ,

PARTY WHICH PURCHASED THE PROPERTY AFTER FORECLOSURE WAS COMMENCED WAS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BUT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO ALLEGE PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH NOTICE REQUIREMENTS; THE ESTATE OF THE ORIGINAL BORROWER IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the party (appellant) which purchased the property after foreclosure was commenced should have been allowed to intervene in the foreclosure proceedings. The Second Department further determined the estate of the original borrower was not a necessary party, the appellant did not have standing to allege plaintiff bank’s noncompliance […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy