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BANK’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW AND REARGUE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion to renew and reargue in this foreclosure action should not have been granted:

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A motion for leave to renew must be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination and must contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion (see CPLR 2221[e][2]). While a court has discretion to entertain renewal based on facts known to the movant at the time of the original motion, the movant must set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to submit the information in the first instance  … . Renewal “is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation” … . …

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A motion for leave to reargue is similarly directed to the trial court’s discretion and, to warrant reargument, the moving party must demonstrate that the court overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts or misapplied law (see CPLR 2221[d] …). Here, … the court, in its initial determination, did not overlook or misapprehend relevant facts or misapply the law in deciding that [the bank] had failed to meet its prima facie burden on the issue of standing, thus requiring denial of its motion … . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Jeffrey Novis, 2018 NY Slip Op 00281, Second Dept 1-17-18

FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, BANK’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW AND REARGUE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (BANK’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW AND REARGUE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT)).CPLR 2221 (BANK’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW AND REARGUE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the affidavit of merit submitted by the bank did not demonstrate the affiant had the authority to act on the bank’s behalf:

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“Where, as here, a foreclosure complaint is not verified, CPLR 3215(f) states, among other things, that upon any application for a judgment by default, proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default, and the amount due are to be set forth in an affidavit made by the party” … . Here, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of merit executed by the Vice President of Loan Documentation for the plaintiff’s purported “servicer.” However, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the Vice President of Loan Documentation had the authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for leave to enter a default judgment … and for an order of reference, with leave to renew upon proper papers … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A.. v Cooper, 2018 NY Slip Op 00280, Second Dept 1-17-18

FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, , AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, FORECLOSURE, AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (FORECLOSURE, AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPRL 3215  (FORECLOSURE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, , AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provisions of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) in this foreclosure action. Therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

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The plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or any proof of mailing by the post office demonstrating that it properly served the defendant pursuant to the terms of the statute … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of a vice president for loan documentation of the loan servicer was insufficient to establish that the notice was sent to the defendant in the manner required by RPAPL 1304, as the loan servicer did not provide proof of a standard office mailing procedure and provided no independent proof of the actual mailing … .

The Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with RPAPL 1304. The defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, submitting, inter alia, his own affidavit attesting that he did not receive any notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Henry, 2018 NY Slip Op 00326, Second Dept 1-17-18

FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW 1304, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provisions of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). Therefore the bank’s summary judgment motion should not have been granted:

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… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with the requirements of RPAPL 1304 … .. In moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Jason Ussery, a representative of its loan servicer, who stated that “[a]t least 90 days prior to the commencement of the action, notice was sent to Defendant by certified mail and first class mail to the last known address of the Defendant and, if different, to the residence that is the subject of the mortgage.” Ussery annexed copies of the 90-day notices mailed to the defendant, all of which contained a bar code with a 20-digit number below it, but no language indicating that a mailing was done by first-class or certified mail, or even that a mailing was done by the U.S. Postal Service … . Moreover, Ussery did not make the requisite showing that he was familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish “proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Zavolunov, 2018 NY Slip Op 00271, Second Dept 1-17-18

FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW 1304, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, NOTICE, BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW 1304, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should have made the findings to enable a child to petition for special immigrant juvenile status:

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… [T]he record supports a finding that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not viable due to parental neglect and abandonment … . The child testified that, while in El Salvador, although he was approached by gang members to join their gang during his walk to school, his parents did not make any arrangements for his transportation to and from school to ensure his safety or do anything to deter such recruitment activities although aware of such activities and the fact that a neighborhood boy, who resisted the gang’s efforts, was killed while traveling to another village … . Moreover, the child testified that his parents strongly encouraged him to leave the family home in El Salvador but did not provide alternate living arrangements and have not supported him since his arrival in New York.

Accordingly, the Family Court should have granted the petitioner’s motion for the issuance of an order, inter alia, making specific findings so as to enable the child to petition for SIJS. Since the record is sufficient for this Court to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not viable due to parental neglect and abandonment. Matter of Nelson A. G.-L. (Maria Y. G. S.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00289, Second Dept 1-17-18

FAMILY LAW (SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (FAMILY LAW, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))

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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the juvenile delinquency petition was jurisdictionally defective and dismissed it:

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For the petition, or a count thereof, to be sufficient on its face, the factual part of the petition or of any supporting depositions must set forth sworn, nonhearsay allegations sufficient to establish, if true, every element of each crime charged and the alleged delinquent’s commission thereof … . Such allegations must be set forth in the petition and/or the supporting depositions … . The failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition or count … . Here, neither the petition nor the supporting deposition provided sworn, nonhearsay allegations as to the appellant’s age, which is an element of the crime of unlawful possession of weapons by persons under 16 … . Matter of Ricki I., 2018 NY Slip Op 00291, Second Dept 1-17-18

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (FAMILY LAW, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/WEAPON, UNLAWFUL POSSESSION (FAMILY LAW, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS DESPITE HER VIOLATION OF TERMS OF SUSPENDED JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the record did not support the termination of mother’s parental rights based on a violation of the terms of a suspended judgment:

Here, a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that the mother failed to comply with certain conditions set forth in the suspended judgment. However, the evidence did not support the Family Court’s conclusion that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the mother’s parental rights … .

,,, [T]he testimony elicited at the hearing demonstrated that the children emphatically wanted to be with the mother, that the mother regularly visited with the children until the court suspended all contact, and that there is a strong bond between the children and their mother. Further, the mother had not used illegal substances for a substantial period of time, was committed to her recovery, regularly attended AA meetings, completed programs related to issues of anger and domestic violence, obtained an order of protection against her abuser, and engaged in mental health treatment. In addition, while the court determined that the mother violated the terms of the suspended judgment, in large part, based on a finding that she failed to comply with a provision mandating ongoing involvement in a specified parenting class, the mother completed that class prior to the conclusion of the hearing.

Under these facts, we find that termination of the mother’s parental rights was not in the best interests of the children … . Matter of Skyler G. (Heather G.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00288, Second Dept 1-17-18

FAMILY LAW (PARENTAL RIGHTS, RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS DESPITE HER VIOLATION OF TERMS OF SUSPENDED JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/PARENTAL RIGHTS, TERMINATION (RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS DESPITE HER VIOLATION OF TERMS OF SUSPENDED JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/SUSPENDED JUDGMENT (FAMILY LAW, PARENTAL RIGHTS, RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS DESPITE HER VIOLATION OF TERMS OF SUSPENDED JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the findings of the NYS Division of Human Rights (SDHR) in this sex discrimination action should not be disturbed. The SDHR found that petitioner was not subjected to a hostile work environment and was not constructively discharged because of her sex. The Second Department explained the court’s limited review power in this context:

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The scope of judicial review under the Human Rights Law is extremely narrow and is confined to the consideration of whether the determination of the SDHR is supported by substantial evidence in the record… . Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact . . . More than seeming or imaginary, it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” … .. “Courts may not weigh the evidence or reject [the SDHR’s] determination where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists” … . Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s determination that the petitioner was not subjected to a hostile work environment or constructively discharged because of her sex … . Matter of Leippe v Gerald J. Wilkoff, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00294, Second Dept 1-17-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  (STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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2014 COUNTY COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE 2016 COUNTY COMMITTEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the 2014 County Committee (of the Conservative Party) did not have the authority to fill vacancies in the 2016 County Committee. Only the 2016 County Committee had that authority:

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The filling of vacancies in a political party’s county committee is governed by Election Law § 2-118, which provides, in pertinent part, that, in the case of a failure to elect a member of the committee, the vacancy created thereby shall be filled by the remaining members of the committee. Therefore, only the 2016 County Committee had the authority to fill the subject vacancies.

With the election of the 2016 County Committee in the primary election, the 2014 County Committee had no further official authority, and no rule of the 2014 County Committee could extend the authority of its executive committee to continue to exercise functions in substantial matters after the members of the 2016 County Committee had been elected … . The filling of vacancies for the 2016 County Committee was a “substantial matter,” and therefore the actions of the 2014 Executive Committee in filling vacancies in the 2016 County Committee were improper … . Matter of Brocato v Tinari, 2018 NY Slip Op 00286, Second Dept 1-17-18

ELECTION LAW (2014 COUNTY COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE 2016 COUNTY COMMITTEE (SECOND DEPT))

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UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, applying a weight of the evidence analysis, determined the defendant had demonstrated he was not responsible for the criminal acts by reason mental disease or defect. Both the defense and the prosecution presented expert opinion evidence on the “not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect” affirmative defense. The Second Department found that the defense expert, who was experienced in forensic examinations (the prosecution expert was not) proved the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence:

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In conducting our weight of the evidence review where a defendant relies solely upon the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, we first determine whether a finding of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect would have been reasonable. If we answer that question in the affirmative, then we must weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, and evaluate the strength of such conclusions in order to decide whether the defendant met his burden of proving the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect by the preponderance of evidence … .

Given the conflicting expert opinions, as well as the witness testimony and psychiatric records, a finding of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect would have been reasonable. Weighing the opinion of the defense expert, who was an experienced forensic psychiatrist, against the opinion of the prosecution expert, a clinical neuropsychologist with limited experience in forensics, the defense expert’s opinion was more convincing, and entitled to more weight. The defense expert’s opinion better accounted for the witnesses’ testimony regarding their observations of the defendant’s increasingly bizarre behavior and onset of mental illness which began to exhibit itself just weeks before the incident, and continued during and after the incident until the defendant was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. The defense expert’s opinion was further corroborated by the defendant’s subsequent psychiatric diagnosis and history. People v Hernandez-Beltre, 2018 NY Slip Op 00307, Second Dept 1-17-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW,  MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (CRIMINAL LAW, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT PROVED HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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