You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

,

SUPREME COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED A SUCCESSIVE AND LATE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s breach of contract cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary of the contract entered into by defendant county. The Second Department noted that Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the defendant county to make a […]

, ,

DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER AND RETAILER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DESIGN DEFECT, FAILURE TO WARN AND IMPLIED WARRANTY CAUSES OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED USING A “HOVERBOARD” (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been awarded to the manufacturer and retailer of a “hoverboard” on the products liability (design defect), failure to warn and implied warranty causes of action. Plaintiff alleged she was using the hoverboard in accordance with the instructions and was injured. The expert affidavit […]

, , ,

THE DEPOSITION OF THE NONPARTY MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER IN THE COOPERATIVE REGARDING LEAKS IN THE UNITS WAS PROPER AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STOPPED AND SUPPRESSED BY THE JUDGE; SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WERE WARRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the deposition of a witness, Ruth Miller, was proper and the judge should not have ordered the deposition to cease and should not have suppressed the portion of the deposition which had already been taken. Miller was a nonparty majority shareholder in the cooperative and the action concerned […]

,

DEFENDANT’S REPEATED REQUESTS TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WERE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY THE THREE JUDGES TO WHOM THE REQUESTS WERE MADE; CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s repeated requests to represent himself had not been properly addressed by the three calendar judges to whom the requests were made: “The denial of defendant’s repeated requests to proceed pro se deprived defendant of his right to represent himself and requires reversal […]

, ,

CONVCTION OF ASSAULT FIRST DEGREE AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED OFFENSE DOES NOT REQUIRE REGISTRATION AS A SEX OFFENDER PURSUANT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kern, reversing Supreme Court, agreeing with the Second Department in a matter of first impression, determined conviction of assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony does not require registration as a sexual offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA): The main […]

, , ,

THE LANDLORD’S SUMMARY PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY BROUGHT IN SUPREME COURT BECAUSE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS PROHIBITED BRINGING THE ACTION IN CIVIL COURT; ALTHOUGH SUA SPONTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE, THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS DEEMED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the landlord’s summary proceeding on the ground that it should have been brought in Civil Court, not Supreme Court. COVID-related Executive Orders prohibited actions for nonpayment of rent in Civil Court. The First Department noted that a sua sponte order is not […]

, ,

THE NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS WHICH MUST BE ON DUTY DURING A SHIFT IS A HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUE, WHICH IS ARBITRABLE PURSUANT TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT, NOT A JOB SECURITY ISSUE (WHICH IS NOT ARBITRABLE) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the number of firefighters which must be on duty during a shift is not a job-security issue and is therefore arbitrable pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA): Respondent contends that Supreme Court erred in concluding that its grievance concerned nonarbitrable job security clauses as the clauses relate […]

, , ,

PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT IN THIS SUBWAY ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A TRAIN AND ALLEGED THE ALLOWED SPEED FOR ENTERING A STATION WAS TOO HIGH; DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT SPEED STUDIES HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, determined the NYC Transit Authority’s (TA’s) motion to aside the plaintiff’s verdict in this subway accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff was on the tracks when he was struck by a train. Plaintiff argued the speed regulations allowed the train to enter the station […]

,

A DEFENSE WITNESS WHO WOULD HAVE TESTIFIED THAT A KEY PROSECUTION WITNESS HAD A POOR REPUTATION FOR TRUTHFULNESS AND VERACTIY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM TESTIFYING; CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the witness who would have testified that the complainant’s mother, a prosecution witness, had a poor reputation for truthfulness and veracity should not have been prohibited from testifying: … [T]he defendant sought to introduce testimony from Marie Anisca-Oral, a friend of his older sister, on the subject of […]

, ,

DEFENDANT REFUSED TO SPEAK WITH HIS ATTORNEY; THE JUDGE DENIED REQUESTS FOR NEW COUNSEL WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE DEFENDANT, WHO WAS PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM; DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s right to counsel had not been adequately protected and returned the case to pre-suppression-hearing status. Defendant refused to speak with his attorney and the judge, despite defendant’s presence in the courtroom, never discussed the issue with the defendant before denying a request to assign new counsel: … […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy