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Best Interest of the Incapacitated Person Justified Removal of Guardian of Person and Property

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly exercised its broad discretion in granting the cross-motion to remove the guardian of Helen S.’ person and property (pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law 81.35). Helen S. testified that the guardian yelled and screamed at her, made her very nervous and upset causing her body to shake, and causing her to throw up. The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

A guardian may be removed pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.35 when ” the guardian fails to comply with an order, is guilty of misconduct, or for any other cause which to the court shall appear just'” … . “The trial court is accorded considerable discretion in determining whether a guardian should be replaced,” and the “overarching concern remains the best interest of the incapacitated person” … .  Matter of Helen S. (Falero), 2015 NY Slip Op 06153, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Evidence of Post-Accident Elevator-Repairs Not Discoverable

The Second Department determined plaintiff, who was injured in an elevator accident, was not entitled to the post-accident elevator-repair records. Such records are only discoverable if there is a question about whether a defendant actually maintains or has control over an instrumentality, not the case here:

CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof” … . “[E]vidence of subsequent repairs is not discoverable or admissible in a negligence case” … . An exception to this rule applies if a defendant’s maintenance of, or control over, the subject instrumentality is at issue … .

Here, the plaintiff moved to compel production of post-accident repair records generated during the three-year period between the date of the plaintiff’s accident and the date of the inspection of the subject elevator by the plaintiff’s expert. Yet it is undisputed that the defendant exercised maintenance and control over the elevator. Graham v Kone, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 06111, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Once the Insurer Shows an Exclusion to Coverage Applies, the Burden is on the Insured to Demonstrate an Exception to the Exclusion Applies

In finding the insurer was properly awarded summary judgment, the Second Department explained the burdens of proof re: exclusions from coverage (burden on insurer) and exceptions to exclusions from coverage (burden on insured):

“In determining a dispute over insurance coverage, we first look to the language of the policy” … . Although the insurer has the burden of proving the applicability of an exclusion …, it is the insured’s burden to establish the existence of coverage … . Thus, “[where] the existence of coverage depends entirely on the applicability of [an] exception to the exclusion, the insured has the duty of demonstrating that it has been satisfied” … .

The defendant [insurer] established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating the applicability of an exclusion in the plaintiff’s policy … . … [T]he plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the applicability of an exception to the exclusion … . Copacabana Realty, LLC v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2015 NY Slip Op 06106, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Striking Answer for Spoliation of Evidence Too Severe a Sanction—Spoliation Was Not “Willful or Contumacious,” Both Parties Were Prejudiced by the Loss, Plaintiff Was Not Deprived of Means of Proving the Claim

The Second Department determined striking the defendant’s answer was too severe a sanction for spoliation of evidence which was not “willful or contumacious.”  Plaintiff was injured attempting to use a tranquilizer gun. The gun was sent out for repairs after the incident and a portion of the gun was not found after a diligent search.  The sanction was too severe because both parties were prejudiced by the loss and the loss did not deprive plaintiff of the means of proving his claim:

Under the common-law doctrine of spoliation, a party may be sanctioned where it negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence (see CPLR 3126…). “The nature and severity of the sanction depends upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the knowledge and intent of the spoliator, the existence of proof of an explanation for the loss of the evidence, and the degree of prejudice to the opposing party” … .

“The party requesting sanctions for spoilation has the burden of demonstrating that a litigant intentionally or negligently disposed of critical evidence, and fatally compromised its ability to'” prove its claim or defense … . However, ” striking a pleading is a drastic sanction to impose in the absence of willful or contumacious conduct'” and, thus, the courts must ” consider the prejudice that resulted from the spoliation to determine whether such drastic relief is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness'” … . When the moving party is still able to establish or defend a case, a less severe sanction is appropriate …. Furthermore, where the plaintiffs and the defendants are equally affected by the loss of the evidence in their investigation of the accident, and neither have reaped an unfair advantage in the litigation, it is improper to dismiss or strike a pleading on the basis of spoliation of evidence … .

The determination of the appropriate sanction for spoliation is within the broad discretion of the court … . This Court will substitute its judgment for that of the Supreme Court only if that court’s discretion was improvidently exercised … .

Here, the Supreme Court, upon renewal and reargument, improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing the sanction of striking the City defendants’ answer, as the plaintiff failed to establish that the City defendants’ failure to preserve the subject tranquilizer gun was willful or contumacious … , or that their conduct deprived him of the means of proving his claim … . The City defendants’ repair of the subject gun prejudiced all parties, but does not prevent the plaintiff from proving his claim … . Morales v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06121, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Most Important Among the Criteria for Allowing a Late Notice of Claim Is the Municipality’s Timely Knowledge of the Essential Facts Underlying the Claim (Not Met Here)

In finding Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff’s petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the Second Department explained the relevant criteria, noting it is most important that the municipality have timely knowledge of the actual facts underlying the claim:

“In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits” … . “While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance” … . The determination to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court … . Matter of Barrett v Village of Wappingers Falls, 2015 NY Slip Op 06138, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Defendant Did Not Waive the Statute of Limitations Defense, Pled In Its Answer, by Failing to Assert It in a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss—Although Defendant’s Post-Answer Motion Was Ostensibly Brought Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the Parties Laid Bare Their Proof and Supreme Court Properly Treated the Motion as One for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CPLR 3212 Seeking Dismissal of the Complaint as Time-Barred

The Second Department determined defendant did not waive its statute of limitations defense, asserted in its answer, by not making a pre-answer motion to dismiss. Although defendant’s subsequent motion was ostensibly brought pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the parties laid bare their proof. Therefore Supreme Court properly treated the motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, seeking to dismiss the complaint as time-barred:

Initially, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendant did not waive its statute of limitations defense, asserted in its answer, by failing to make a pre-answer motion to dismiss … . Rather, a statute of limitations defense may be asserted after joinder of issue in a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 … . Although the defendant’s motion was made pursuant to 3211(a)(5), the parties clearly charted a summary judgment course by submitting extensive documentary evidence and factual affidavits laying bare their proof … . Thus, the defendant’s motion is properly treated as a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred … . Meredith v Siben & Siben, LLP, 2015 NY Slip Op 06120, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Criteria for Vicarious Liability of Hospital for Actions of Non-Employee Physician Explained (Not Met Here)

The Second Department determined summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted to defendant hospital. The suit against the hospital was based upon the actions of a non-employee physician chosen by the plaintiff.  The Second Department succinctly explained the theories under which a hospital may be liable for the actions of a non-employee physician (none of which applied here):

Generally speaking, a hospital may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a private attending physician chosen by the patient … . Moreover, so long as the resident physicians and nurses employed by the hospital have merely carried out that private attending physician’s orders, a hospital may not be held vicariously liable for resulting injuries … . These rules will not, however, shield a hospital from liability in three situations. The first is when the private physician’s orders “so greatly deviate from normal medical practice that [the hospital’s employees] should be held liable for failing to intervene” … . Put another way, a hospital may be held liable when the staff follows orders despite knowing “that the doctor’s orders are so clearly contraindicated by normal practice that ordinary prudence requires inquiry into the correctness of the orders” … . Second, a hospital may be held liable when its employees have committed independent acts of negligence … . Third, a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of a private, nonemployee physician on a theory of ostensible or apparent agency … . Doria v Benisch, 2015 NY Slip Op 06109, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Defendant Did Not Waive the Statute of Limitations Defense, Pled In Its Answer, by Failing to Assert It in a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss—Although Defendant’s Post-Answer Motion Was Ostensibly Brought Pursuant to CPLR 3211 Instead of 3212, the Procedural Irregularity Should Have Been Excused under CPLR 2001

The Second Department explained there is no requirement that a statute of limitations defense be raised solely in a pre-answer motion to dismiss.  The defense may be asserted in the answer, and subsequently raised in a summary judgment motion or at trial. Although defendant’s post-answer motion was ostensibly brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 instead of 3212, the procedural irregularity should have been excused under CPLR 2001:

CPLR 3211(a) permits a defendant who wishes to raise a defense based on the statute of limitations to do so by way of a motion to dismiss. That section provides, in relevant part, that “[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him [or her] on the ground that . . . the cause of action may not be maintained because of [the] statute of limitations” (CPLR 3211[a][5]). CPLR 3211(e) provides that the defendant may make the motion to dismiss before its answer is required to be served, or may include the defense in its answer and seek relief later. When the defendant does neither, the defense is waived.

“At any time before service of the responsive pleading is required, a party may move on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) . . . . Any objection or defense based upon a ground set forth in paragraph[ ] five . . . of subdivision (a) is waived unless raised either by such motion or in the responsive pleading” (CPLR 3211[e]).

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, a defendant who wishes to assert the statute of limitations as a defense is not limited to asserting it by way of a pre-answer motion. The defendant may instead choose to raise that defense in its answer, and either move on that ground later in a motion for summary judgment, or wait until trial to have it determined … .

Here, the defendant did not make a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint, but raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its answer. Then, after the note of issue was filed, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground. Although the defendant denominated its motion as a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, rather than as a motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, that procedural irregularity should have been excused under CPLR 2001, upon proper notice to the parties … . Wan Li Situ v MTA Bus Co., 2015 NY Slip Op 06130, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Court of Claims Must Determine the Interests of All Parties Named by the Attorney General as Potentially Entitled to Payment for a Taking by the State—Therefore a Claimant Must Join all the Parties Named by the Attorney General

The Second Department explained the procedure under the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) for determining how to apportion payment for a taking when there is a dispute about which parties are entitled to payment. Under the EDPL and the Court of Claims Act, the Court of Claims must determine the interests of all parties named by the Attorney General as having a possible claim. Therefore a claimant must join all the named parties in any action seeking payment:

EDPL 304(E)(1) … provides that when the Attorney General determines that there is a conflict with regard to the person or persons legally entitled to receive payment for the value of property acquired by the State through the power of eminent domain, he or she shall request the Comptroller to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account “to be distributed as ordered by the Court of Claims on application of any person claiming an interest in the amount” (EDPL 304[E][1]). The statute further provides that the procedure to be employed in connection with such an application “shall be the same as provided in [Court of Claims Act § 23],” and that “[n]o judgment of distribution shall be made unless the court shall first obtain personal jurisdiction over all persons certified by the Attorney General as having or claiming to have an interest in the fund” (EDPL 304[E][1]).

The claimant argues, in effect, that Mazur Brothers, Inc. (hereinafter MBI), an entity that the Attorney General has determined has a possible interest in the subject proceeds, does not in fact have any such interest and that, therefore, the claimant was under no obligation to join MBI as a party to this claim. In advancing this argument, however, the claimant essentially asked the Court of Claims to assume the very fact that is the ultimate fact that must be proven, namely, that MBI has no interest in the money deposited by the Comptroller. Without jurisdiction over MBI, it would have been improper for the Court of Claims to grant the relief requested by the claimant in connection with this claim. Indeed, as the claimant appears to have recognized, its remedy, under these circumstances, lies in a special distribution proceeding pursuant to EDPL 304 … . Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06119, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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Defendant Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees after Plaintiff’s Motion for a Voluntary Discontinuance in a Foreclosure Action Was Granted Without Prejudice—Defendant Was Not a “Prevailing Party” within the Meaning of Real Property Law 282—Denial of Attorney’s Fees Was Not an Abuse of Discretion Under CPLR 3217 (c)

After the grant of plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary discontinuance (without prejudice) of a foreclosure action defendant (Rivera) sought the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Real Property Law 282 and CPLR 3217 (b). The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied the request for attorney’s fees. Under the Real Property Law, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees, but plaintiff’s voluntary discontinuance was not on the merits.  Therefore defendant was not the prevailing party within the meaning of the statute. The award of attorney’s fees under CPLR 3217 (b) is discretionary and Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request:

In New York, “attorneys’ fees are deemed incidental to litigation and may not be recovered unless supported by statute, court rule or written agreement of the parties” … .

[Real Property Law 282] provides that “[w]henever a covenant contained in a mortgage on residential real property shall provide that . . . the mortgagee may recover attorneys’ fees and/or expenses incurred as the result of the failure of the mortgagor to perform any covenant or agreement contained in such mortgage . . . there shall be implied in such mortgage a covenant by the mortgagee to pay to the mortgagor the reasonable attorneys’ fees and/or expenses incurred by the mortgagor . . . in the successful defense of any action or proceeding commenced by the mortgagee against the mortgagor arising out of the contract” (Real Property Law § 282). * * *

Here, the voluntary discontinuance of this action pursuant to CPLR 3217(c) was without prejudice and there was no substantive determination on the merits of either the plaintiff’s cause of action or Rivera’s counterclaims and defenses. Accordingly, Rivera was not a prevailing party for the purposes of Real Property Law § 282 and was not entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee for a “successful defense” of this foreclosure action (Real Property Law § 282…).

* * * The determination of whether to award an attorney’s fee [pursuant to CPLR 3217 (c)] as a condition of granting a voluntary discontinuance is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court … . Here, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of Rivera’s motion which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) … . DKR Mtge. Asset Trust 1 v Rivera, 2015 NY Slip Op 06108, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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