You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

,

THE PEOPLE FAILED TO TIMELY REDUCE THE BOND OBLIGATION TO A JUDGMENT, THEREFORE THE SURETY’S MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT FORFEITING THE $100,000 BAIL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined the surety’s motion to vacate a judgment forfeiting $100,000 bail should have been granted. Although the surety’s (Empire’s) motion was untimely, the People had failed to timely reduce the bond obligation to a judgment. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here: In […]

THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT INCLUDE AN OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE FELONY COMPLAINT OR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the superior court information (SCI) was jurisdictionally defective because it did not include an offense charged in the felony complaint or a lesser included offense: … [D]efendant pleaded guilty, as charged in the SCI, to attempted robbery in the second degree under Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 160.10 […]

,

CRITERIA FOR RECLASSIFICATION OF THE SORA RISK-LEVEL EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department explained the criteria for an application for risk-level reclassification under SORA: Turning to the August 2019 order denying defendant’s application for reclassification, it was his burden “to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the requested modification [was] warranted, and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of […]

CLAIMANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS EXAMINE THE CONSULTANTS WHOSE REPORTS WERE THE BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OF CLAIMANT’S REQUEST FOR SURGERY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant should be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the consultants (Cash and Storrs) whose reports were the basis for the denial of claimant’s request for surgery: The … request for surgery was not made until after the WCLJ [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge] ordered [the] depositions, […]

, ,

THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SELLER’S BUSINESS TO BUYER DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA IN LABOR LAW 581; THEREFORE THE TRANSFER DID NOT TRIGGER THE TAKEOVER OF THE SELLER’S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXPERIENCE ACCOUNT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the HOP’s purchase of certain aspects of a competing business, Playground, did not trigger HOP’s takeover of Playground’s unemployment insurance experience account: The statute provides that where a business has been transferred from one employer to another, either in whole or in part, the transferee shall take […]

IN A COMPLEX MARITAL-PROPERTY, MAINTENANCE AND CHILD-SUPPORT ANALYSIS TOO DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE TO SUMMARIZE HERE, THE COURT NOTED THAT, ABSENT A VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT, A PARENT MAY NOT BE DIRECTED TO SUPPORT A CHILD AFTER THE AGE OF 21 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in an extensive marital-property, maintenance and child-support decision too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here, noted that a parent is not obligated to support a child over the age of 21: The defendant … contends that the Supreme Court improperly directed him to pay basic child-support and add-on expenses for the […]

,

THE POLICE ACTED ILLEGALLY IN DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO GET OUT OF HIS VEHICLE; HOWEVER THE DEFENDANT’S SUBSEQUENT INDEPENDENT ACT OF RUNNING OVER THE POLICE OFFICER DISSIPATED THE ILLEGALITY OF THE POLICE CONDUCT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CERTAIN TESTIMONY ABOUT THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE POLICE WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress testimony about an encounter with police was properly denied. Although the police acted illegally in directing defendant to get out of his car and in trying to physically remove defendant from his car, the subsequent criminal act by the defendant, running over the police officer, dissipated the […]

,

THE USUAL STRICT CRITERIA FOR VACATING A DEFAULT ORDER ARE RELAXED IN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS; MOTHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT ORDER AWARDING CUSTODY TO FATHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s motion to vacate the default order granting custody to father should have been granted. The usual strict criteria for a default order are relaxed in child custody matters: The determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a […]

,

NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE FLORIDA CHILD SUPPORT ORDER, EVEN THOUGH FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION HAD TERMINATED BY THE TERMS OF THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Florida, which issued the child support order and where father resides, continued to have jurisdiction over the child support order, even though the child support obligation had terminated. Therefore the New York child support order was not a “de novo” order. Rather, it was a modification of the […]

,

FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT ORDER TERMINATING HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; FATHER ATTEMPTED TO ATTEND THE HEARING, BUT WAS LATE; FATHER WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL BUT NONE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED; AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE HE DID NOT ABANDON THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s motion to vacate the default order terminating his parental rights should have been granted. Father had appeared on the day of the hearing but it had concluded. In addition father was entitled to counsel and there was evidence father had not abandoned the child: A parent seeking […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy