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THE VIRGINIA DIVORCE DID NOT CHANGE THE PARTIES’ STATUS FROM TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY TO TENANTS IN COMMON FOR THEIR NEW YORK MARITAL RESIDENCE; NEW YORK FOLLOWS THE “DIVISIBLE DIVORCE” DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the Virginia divorce did not affect the couple’s status as tenants by the entirety for the marital home n New York: The plaintiff contends that the tenancy by the entirety dissolved by operation of law when the Virginia divorce decree was entered, and that the ownership interest in the subject […]

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DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ADMITTING LAW-FIRM BUSINESS RECORDS DID NOT INDICATE THE AFFIANT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE LAW FIRM; THEREFORE THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE RECORDS IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for the admissibility of business records (the Matter Ledger Card) which purported to describe the legal work done by defendants for plaintiff: We agree with the plaintiff that the court should not have considered these documents because the defendants failed to […]

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS MISSED THE DEADLINE AND THEREBY WAIVED THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF PLAINTIFF, THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE NOTE OF ISSUE AND COMPEL AN EXAM SHOUD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion to strike the note of issue and certificate of readiness and compel a medical examination of plaintiff should have been granted. Although the defendants missed the agreed deadline for the exam, they had an adequate excuse and there was no prejudice: Although a defendant waives […]

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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE TRIPPED ON A TWIG ON THE SIDEWALK WHICH WAS NOT ADEQUATELY ILLUMINATED; DEFENDANT, IN HER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITIONS OR THAT THE CONDITIONS WERE NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OPPOSING PAPERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant property owner’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged she tripped on a twig on the sidewalk in an area which was not adequately illuminated. The defendant, in her motion papers, did not demonstrate she lacked […]

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IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, THE FACT THAT THE INTRUDER KILLED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESIDENT OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT BUILDING, IN A PRE-MEDITATED, TARGETED ATTACK DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, INSULATE THE LANDLORD FROM LIABILITY BASED UPON AN ALLEGEDLY BROKEN LOCK ON THE BUILDING’S EXTERIOR DOOR; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH A LINE OF 1ST DEPARTMENT CASES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, disagreeing with a line of First Department decisions, determined a targeted, premeditated attack on a building resident is not necessarily an intervening cause which insulates the landlord from liability. Here plaintiff’s decedent was targeted by her former fiance (Boney) who set her, himself and one […]

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT SEEK LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE A LATE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OFFERED AN EXPLANATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REPLY PAPERS; THE EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s late motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Defendants did not seek permission to make the late motion and only offered an explanation for the delay in reply papers, which should not have been considered: Pursuant to CPLR 3212(a), unless the trial court directs otherwise, […]

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PLAINTIFF’S SIGNING A CONSENT FORM PRIOR TO SURGERY DID NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice, lack of informed consent and battery causes of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged defendant doctor operated on the wrong site. Defendant testified she removed a cyst from plaintiff’s left leg and plaintiff alleged defendant should have removed an abscess. The court noted […]

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DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; INSURANCE LAW 2601 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION; A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES CAUSE OF ACTION WILL SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined emotional-distress damages are not available for breach of contract and Insurance Law 2601 does not create a private right of action. Plaintiff’s property was damaged by Hurricane Sandy. Plaintiff and defendant insurers reached a settlement agreement in which defendants agreed to pay plaintiff $1.6 million within 21 days. […]

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THE NYC ADMINSTRATIVE CODE REQUIRES ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS TO REPAIR SIDEWALK FLAGS OVER 1/2 INCH; PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE THE FLAG WAS THREE INCHES; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should not have been granted. There was evidence the sidewalk flag was three inches high and the NYC Administrative Code requires the abutting property owner to repair any flags over 1/2 inch: The Administrative Code of […]

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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted and, upon a search of the record, summary judgment should have been granted to defendant in this foreclosure action. The proof of mailing of the notice required by RPAPL 1304 was not sufficient: Plaintiff failed to […]

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