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THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE NOT INTERTWINED; THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; IN RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, THE JUDGE PROPERLY TOLD THEM THEY COULD FIND THAT THE ACCIDENT DID NOT HAPPEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the verdict finding the defendant negligent but that the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident should not have been set aside. The plaintiff alleged repair to the steering mechanism of his van was […]

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ALTHOUGH THE LEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BY THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) THE OWNERS OF THE LLC SIGNED A PARAGRAPH AGREEING TO GUARANTEE THE PAYMENT OF THE RENT; THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL OWNERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the lease was entered into by the limited liability company (LLC), the owners of the LLC signed as personal guarantors of the rent payments. Therefore the breach of contract action against the individual owners should not have been dismissed: “An agent executing a contract on behalf […]

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DEFENDANT AND A WITNESS SAID THE LIGHT WAS RED, PLAINTIFF SAID THE LIGHT WAS GREEN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED, CREDIBILTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this intersection bicycle-vehicle accident case, reminds us that credibility plays no role in a summary judgment ruling. Plaintiff, the bicyclist, alleged he entered the intersection with a green light. Defendant and a witness alleged plaintiff entered the intersection against a red light. The conflicting evidence required denial of […]

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TO DEFEAT A CPLR 3215(C) MOTION TO DISMISS AN ACTION AS ABANDONED, “SUFFICIENT CAUSE” FOR A DELAY IN MAKING A MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED, NOT THE CASE HERE; THE DISSENTERS ARGUED PARTICIPATION IN THE LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER PARTIES DEMONSTRATED THERE WAS NO INTENT TO ABANDON THE ACTION; THE MAJORITY REJECTED THE DISSENTERS’ ARGUMENT, IN PART BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development’s (HPD’s) motion to dismiss the action against it by defendant Cliffcrest as abandoned should have been granted. The two dissenters relied on an argument not raised in Supreme Court: The motion court should have granted HPD’s motion to dismiss the […]

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PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR SPECIFIED DISCOVERY IN OPPOSITION TO AN “ANTI-SLAPP-LAW” MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the request for specified discovery made by plaintiffs with respect to the SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public petition and participation) defense should have been granted: … [I]n opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss … , plaintiffs made an alternative request for specified discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211(g)(3). In […]

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VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEWS OF RESPONDENT FATHER’S CHILDREN LED TO CRIMINAL SEXUAL ABUSE CHARGES AGAINST FATHER WHICH WERE DISMISSED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF WITNESS COOPERATION; THE VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEWS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE SEALING REQUIREMENT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND CAN BE USED IN A FAMILY COURT PROCEEDING ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY FATHER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gonzalez, determined that videotaped interviews respondent father’s children by the Manhattan Child Advocacy Center (CAC) are not subject to sealing under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)  160.50 and therefore can be presented in a Family Court proceeding brought by the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) alleging sexual […]

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THE “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY RETAINING THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S BURGLARY PROSECUTION IN COUNTY COURT WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED; THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO FAMILY COURT; THE CRITERIA FOR RETENTION IN COUNTY COURT ARE EXPLAINED IN DEPTH (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Powers, determined the People did not demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances’ justifying retaining the 17-year-old defendant’s burglary case in County Court. The matter should have been transferred to Family Court: … [W]e agree with the Second Department’s conclusion that the Legislature intended for adolescent offenders […]

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THE DEFENDANT HOSPITAL, CREMATORY AND FUNERAL CHAPEL RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY DECEDENT’S DOMESTIC PARTNER; PLAINTIFFS, DECEDENT’S ADULT CHILDREN, RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE DOMESTIC PARTNER UNTIL A MONTH AFTER DEATH; THE “INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS OF SEPULCHER” ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this “infringement of rights of sepulcher” proceeding should have been granted. The defendant hospital, crematory (Greenwood) and funeral chapel (Ackerman) relied in good faith on information provided by the decedent’s “alleged domestic partner,” Ms. Taddeo. Plaintiffs, the adult children of the decedent, […]

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RENEW THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WHEN ADDITIONAL GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELEASED TO THE DEFENSE BECAUSE THE JUDGE HAD REVIEWED THE ENTIRE GRAND JURY MINUTES BEFORE DENYING THE MOTION; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE MOTION COURT WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED FROM ANOTHER ARGUMENT BASED ON THE NEWLY RELEASED EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming defendant’s conviction over a two-justice dissent, determined defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew the defense motion to dismiss the indictment after additional grand jury testimony was released. The majority concluded there was no new evidence to support a motion to renew because the judge reviewed all the grand […]

THE 2022 AMENDMENT TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 111 REQUIRING CONSENT TO ADOPTION BY A NONMARITAL FATHER WHO HAS ACKNOWLEDGED PATERNITY APPLIES RETROATIVELY; TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice O’Neill Levy, reversing Family Court, vacating the termination of respondent father’s parental rights, determined the 2022 amendment of Domestic Relations Law section 111 requiring consent for adoption by a nonmarital parent who has acknowledged paternity applied retroactively to this proceeding: Domestic Relations Law § 111 was […]

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