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TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (a).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined that a Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) proceeding (challenging a tax assessment) which is dismissed for failure to provide timely notice to the school district cannot be restarted pursuant to CPLR 205 (a). Standard statutory-construction analysis led to the result:

By amending RPTL 708 (3), the legislature allowed school districts to reserve funds to satisfy judgments in tax certiorari proceedings. That right of reservation, however, extended only to the extent funds reserved “might reasonably be deemed necessary to [pay] anticipated judgments and claims” (Education Law § 3651 [1-a]). A school district of necessity must know of a proceeding in order to be able to estimate the amount it is permitted to set aside. The notice requirements the legislature included in RPTL 708 (3) act to balance the strictures of the Education Law. A petitioner who ignores the mailing requirements of RPTL 708 (3) and simultaneously denies a school district the opportunity to economically address a tax certiorari proceeding is not permitted to recommence a proceeding dismissed based upon such noncompliance. To do so would be to undermine the aims of fairness and efficiency that prompted the amendments to RPTL 708 (3) … . Matter of Westchester Joint Water Works v Assessor of City of Rye, 2016 NY Slip Op 04438, CtApp 6-9-16

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))

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MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff's motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim was properly denied. Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice on the part of defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). The majority concluded that the mere existence of medical records documenting the hospital care did not demonstrate timely knowledge of the nature of the claim:

… [T]he medical records must do more than “suggest” that an injury occurred as a result of malpractice. [The plaintiff's] argument implies that so long as medical experts reasonably disagree as to whether, based on their respective interpretations of the medical records, the medical staff deviated from the standard of care, a factual question is present and an application for service of late notice must be granted as a matter of law. … [T]he medical records must “evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted an[] injury on plaintiff . . .” in order for the medical provider to have actual knowledge of the essential facts … . Wally G. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Metropolitan Hosp.), 2016 NY Slip Op 04443, CtApp 6-9-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST CITY HOSPITAL, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CLAIM AGAINST CITY HOSPITAL, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)

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STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined Supreme Court should not have awarded sole custody to father without a hearing. The “adequate relevant information” standard used by the Appellate Division was not the correct one:

… [W]e hold only that, on this record, the Appellate Division erred in holding that a hearing was not required based on an application of the “adequate relevant information” standard. In doing so, we reaffirm the long-established principle that, as a general matter, custody determinations should be rendered only after a full and plenary hearing. We decline, however, to fashion a “one size fits all” rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide. However, where, as here, facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a custody hearing is required. Accordingly, a court opting to forego a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were — or were not — material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision. Under the circumstances of this case, a plenary hearing was necessary. S.L. v J.R., 2016 NY Slip Op 04442, CtApp 6-9-16

FAMILY LAW (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/CUSTODY (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)

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EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED.

The Court of Appeals determined the admission of evidence of an assault on the same victim (A.H.) a week before the charged assault was not error. The defendant acknowledged the evidence was relevant but argued the evidence should have been summarized because it was unduly prejudicial to allow the jury to hear the details:

We cannot say that both defects necessary for reversible error are present in defendant's case, namely, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to limit A.H.'s testimony and that such error substantially prejudiced the defendant so as to foreclose a determination of harmlessness. … A.H.'s testimony concerned the same parties, and served the nonpropensity purpose of directly explaining her relationship with the defendant and his motive. This is far from a case where “the jury did not require a recital of such a prologue to understand fully what had taken place in the defendant's encounters with [the victim]” … . In the same vein, testimony that the defendant previously attacked A.H. would not have led the jury to marginalize, relegate to the background, or ignore the grievous nature of the New York City assault, which was characterized by physical violence and several failed attempts at immolation.

Under these circumstances, we perceive no error that requires a reversal of defendant's conviction. People v Frankline, 2016 NY Slip Op 04441, CtApp 6-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)/EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)/UNCHARGED CRIMES (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)

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MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined defendant's motion to set aside his conviction was properly denied without a hearing. Defendant's allegations of defense counsel's conflict of interest were deemed insufficient. Defendant alleged his lawyer represented both him and the District Attorney simultaneously:

CPL 440.30 requires that, where the motion to vacate a judgment of conviction “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts,” sworn allegations thereof must be included in the motion papers (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The sworn allegations can be based on personal knowledge or on information and belief, but in support of the latter, “the affiant must state the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief” (CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The People “may” file an answer “denying or admitting any or all of the allegations” (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The statute permits a court to deny the motion without a hearing in certain circumstances, including if it “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate all the essential facts” (CPL 440.30 [4] [b]). * * *

Here, defendant's actual conflict claim consists of unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations of simultaneous representation. * * *

… [T]he statute is plain that the initial failure by a defendant to carry his or her burden of coming forward with sworn allegations substantiating the essential facts in the 440 motion does not shift the burden to the People in their responsive pleadings. * * *

To the extent defendant's allegations are sufficient to establish a potential conflict — based on the successive representation — his papers do not attempt to demonstrate that such a conflict operated on the defense. People v Wright, 2016 NY Slip Op 04440, CtApp 6-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)

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APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over an extensive two-judge dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the common interest attorney-client privilege should only apply when there is litigation or pending litigation involving the parties with a common interest. The 1st Department had extended to privilege to merger negotiations between Countrywide and Bank of America at a time when the failure of mortgage-backed securities was in the air but there was no litigation or pending litigation:

Disclosure is privileged between codefendants, coplaintiffs or persons who reasonably anticipate that they will become colitigants, because such disclosures are deemed necessary to mount a common claim or defense, at a time when parties are most likely to expect discovery requests and their legal interests are sufficiently aligned that “the counsel of each [i]s in effect the counsel of all” … . When two or more parties are engaged in or reasonably anticipate litigation in which they share a common legal interest, the threat of mandatory disclosure may chill the parties’ exchange of privileged information and therefore thwart any desire to coordinate legal strategy. In that situation, the common interest doctrine promotes candor that may otherwise have been inhibited.

The same cannot be said of clients who share a common legal interest in a commercial transaction or other common problem but do not reasonably anticipate litigation. Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 04439, CtApp 6-9-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/ATTORNEYS (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)

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LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES.

The Second Department determined the value of properties transferred upon decedent's death was the fair market value at the time of death. The fact that decedent willed life estates in the properties did not diminish the value of the properties for estate tax purposes:

“Because the estate tax is a tax on the privilege of transferring property upon one's death, the property to be valued for estate tax purposes is that which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the interest held by the decedent before death or that held by the legatee after death” … . An estate tax taxes “not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death” … . “The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate … is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death” … . An estate tax is a tax on the privilege of passing on property, not a tax on the privilege of receiving property; “[t]he tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of the property by the legatees” … .

Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the life estates in the condominium and cooperative apartment granted by the decedent to his longtime companion upon the decedent's death did not diminish the value of those properties for estate tax purposes and should not have been taken into account on the estate tax return. Matter of Cleary, 2016 NY Slip Op 04410, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/TAX LAW (ESTATE TAX, (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/ESTATE TAX (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants in this action alleging trespass and nuisance caused by water runoff:

A landowner will not be liable for damages to abutting property caused by the flow of surface water due to improvements to his or her land, provided that the improvements were made in good faith to make the property fit for some rational use, and that the water was not drained onto the other property by artificial means, such as pipes and ditches … . …

… [P]laintiffs raised triable issues of fact … by adducing evidence, inter alia, that a gutter downspout located on the defendants’ property and a drainage pipe installed under the low point in the defendants’ new driveway diverted rainwater runoff onto the plaintiffs’ properties … . Biaglow v Elite Prop. Holdings, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 04373, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

REAL PROPERTY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/TRESPASS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/NUISANCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/WATER RUNOFF (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)

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DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS.

The Second Department determined the “duplicate coverage” prohibition in the supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) endorsement of the GEICO policy did not prevent plaintiff's widow, Maria Sherlock, from proceeding to arbitration seeking coverage under the endorsement. The driver, Maldonado, who struck and killed plaintiff's decedent had a policy with $50,000 coverage. Maldonado's insurer settled for its $50,000 limit. Because the accident occurred during a police chase and the municipality was sued, the municipality's insurer settled for $425,000.  Geico argued any recovery under the SUM endorsement would constitute prohibited duplicate coverage. Maria Sherlock argued the overall damages were in the millions and recovery of difference between the $250,000 SUM limit and the $50,000 paid out under defendant's policy would therefore not be duplicative, even taking into account the $425,000 recovery from the municipality:

The key to a proper understanding of [the duplicate coverage prohibition] is the recognition that “shall not duplicate” is not aimed at preventing an insured from seeking full compensation by combining partial recoveries from several tortfeasors, but at preventing double recoveries for their bodily injuries.

… Sherlock alleged in her request for arbitration that the bodily injury damages are in the millions of dollars. Presumably, if the Maldonado defendants' policy had contained the same $250,000 liability limit that the GEICO policy provided, … Sherlock would have been able to obtain $250,000 from the Maldonado defendants' insurer as well as the $425,000 from the [municipal] defendants' insurer. … Sherlock seeks only, through her claim under the SUM endorsement—for which she paid a premium—to be in the same position she would have been in had the Maldonado defendants not been underinsured relative to the GEICO policy. Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Sherlock, 2016 NY Slip Op 04414, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

INSURANCE LAW (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/NON-DUPLICATION PROVISION (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)

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JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS.

The Second Department determined the Family Court judge was biased against mother who sought to prevent her children from being immunized for religious reasons:

Public Health Law § 2164, which requires that an adequate dose or doses of an immunizing agent against certain diseases be administered to children at various intervals, does not apply to children whose parent or parents hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practices required therein (see Public Health Law § 2164[9]). When a parent seeks to assert a religious objection to immunization under Public Health Law § 2164(9), he or she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her opposition to immunization ” stems from genuinely-held religious beliefs'” … . * * *

Here, the record demonstrates that the Family Court had a predetermined outcome of the case in mind during the hearing. In addition to certain comments made by the court regarding the sincerity of the mother’s religious beliefs, the court took an adversarial stance, aggressively cross-examined the mother, continually interrupted her testimony, mocked her beliefs, and generally demonstrated bias. The Family Court’s bias unjustly affected the result of the hearing to the detriment of the mother. Matter of Baby Girl Z. (Yaroslava Z.), 2016 NY Slip Op 04425, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

FAMILY LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/JUDGES (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/IMMUNIZATION (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/RELIGION (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)

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