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CIVIL SERVICE LAW 75-B SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE AS THE EMPLOYMENT ANTI-RETALIATION STATUTES IN THE NEW YORK STATE AND NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD RESIGNED AT TIME OF THE SUIT, HIS RETALIATION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s retaliation claim pursuant to Civil Service Law 75-b should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff, an employee of the NYC Department of Buildings (DOB), alleged he was denied a job because of a poor reference allegedly made in retaliation for his reporting a conflict of interest to the […]

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PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS’ 2010 BREACH OF A CONDOMINIUM-SALE CONTRACT ACTION WAS DISMISSED ON STATUTE OF FRAUDS GROUNDS; WHEN A WRITTEN CONTRACT SUBSEQUENTLY SURFACED, DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS DID NOT MOVE TO RENEW, VACATE OR APPEAL THE ORDER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the legal malpractice action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiffs, apparently represented by defendant attorneys, brought a 2010 action for breach of a condominium-sale contract which was dismissed on statute of frauds grounds (no written contract). When the written contract for the condominium sale surfaced, the defendants did […]

DEFENDANT VIDEO-HOSTING SERVICE, VIMEO, DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF BY REMOVING FIVE VIDEOS POSTED BY PLAINTIFF CLAIMING CHILDHOOD VACCINATION LEADS TO AUTISM; THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AUTHORIZES INTERNET PROVIDERS TO REMOVE “OBJECTIONABLE” MATERIAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined defendant video-hosting service, Vimeo, did not breach its contract with plaintiff by removing five videos posted by plaintiff which Vimeo concluded made false or misleading claims about vaccine safety. The videos claimed that childhood vaccines lead to autism: This appeal concerns whether a video-hosting […]

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THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT (SARA), PROHIIBITING CERTAIN SEX OFFENDERS FROM RESIDING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, APPLIES TO SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE UNDER POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS); THE DISSENT ARGUED SARA, BY ITS TERMS, APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE ON PAROLE OR CONDITIONALLY RELEASED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined the residency requirement of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) is a mandatory condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) for sex offenders subject to SARA. The dissent argued the applicable statutes do not mention postrelease supervision (PRS) and, by their terms, apply only to defendants who […]

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DEFENDANT, AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA, AGREED TO A SENTENCE OF 20 DAYS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE; AT SENTENCING, AFTER DEFENDANT HAD COMPLETED THE COMMUNITY SERVICE, THE PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BARGAINED-FOR SENTENCE WAS A ONE-YEAR CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE; ON APPEAL DEFENDANT ARGUED HE NEVER AGREED TO THE CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE AND HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT VOLUNTARY; THE MAJORITY HELD THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DeFiore, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined defendant’s argument that his plea was invalid because he was not informed that a one-year conditional discharge (CD) would be imposed, was not preserved for appeal. Defendant argued only the community-service sentence was agreed to at the time […]

THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING THAT POWER BUGGIES BE OPERATED BY TRAINED, COMPETENT, DESIGNATED PERSONNEL DOES NOT SET FORTH A SPECIFIC STANDARD OF CONDUCT SUCH THAT IT GIVES RISE TO A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY UNDER LABOR LAW 241(6); PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN AN UNTRAINED OPERATOR LOST CONTROL OF A POWER BUGGY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over an extensive three-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the Industrial Code provision which provides “[n]o person other than a trained and competent operator designated by the employer shall operate a power buggy” was not a concrete specification sufficient to give rise to […]

“INTERACTIVE FANTASY SPORT” (IFS) IS NOT “GAMBLING;” THE STATUTES AUTHORIZING AND REGULATING IFS ARE NOT, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a comprehensive three-judge dissent, determined the 2016 statutes authorizing and regulating “interactive fantasy sport” (IFS) do not violate the New York Constitution’s prohibition of “gambling:” … IFS contests are not prohibited gambling activities because contestants use significant skill to select their rosters, creating […]

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​ THE TARGETS OF A NO-KNOCK WARRANT ARE OWED A “SPECIAL DUTY” SUCH THAT A MUNICIPALITY MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS EXECUTING THE WARRANT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a comprehensive opinion by Judge Singas, over a two-judge dissent, determined the police owe a “special duty” to those targeted by a no-knock warrant such that liability may be imposed on a municipality for the negligence of the police during execution of the warrant.. Here plaintiff alleged he was shot […]

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A LOCAL ONLINE NEWS OUTLET SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM A FAMILY COURT HEARING REGARDING WHETHER A DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM A NEGLECT PROCEEDING ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST GROUNDS; THE OUTLET IS ENTITLED TO A TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined appellant, an online local news outlet, should not have been excluded from an attorney-disqualification hearing and was entitled to a transcript of the hearing. The respondent in a neglect proceeding had moved to disqualify the deputy county attorney on conflict of interest grounds. Appellant’s owner deemed the motion […]

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DEFENDANTS’ OWN SUBMISSIONS DEMONSTRATED (1) PLAINTIFF OWNED THE PROPERTY LEFT IN THE HOUSE PURCHASED BY DEFENDANTS, (2) PLAINTIFF HAD REMOVED SOME OF THE PROPERTY, AND (3) PLAINTIFF ASKED FOR MORE TIME TO REMOVE MORE PROPERTY; THOSE FACTS NEGATED DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF HAD ABANDONDED THE PROPERTY; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CONVERSION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the conversion cause of action should not have been granted. Defendants’ own submissions demonstrated plaintiff’s ownership of the property, his removal of some of the property, and his request for more time to remove the rest. The property was in a house […]

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