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HEART ATTACK DEEMED WORK-RELATED.

The Third Department determined substantial evidence supported the conclusion decedent-worker's heart attack was employment-related. Decedent suffered the heart attack while walking to a storage structure in freezing temperatures:

[T]he testimony and evidence in the record demonstrates that shortly before decedent collapsed, he was instructed to add insulation in an attempt to fix the frozen valve and, to do so, traveled outside at night across snow-covered ground in freezing temperatures to locate and retrieve additional insulation from a storage structure located at least 500 feet away. In addition, Thomas Martin, the lead process operator, explained in his testimony that if decedent and his colleague were unable to quickly fix the frozen valve that evening, the glycol treatment facility at the airport would have “shut[] down.” Based upon the foregoing, Raymond Basri, a doctor specializing in internal medicine with 25 years of experience in diagnostic cardiology who reviewed decedent's medical records, opined that decedent's work activities immediately prior to his collapse, in combination with the environmental conditions at that time and the physical and emotional stress associated with having to assist with the timely repair of the frozen valve, were significant contributing factors to decedent's acute myocardial infarction and resulting death. Matter of Kilcullen v AfFCO/Avports Mgt. LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 03033, 3rd Dept 4-21-16


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RADIATION THERAPIST WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS, DESPITE INDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR DESIGNATION IN THE AGREEMENT.

The Third Department determined a licensed radiation therapist (RT) was an employee of La Cruz Radiation Consultants and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, despite the use of the term “independent contractor” in the relevant agreement:

La Cruz screened the RTs' credentials and assigned them to its clients to provide radiation therapy services, directing them where and when to report. La Cruz paid the RTs a set rate of $50 per hour, did not take payroll deductions from their salary and issued 1099 tax forms; La Cruz required that the RTs submit to it biweekly time sheets signed by the client's supervisor, and La Cruz, in turn, billed the clients an increased price for the RTs' services and collected all payments from the client. Once assigned, the client determined the RTs' schedule to meet their staffing needs and whether to continue to use their services or seek a different referral from La Cruz, and the client's chief radiology therapist or physician oversaw their work. Under the agreement that designated the RTs as independent contractors, claimant was required to call La Cruz and the client if she could not be at work at the scheduled time, questions regarding payment for services were directed to La Cruz and the RTs were prohibited from working directly for the assigned clients or La Cruz competitors. La Cruz would find replacements for the RTs if they could not work the schedule set by the client for any reason. Claimant testified that, on the day that the client informed her that her services no longer were needed, she was under consideration to be hired as an employee of the client and, because the client had not given advance notice of her discharge, La Cruz reimbursed her for expenses for her travel to the client. Notwithstanding proof in the record that might support a contrary conclusion, we find that the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence to support the Board's decisions that La Cruz, while not directly supervising claimant's daily RT activities for the client, retained sufficient overall control over the work performed by claimant and those similarly situated to establish an employer-employee relationship… . Matter of Ryan (La Cruz Radiation Consultants, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 03038, 3rd Dept 4-21-16


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PARALEGAL IN SMALL LAW OFFICE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS.

The Third Department determined claimant, a paralegal in a small law office, was an employee entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

… [C]laimant's work was assigned by the law office, he could not reassign his work to anyone, he was paid hourly and he was required to submit time sheets reflecting both client billable hours and administrative hours. Furthermore, claimant's work was reviewed by an attorney, any corrections were to be made by claimant, the law office was ultimately responsible for the work product, the law office supplied claimant with all of the equipment and material needed to perform the work and any expenses were reimbursed by the law office. In view of the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the law office exercised sufficient control over claimant's work to establish an employer-employee relationship … . Matter of Kristensen (Law Offs. of David C. Birdoff–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 03035, 3rd Dept 4-21-16


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DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED WATER WAS NOT DIVERTED ONTO PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY IN BAD FAITH.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant land-owner was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging the improper diversion of water onto plaintiff's property:

“Landowners making improvements to their land are not liable for damage caused by any resulting flow of surface water onto abutting property as long as the improvements are made in a good faith effort to enhance the usefulness of the property and no artificial means, such as pipes and drains, are used to divert the water thereon” … . “Thus, a plaintiff seeking to recover must establish that the improvements on the defendant's land caused the surface water to be diverted, that damages resulted and either that artificial means were used to effect the diversion or that the improvements were not made in a good faith effort to enhance the usefulness of the defendant's property”… .

Defendant averred that the complained-of work involved the removal of 17 to 25 cubic yards of soil around the entrance to the culvert and that it did not artificially channel water onto plaintiffs' property. He also stated that he performed the work in a good faith effort to create a detention area that would remediate drainage issues on his property in the event that the flow through the culvert was slow or blocked. Defendant further submitted the affidavit of a neighbor of the parties, a civil engineer with experience in stormwater management, who opined that the work did improve drainage and had no effect on the amount of water flowing onto plaintiffs' property. Defendant accordingly met his prima facie burden of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment, shifting the burden to plaintiffs to demonstrate that the changes were undertaken in bad faith or diverted additional water onto their property by artificial means… . Silverman v Doell, 2016 NY Slip Op 03054, 3rd Dept 4-21-16


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LADDER WAS NOT DEFECTIVE, FALL NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240.

The First Department determined plaintiff's fall from a ladder did not support a Labor Law 240 cause of action. Plaintiff's pant leg caught on an unmarked rebar as he descended from the third rung. The accident was not caused by a defective ladder and was not attributable to an extraordinary elevation-related risk:

… [D]ismissal of the Labor Law § 240 claim was proper, as there is no dispute that the ladder was free from defects, and the record shows that plaintiff's fall was not attributable to the kind of extraordinary elevation-related risk that the statute was designed to prevent. Rather, plaintiff's injuries “were the result of the usual and ordinary dangers at a construction site” … . Almodovar v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2016 NY Slip Op 03075, 1st Dept 4-21-16


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ORDINANCE OR LAW ENDORSEMENT DID NOT REQUIRE INSURER TO PAY FOR REMEDIATION OF CODE VIOLATIONS NOT RELATED TO THE COVERED DAMAGE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined a “Blanket Ordinance or Law Coverage Endorsement” did not cover remediation of below-code construction which was not related to the covered damage. Below-code structural concrete was discovered when covered water-related damage was being repaired. Because the below-code concrete was unrelated to the water damage, the “Law Coverage Endorsement” did not obligate the insurer to pay for remedtion of the concrete-work:

Here … the latent problem that was uncovered by inspection necessitated by the covered damage was not a problem related to the covered damage; rather, the inspection discovered a latent, unrelated problem with the building's infrastructure. The condition of the concrete slabs in plaintiff's building, which had to be repaired to bring the building into compliance with the Building Code, bore no relationship to the covered loss — the water damage … .

… The Ordinance or Law endorsement cannot be triggered simply by the discovery, in the course of an inspection necessitated by a covered event, of structural problems that amount to code violations. That is so whether the discovered condition could have been discerned earlier … or where, as here, it could not have been discovered absent the covered damage. St. George Tower v Insurance Co. of Greater N.Y., 2016 NY Slip Op 03100, 1st Dept 4-21-16


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FAILURE TO INFORM JURY OF EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE TOP COUNT BASED ON THE JUSTIFCATION DEFENSE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The First Department reversed defendant's conviction in the interest of justice because the trial judge did not make clear that acquittal of the top count (second degree murder) based on the justification defense required acquittal of the lesser homicide charges:

… [R]eversal in the interest of justice is warranted by the court's failure to convey to the jury, either directly or indirectly, in any part of its charge, that an acquittal on the top count of murder in the second degree based on a finding of justification would preclude consideration of the two lesser homicide charges. While the jury may have acquitted on the top charge without relying on defendant's justification defense, it is nevertheless “impossible to discern whether acquittal of the top count . . . was based on the jurors' finding of justification so as to mandate acquittal on the two lesser counts”… . People v Rowley, 2016 NY Slip Op 03084, 1st Dept 4-21-16


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POLICE OFFICER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-E CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT MET BY POINTING TO GAPS IN OTHER PARTY’S PROOF.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dismissal of plaintiff police officer's negligence cause of action did not mandate dismissal of the General Municipal Law 205-e cause of action. Plaintiff alleged his slip and fall injury resulted from defendant's failure to comply with specified regulations. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant did not affirmatively demonstrate the regulations were not breached. The court noted that simply pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof is not enough in the summary judgment context:

…[T]he dismissal of the plaintiff's common-law negligence cause of action was not fatal, as a matter of law, to his General Municipal Law § 205-e cause of action. In order to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e, the statute does not mandate that the plaintiff establish general negligence, but rather, negligence of any person in “failing to comply” with the requirements of, inter alia, a regulation … , or ” negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties'” … . Furthermore, while the plaintiff alleged in his consolidated complaint that the defendants violated certain identified regulations, the defendants failed to affirmatively demonstrate in their submissions to the Supreme Court that these regulations were not breached. A defendant's prima facie burden on a motion for summary judgment cannot be met by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's case … . Vaughn v Veolia Transp., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02985, 2nd Dept 4-20-16


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VILLAGE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION WHICH LED TO PLAINTIFF’S TRIP AND FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined defendant village's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been denied. Although the village demonstrated it did not have written notice of the stop-sign “stump” over which plaintiff tripped, the village did not demonstrate it did not create the dangerous condition. There was evidence the stump was exposed (not buried) immediately after the village removed the stop sign:

” Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by an improperly maintained street or sidewalk unless it has received written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies'” … . ” The only recognized exceptions to the statutory prior written notice requirement involve situations in which the municipality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence, or where a special use confers a benefit upon the municipality'” … . The affirmative negligence exception “is limited to work by the City that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition” … .

Where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged that the affirmative negligence exception applies, the Village was required to show, prima facie, that the exception does not apply. Although the Village proved that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged defect … . Kelley v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 2016 NY Slip Op 02966, 2nd Dept 4-20-15


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LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF EXCUSE.

The Second Department determined a late notice of claim was properly allowed despite the absence of an excuse for the delay in serving the notice. The claim alleged negligence during an emergency cesarean birth at defendant facility. Because the medical records memorialized the event, the delay caused no prejudice to the defendant:

The petitioner established that the appellant had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim by virtue of its possession of the infant's medical records, which detail her delivery and post-natal care, and established that the delay in serving the notice of claim would not substantially prejudice the appellant in maintaining its defense on the merits. Under those circumstances, the fact that the petitioner could not show a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the appellant … . Matter of Benjamin v Nassau Health Care Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 02989, 2nd Dept 4-20-16


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