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IN ORDER TO KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE DEFENDANT NEED NOT BE INFORMED OF HIS MAXIMUM SENTENCING EXPOSURE IN YEARS; THE “SPEEDY TRIAL” TIME ASSOCIATED WITH THE JOINDER OF A CO-DEFENDANT FOR TRIAL IS CHARGED TO THE DEFENDANT, EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT YET BEEN ARRAIGNED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, affirming the Appellate Division, determined (1) in order to effectively waive the right to counsel, a defendant need not be informed of his maximum sentencing exposure in years, and (2) the pre-arraignment delay associated with the joinder […]

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AFTER TWO MENTIONS OF THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR AN ATTORNEY WHICH DID NOT AMOUNT TO AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST, THE DEFENDANT STATED “THAT’S WHAT I WANT A LAWYER FOR,” HE WAS “SCARED TO TALK,” AND HE “COULD STILL COOPERATE LATER;” THOSE STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY THE POLICE AS A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined statements made by defendant after he invoked his right to counsel should have been suppressed: In the course of the investigators’ questioning of defendant, they transitioned away from asking defendant about his flight from the police and turned to the underlying domestic violence incident. When they began […]

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THE DELAY IN PRODUCING THE DEFENDANT FOR ARRAIGNMENT AFTER THE PEOPLE BECAME AWARE HE WAS IN CUSTODY WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PEOPLE (A “CONTRADICTORY HOLDING” BY THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT WAS NOTED); DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the People were not timely ready for trial and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal on “speedy trial” grounds: … [T]he People became aware that defendant was in the custody of DOCCS at the May 13, 2019 appearance, and they […]

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR AN INTOXICATION JURY INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the denial of defendant’s request for the intoxication jury instruction was reversible error: … County Court improperly refused to instruct the jury as to the defense of intoxication. “An intoxication charge is warranted if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is sufficient […]

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the denial of defendant’s request for a cross-racial identification jury instruction was reversible error: As held by the Court of Appeals in People v Boone (30 NY3d 521 [2017]), “when identification is an issue in a criminal case and the identifying witness and defendant appear […]

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IN THIS “ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON” AND “FALSIYFING BUSINESS RECORDS” PROSECUTION, THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO A RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED AFTER A HEARING OF WHICH HE HAD NOTICE AND IN WHICH HE COULD HAVE PARTICIPATED; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE HIS ANSWERING “NO” TO THE QUESTION WHETHER HE WAS SUBJECT TO A RESTRAINING ORDER WAS FALSE; CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department reversed defendant’s “attempted criminal possession of a weapon” and “falsifying business records” convictions as against the weight of the evidence. Defendant, when attempting to purchase a shotgun, answered “no” to the question whether he was subject to a court order. Although restraining orders were produced by the People, there was no proof […]

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THE NEARLY THREE-YEAR GAP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF’S KNEE SURGERY AND HIS SEEING THE SURGEON TO COMPLAIN OF KNEE PAIN DID NOT PRECLUDE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact about whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to render the action timely. Plaintiff had knee surgery and did not see the surgeon again for nearly three years when he experienced pain. He had not seen any other orthopedic surgeons in the […]

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THE WARRANT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO MORE THAN 1100 SHARES OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION’S STOCK WAS APPENDED TO PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT; THE TWO CONTRACTS DID NOT MERGE AND ANY ALLEGED BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BY PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRECLUDE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WARRANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Oing, affirming Supreme Court, determined that the Warrant was a separate contract entitling plaintiff to 1,148 shares of defendant corporation, SPI. SPI argued the Employment Contract and the Warrant merged forming a single contract and plaintiff’s breach of the Employment Contract precluded recovery on the Warrant. […]

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DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S ALLEGED BEHAVIOR PRIOR TO THE VERDICT; THE ALLEGED BEHAVIOR WAS NOT SO WRONGFUL OR PERVASIVE AS TO JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the verdict based on the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel should have been denied because (1) no motion for a mistrial was made before the verdict, and (2) counsel’s behavior was not so wrongful and pervasive as to justify setting aside the verdict in […]

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THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S (DOH’S) UPDATED GUIDELINES WHICH PROHIBIT PHYSCIANS WHO TREAT CANCER PATIENTS FROM DISPENSING MEDICATIONS WHICH ADDRESS THE SIDE EFFECTS OF CANCER TREATMENTS ARE “IRRATIONAL” (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the NYS Department of Health’s (DOH’s) definition of “oncological protocol” was irrational. The petitioner provides physician-care to cancer patients, including Medicaid recipients. Physicians who provide care to cancer patients can dispense medications (72-hour supplies) pursuant to the DOH’s “oncological protocol.” In […]

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