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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE ORDER OF PROTECTION BY GOING INSIDE THE PROTECTED PERSON’S HOUSE, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSON; CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FIRST CONVICTION REDUCED TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SECOND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing the criminal contempt first conviction to criminal contempt second, determined the evidence was legally insufficient. The defendant violated the order of protection by going inside the protected person’s house but there was insufficient evidence of any contact between the defendant and the protected person: … [T]he People adduced legally insufficient evidence […]

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THE UNIQUE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FIRST DEGREE FOR VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION WERE NOT MET; THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT STIPULATED TO THE ACCURACY OF AN INACCURATE SPECIAL INFORMATION ABOUT A PRIOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CONVICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A DIFFERENT RESULT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department reduced the criminal contempt first degree convictions to criminal contempt second degree for violation of an order of protection, explaining the proof requirements for criminal contempt first were not met and noting that defendant’s stipulation to an inaccurate special information re a predicate offense does not require a different result: The People […]

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THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENSE EXPERT USING DECEDENT’S HUSBAND’S DEPOSITION IN THIS NEGLIGENCE AND PUBLIC-HEALTH-LAW VIOLATION CASE; THE DECEDENT’S HUSBAND, A NONPARTY, WAS AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY; THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should not have been allowed to cross-examine the defense expert using the deposition of decedent’s husband, who was available to testify. The defense motion to set aside the verdict in this negligence and Public-Health-Law violation case should have been granted: Supreme Court erred in allowing plaintiff to […]

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DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RE TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE, WHICH ARE NOT VIOLENT FELONIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the sentences for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon third degree, D felonies, were illegal: … [T]he determinate terms of incarceration of seven years imposed on counts 2 and 10 of the indictment, for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, class D felonies, are illegal. Those […]

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THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR UNCHARGED SHOOTING; DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR FOR THAT EVIDENCE; THE PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TREAT THE PEOPLE’S WITNESSES AS HOSTILE WITNESSES; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of attempted murder and ordering a new trial, determined evidence of a prior uncharged shooting should not have been admitted and the prosecutor should not have been allowed to cross-examine the People’s witnesses as hostile witnesses: County Court erred by permitting the prosecutor to present evidence of a prior uncharged […]

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TOWN PROCEEDINGS ABOUT WHETHER THE TOWN WAS OBLIGATED TO PLOW THE ROAD LEADING TO PETITIONER’S PROPERTY WAS NOT A “QUASI-JUDICIAL” PROCEEDING AND THEREFORE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW WAS NOT “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;” THE STANDARD IS WHETHER THE DETERMINATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR AFFECTED BY AN ERROR OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the the town was obligated to plow the road leading to the petitioner’s property. The decision has a discussion of the evidentiary standards for review of an Article 78 proceeding: With respect to this proceeding, … “the substantial evidence standard of review does not apply to the administrative decision at issue, […]

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THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYEE WAS ON HIS WAY HOME FROM A CORPORATE MEETING HELD BY HIS EMPLOYER WHEN THE CAR ACCIDENT HAPPENED; THE EMPLOYER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE DRIVER WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined defendant driver, Brownlee, was not acting within the scope of his employment, when the car accident occurred. Brownlee was on his way home from a meeting held by his employer, Stellar: … [I]t is undisputed that the collision occurred while Brownlee was driving home from […]

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FATHER AND MOTHER SUBMITTED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ON THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHILDREN WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY EMANCIPATED; FATHER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED BUT MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s motion for summary judgment on his petition to terminate his child support obligations based on the children’s constructive emancipation was properly denied, and mother’s motion for summary judgment dismissing father’s petition should not have been granted. The basis for both rulings was the inadmissible evidence submitted by […]

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“AT ISSUE” WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE EXPLAINED; AS LONG AS THE PRIVILEGED MATERIAL IS NOT USED AS PROOF, IT IS NOT “AT ISSUE.” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the attorney-client privilege was not waived by the appellants’ affirmative defense because the privileged material will not be used to prove the defense. The facts are not described but the lawsuit concerns the purchase of a building and the rent and regulatory status of plaintiffs’ apartments: An “at […]

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO THE CLUB AND THE SECURITY COMPANY IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE CLUB COULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE CLUB, WHETHER THE CLUB WAS THE SPECIAL EMPLOYER OF THE BOUNCERS AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO VICARIOUS LIABILITY, AND WHETHER THERE WAS DRAM SHOP ACT LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant club (Sin City) and security company (Emissary) were not entitled to summary judgment in this third-party assault case. The facts are not described, but apparently plaintiffs were assaulted on the street in front of the club. There was a question of fact whether Sin City was […]

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