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PLAINTIFF RADIATION ONCOLOGIST, THE SOLE SHAREHOLDER IN PLANTIFF PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION, WHICH PAID PLAINTIFF ONCOLOGIST’S SALARY, SUCCESSFULLY SUED THE HOSPITAL WHICH EMPLOYED HIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; THE COURT, IN A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, HELD THAT PLAINTIFF’S SALARY WAS NOT A CORPORATE EXPENSE AND THEREFORE WAS RECOVERABLE AS LOST PROFITS IN THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fisher, determined plaintiff’s salary, paid to hm as the sole shareholder in a professional service corporation, was not a corporate expense and therefore could be recoverable as damages for lost profits in this breach of contract action. Plaintiff, a radiation oncologist, successfully sued the hospital for […]

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7/8 INCH HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE FLOOR AND DOORWAY THRESHOLD WAS DEEMED TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE NYC BUILDING CODE, WHICH REQUIRES A HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL OF NO MORE THAN 1/2 INCH, DID NOT APPLY TO THE HOME PURCHASED IN 1980 (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the 7/8 height-differential between the floor and the threshold was trivial as a matter of law in thus slip and fall case. The court noted that the NYC Building Code, which requires a height-differential of no more than 1/2 inch did not apply to the home which […]

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THE “REFRAIN FROM GANG-RELATED ASSOCIATIONS” PROBATION CONDITIONS WERE STRUCK BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH GANGS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a probation condition imposed by the court must be stricken because it was not shown to be related to “defendant’s rehabilitative prospects:”​ Defendant’s challenges to two of his probation conditions as unrelated to his rehabilitation do not require preservation and survive his waiver of the right to […]

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IN THIS EJECTMENT ACTION, DEFENDANT-TENANT’S “FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,” “WAIVER,” “CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION,” “BREACH OF COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT,” “IMPROPER NOTICE OF DEFAULT,” AND “TRESPASS” AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined several affirmative defenses in this ejectment action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff landlord sought to eject defendant tenant from a parking lot for nonpayment of rent. Defendant alleged, and plaintiff acknowledged, plaintiff had rented certain parking spaces to a third party. The Second Department held: (1) […]

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ALTHOUGH CONTRACTING COVID-19 IS COMPENSABLE UNDER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, HERE THE PROOF THAT CLAIMANT CONTRACTED COVID-19 BECAUSE OF WORKPLACE EXPOSURE WAS INSUFFICIENT (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the record did not support the finding that claimant, a school custodian, contracted COVID-19 from workplace exposure. The decision is fact-specific. Claimant had little contact with students during his work hours and there were other possible sources of infection: We acknowledge that “the contraction of COVID-19 […]

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THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES’ (DCJS’S) DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER WAS TERMINATED “FOR CAUSE” WAS CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS; THE DETERMINATION WAS REVERSED AS “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS” (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, held the Division of Criminal Justice Services’ (DCJS’s) determination that petitioner police officer was terminated “for cause,” in the face of a consent order and evidence demonstrating petitioner resigned, was arbitrary and capricious.  The opinion is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized […]

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PETITIONER, A TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUAL, WAS ENTITLED, FOR PERSONAL SAFETY REASONS, TO THE SEALING OF THE RECORD OF HER NAME-CHANGE PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, a transgender individual, was entitled, for her personal safety, to the sealing of the record of her name-change proceeding: We analyzed Civil Rights Law § 64-a in Matter of Cody VV. (Brandi VV.) (226 AD3d 24 [3d Dept 2024]). There, Supreme Court — the same justice — denied an […]

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THE WAS NO PROOF DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA RISK-LEVEL HEARING; ORDER REVERSED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the SORA risk-level determination, held that the record did not establish that defendant waived his right to be present at the risk-level hearing: “A sex offender facing risk level classification under SORA has a due process right to be present at the SORA hearing” (… see Correction Law § 168-n[3]). “To establish […]

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THE REFEREE’S REPORT WAS BASED UPON BUSINESS RECORDS WHICH WERE NOT PRODUCED; PROOF OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT WAS BASED UPON BUSINESS RECORDS FOR WHICH NO FOUNDATION WAS LAID; THE MOTION TO CONFIRM THE REFEREE’S REPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should not have been confirmed because the report was based upon business records which were not produced. In addition defendant’s default was based upon records for which no foundation was laid: “The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the […]

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THE PROCESS SERVER KNEW WHERE DEFENDANT LIVED AND WORKED AND MADE SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO SERVE DEFENDANT AT HOME; WITHOUT MAKING ANY ATTEMPT TO SERVE DEFENDANT AT WORK, THE PROCESS SERVER RESORTED TO “NAIL AND MAIL;” THE PROCESS SERVER DID NOT DEMONTRATE “DUE DILIGENCE;” THE COURT NEVER ACQUIRED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined the process server did not demonstrate due diligence in attempting to serve defendant, therefore the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction: “Service of process upon a natural person must be made in strict compliance with the statutory methods of service set forth in CPLR […]

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