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You are here: Home1 / Administrative Law2 / THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES’ (DCJS’S) DETERMINATION...
Administrative Law, Employment Law, Evidence

THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES’ (DCJS’S) DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER WAS TERMINATED “FOR CAUSE” WAS CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS; THE DETERMINATION WAS REVERSED AS “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS” (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, held the Division of Criminal Justice Services’ (DCJS’s) determination that petitioner police officer was terminated “for cause,” in the face of a consent order and evidence demonstrating petitioner resigned, was arbitrary and capricious.  The opinion is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here:​

In its brief on appeal, DCJS states that it “interprets this regulation as requiring a causal nexus between the allegations of misconduct and the officer’s subsequent separation from service.” Although that is a facially rational interpretation of the regulation, DCJS’ determination that that is what occurred here lacks a sound basis in reason and disregards the facts … . Indeed, during the review process, DCJS had before it a copy of the consent award, which clearly stated that petitioner would be reinstated in good standing upon serving his suspension. Although the Police Chief claimed that petitioner never returned to work after the suspension period was over, petitioner submitted documentary evidence demonstrating the inaccuracy of that representation. Moreover, DCJS knew that the Police Chief had characterized petitioner’s separation from employment as a “standard resignation” … and that the consent award did not contain any provision precluding petitioner from seeking employment with the Schenectady County Sheriff’s Department, thereby raising a question as to the sincerity of the Police Chief’s representation [to that effect], as well as his subsequent “for cause” report. In these circumstances, it should have been clear to DCJS that the misconduct allegations were fully resolved upon petitioner serving his suspension and, therefore, the Police Chief’s subsequent reporting that petitioner resigned “in connection with allegations of misconduct” was materially inaccurate. Matter of Ferretti v New York State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., 2025 NY Slip Op 06000, Third Dept 10-30-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when an administrative agency’s determination will be found “arbitrary and capricious.” Here the agency relied on representations by a police chief which were contradicted by the facts.

 

October 30, 2025
Tags: Third Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-30 11:04:512025-11-02 11:35:53THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES’ (DCJS’S) DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER WAS TERMINATED “FOR CAUSE” WAS CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS; THE DETERMINATION WAS REVERSED AS “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS” (THIRD DEPT).
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