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DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS.

The Second Department determined the “duplicate coverage” prohibition in the supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) endorsement of the GEICO policy did not prevent plaintiff's widow, Maria Sherlock, from proceeding to arbitration seeking coverage under the endorsement. The driver, Maldonado, who struck and killed plaintiff's decedent had a policy with $50,000 coverage. Maldonado's insurer settled for its $50,000 limit. Because the accident occurred during a police chase and the municipality was sued, the municipality's insurer settled for $425,000.  Geico argued any recovery under the SUM endorsement would constitute prohibited duplicate coverage. Maria Sherlock argued the overall damages were in the millions and recovery of difference between the $250,000 SUM limit and the $50,000 paid out under defendant's policy would therefore not be duplicative, even taking into account the $425,000 recovery from the municipality:

The key to a proper understanding of [the duplicate coverage prohibition] is the recognition that “shall not duplicate” is not aimed at preventing an insured from seeking full compensation by combining partial recoveries from several tortfeasors, but at preventing double recoveries for their bodily injuries.

… Sherlock alleged in her request for arbitration that the bodily injury damages are in the millions of dollars. Presumably, if the Maldonado defendants' policy had contained the same $250,000 liability limit that the GEICO policy provided, … Sherlock would have been able to obtain $250,000 from the Maldonado defendants' insurer as well as the $425,000 from the [municipal] defendants' insurer. … Sherlock seeks only, through her claim under the SUM endorsement—for which she paid a premium—to be in the same position she would have been in had the Maldonado defendants not been underinsured relative to the GEICO policy. Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Sherlock, 2016 NY Slip Op 04414, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

INSURANCE LAW (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/NON-DUPLICATION PROVISION (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)

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