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THE DEPOSITION OF THE NONPARTY MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER IN THE COOPERATIVE REGARDING LEAKS IN THE UNITS WAS PROPER AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STOPPED AND SUPPRESSED BY THE JUDGE; SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WERE WARRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the deposition of a witness, Ruth Miller, was proper and the judge should not have ordered the deposition to cease and should not have suppressed the portion of the deposition which had already been taken. Miller was a nonparty majority shareholder in the cooperative and the action concerned leaks in the units. The First Department further determined that sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel were warranted:

It was an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to issue a protective order under CPLR 3103(a) barring a continuation of the deposition of nonparty Ruth Miller. Miller is the majority shareholder of the Coop, and therefore is a key figure in the events surrounding plaintiffs’ negligence and breach of contract claims regarding leaks in plaintiffs’ units. Moreover, Miller was a member of the Board during a period of time when decisions were made about building maintenance, which is a relevant issue in plaintiffs’ action. Thus, her testimony is “material and necessary” (CPLR 3101[a] …). …

… [i]t was error for the court to sua sponte issue a suppression order of the testimony previously taken (see CPLR 3103[c]). Defendants made no showing that evidence was improperly or irregularly obtained during the deposition, or that prejudice to a substantial right had accrued through discovery of improperly obtained evidence … . …

… [C]ounsel’s behavior at the deposition was frivolous and unprofessional. Among other things, counsel called the witness “a liar” and told her on the record that she had done “plenty wrong” and had “plenty to worry about in this case,” despite the fact that she is not even a party to the action. Sanctions against counsel are therefore warranted (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 …). Gendell v 42 W. 17th St. Hous. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 00272, First Dept 1-18-22

 

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