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COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the county’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied in this vehicle-accident case alleging the negligent failure to install a guardrail. The county did not demonstrate it was entitled to qualified immunity based upon a relevant highway-safety study of the area, and did not demonstrate the absence of a guardrail was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries:

A municipal defendant is entitled to qualified immunity “where a duly authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury” … . Here, the evidence presented by the County failed to establish that it undertook a study which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that is at issue in this case … . …

… [T]he County failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have a duty to place guardrails near the concrete headwall involved in the plaintiff’s accident. …

… [T]he County’s submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether its alleged negligence in failing to place guardrails near the concrete headwall … was a substantial factor in aggravating the plaintiff’s injuries … . Bednoski v County of Suffolk, 2016 NY Slip Op 08832, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/HIGHWAYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/GUARDRAILS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL IN THIS VEHICLE-ACCIDENT CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

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SCHOOL NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN A STUDENT FELL ON TOP OF HIM.

The Second Department determined the school’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision action was properly denied. The plaintiff student was injured when another student fell on top of him. There was evidence the student who injured plaintiff had been acting up for 10 minutes prior to the incident:

“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that they properly supervised the infant plaintiff or that their alleged negligent supervision was not a proximate cause of his injuries … . In support of their motion, the defendants submitted the infant plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he asserted that the student who fell on top of him had been running around the gym throwing basketballs at another student before he fell on the infant plaintiff, and that this behavior had been transpiring, unimpeded, for approximately 10 minutes before the accident. Roth v Central Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 08894, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN A STUDENT FELL ON TOP OF HIM)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, SCHOOL NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN A STUDENT FELL ON TOP OF HIM)

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SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT.

The Second Department determined the defendant school’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision action was properly denied. The complaint alleged plaintiff’s fall was caused by students jumping up and down on a bridge:

… [T]he defendant, in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, that it properly supervised the infant plaintiff or that its alleged negligent supervision was not a proximate cause of his injuries .. . J.M. v North Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 08847, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT)/EDUCATION-SHOOL LAW (SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT)

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DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE SECURITY COMPANY ALLEGEDLY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined defendant Arrow Security, a company under contract with defendant theater, Paramount, to provide security for patrons, was not entitled to a dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff, an employee of Paramount, alleged he was instructed by Arrow to restrain a person, John Doe, who was in the rear alley of the theater premises. Plaintiff alleged he was beaten and injured by John Doe. The contract between Arrow and Paramount specifically stated the contract did not create a duty owed to third parties. However, the court concluded the complaint stated a claim for common-law negligence because it was alleged Arrow directed plaintiff to restrain John Doe:

… Arrow failed to conclusively establish that it owed no common-law duty to the plaintiff. To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff … , set forth a cognizable legal theory under which Arrow could be found to have assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff by calling for and instructing him to investigate, restrain, and/or detain the intoxicated John Doe … . A duty of care may be assumed where a “defendant’s conduct placed plaintiff in a more vulnerable position than plaintiff would have been in had defendant done nothing” … , or where a defendant’s conduct “enhanced the risk that plaintiff faced, created a new risk or induced plaintiff to forego some opportunity to avoid risk” … . Garda v Paramount Theatre, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08841, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/CONTRACT, TORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/DUTY (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)

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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department determined the defendant abutting property owner’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk trip and fall action was properly denied. The court clearly explained the relationship between the applicable administrative code provision and the abutting property owners’ responsibility for maintaining a safe sidewalk. The plaintiff tripped over a raised sidewalk flag. The defendant’s own motion papers demonstrated he was aware of the defect for four years:

Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter the Administrative Code) imposes tort liability upon certain owners of real property, including the appellant, for injuries proximately caused by the failure of such owners to maintain the sidewalks abutting their property in a reasonably safe condition … . Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code does not, however, impose strict liability upon landowners for injuries arising from allegedly dangerous conditions on a sidewalk abutting their property … . Rather, the injured party has the obligation to prove the elements of negligence to demonstrate that the landowner is liable under this section of the Administrative Code … . Specifically, the injured party must establish (1) the existence of a duty on the landowner’s part as to the injured party, (2) a breach of this duty, and (3) a resulting injury to the injured party … . In support of a motion for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action pursuant to section 7-210 of the Administrative Code, the landowner has the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . Nisimova v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08875, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/SIDEWALKS (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this vehicle-collision case was properly denied. Plaintiff had the right of way and alleged defendant did not stop at a stop sign. However, plaintiff did not demonstrate she was free from comparative fault:

… [T]he only evidence in admissible form submitted by the plaintiff in support of her motion was her own affidavit, in which she briefly alleged that the defendant driver had failed to stop at the stop sign governing traffic on Batchelder Street and yield to traffic on Avenue U. The plaintiff’s affidavit did not set forth other relevant circumstances, including the rate of speed at which she was traveling, where her vehicle was positioned when she allegedly observed the defendant driver fail to stop at the stop sign, and where her vehicle was positioned when the collision occurred. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s affidavit was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant driver’s alleged negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that she was free from comparative fault … . Kanfer v Wong, 2016 NY Slip Op 08851, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (VEHICLE COLLISION, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/ACCIDENTS, VEHICLE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)

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NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, determined the exemption from (New York City) rent stabilization rules for housing units constructed after January 1, 1974, applied to defendant’s post-1974 conversion of a commercial building to residential units:

… [Supreme Court] found that the defendant had made a prima facie showing that the complex was exempt from rent stabilization by demonstrating that its renovations had converted the complex from commercial to residential use, and that it had paid for a majority of the conversion costs. The court further found that the plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the complex was subject to rent stabilization. In this regard, the court reasoned that the 75% requirement of Rent Stabilization Code § 2520.11 did not apply where a commercial building was converted to residential use. We affirm. * * *

The plaintiffs contend that … they raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant failed to replace 75% of the systems … in accordance with section 2520.11(e)(1) of the Rent Stabilization Code… . We disagree. The most natural reading of the … 75% requirement is that it is applicable in situations where an owner purports to substantially rehabilitate an existing residential building, and not in situations where a commercial building is converted to residential use. Bartis v Harbor Tech, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08831, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

LANDLORD-TENANT (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)/RENT STABILIZATION (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE LADDER, BUT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT.

The Second Department determined plaintiff, who alleged a defective stepladder was the cause of his fall, was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action (comparative negligence is not a factor). However, plaintiff should not have been awarded summary judgment on his Labor Law 241(6) cause action (alleging a violation of the industrial code) because plaintiff did not demonstrate his freedom from comparative negligence:

The plaintiff established, prima facie, that the defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1), as the owner of the building where the plaintiff was working, by providing a ladder with a defective supporting bracket, which caused the ladder to move and the plaintiff to fall to the ground … . The fact that the plaintiff may have been the sole witness to the accident does not preclude the award of summary judgment in his favor … . …

However, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, the defendant’s liability under Labor Law § 241(6). Although the evidence demonstrated that the ladder’s defective supporting bracket, which the plaintiff had complained about prior to the accident, constituted a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(3) … , the plaintiff failed to demonstrate his freedom from comparative negligence … . Cardenas v 111-127 Cabrini Apts. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08835, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE LADDER, BUT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/COMPARATIVE FAULT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE LADDER, BUT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE LADDER, BUT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT)

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VIOLATION OF SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONS.

The Second Department determined the prosecutor’s violation of the Sandoval ruling required reversal. Defendant was charged with attempted burglary. The court ruled the defendant could be cross-examined about petit larceny and burglary convictions, but only to the extent he could be question about unspecified misdemeanor and felony convictions. When defendant testified he was repeatedly asked whether he had ever walked into a building which was closed to the public. The Second Department held that defendant had not opened the door to that line of questioning:

On cross-examination, the defendant testified that there were times in the past when he had been intoxicated and “ended up in the bushes” or “in the park” and that it was possible for a drunk person to end up in someone’s backyard. The prosecutor questioned the defendant as to other places he had been in the past, specifically asking if he had ever “enter[ed] a building that [he] had no permission to go?” The defendant initially denied entering a building, but after further questioning, which the Supreme Court allowed over defense counsel’s objection, he admitted that he had walked into a store that was closed but had people in it. The prosecutor pressed further, and later asked the defendant, “Have you ever walked into a building that was completely closed to the public with no people inside of that building?” and the defendant responded, “I don’t recall.” The prosecutor then asked if he had been convicted of a felony and the defendant replied affirmatively. The record reflects more than a half a dozen occasions when the People clearly violated the court’s Sandoval ruling by repeatedly questioning the defendant concerning the underlying facts of his prior burglary conviction.

Defendants who take the witness stand, like other witnesses, place their credibility in issue and, thus, may be cross-examined about past criminal or immoral acts relevant to their credibility … . The policy underlying Sandoval is that the accused has the right to make an informed choice concerning whether he or she should take the witness stand … . Thus, in the interest of fairness, a trial court’s authority to change its Sandoval ruling is limited once the defendant has decided to testify in good-faith reliance on the court’s pretrial ruling … . The defendant in this case was denied that right when, after making what he believed to be an informed judgment and taking the witness stand, the Supreme Court implicitly changed the ruling upon which he relied by allowing the prosecutor to continue her course of prejudicial questioning despite repeated objections from defense counsel. The court’s implicit change in its ruling after the defendant had already taken the witness stand deprived the defendant of a fair trial … . People v Mohamed, 2016 NY Slip Op 08885, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (VIOLATION OF SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONS)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, VIOLATION OF SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONS)/SANDOVAL RULING (VIOLATION OF SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONS)/CROSS-EXAMINATION (CRIMINAL LAW, VIOLATION OF SANDOVAL RULING REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONS)

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EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the emergency doctrine did not justify entrance into the home where hand grenades, guns, forged gun permits, explosives, marijuana and forged currency were seized. The police had responded to a silent alarm and found defendant working on a car outside the home. After questioning the defendant, the defendant unlocked to door of the home (to show the police he had keys to the home). When the defendant attempted to go inside and shut the door, the police pushed their way in and saw two hand grenades and a gun:

In the evaluation of whether a warrantless entry was justified under the “emergency doctrine,” the evidence must establish as a threshold matter that the police had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid” … . Under the Fourth Amendment, the officers’ subjective belief is irrelevant: “[a]n action is reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action'” … .

Here, the evidence at the suppression hearing fell short of the required threshold showing because it did not establish that the circumstances known to the police when they entered the house supported an objectively reasonable belief that entry was needed to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury … . The police were responding, in the early afternoon, to the type of notification that, in their experience, was usually a false alarm, not an emergency. Indeed, the People agree that the triggering of the alarm did not in itself permit the police to enter the house under the emergency doctrine. When the police arrived, they found the defendant, a middle-aged man, openly working on a van in the driveway. He had a key to the house. He explained his connection to the house, and he gave the police his phone so his sister could corroborate what he said. Moreover, there was no sign of a break-in. Neither of the police officers testified that he had any inkling that there were guns and other weaponry in the house. Their testimony was about their concern for the possible safety of anyone who might be in the house. Nothing, however, supported an objectively reasonable belief that “there was an emergency at hand requiring the immediate assistance of the police in order to protect life or property” … . Indeed, the facts known to the officers fell far short of the circumstances under which the emergency doctrine has been held applicable … . Simply put, this warrantless entry under the emergency doctrine was “unreasonable” (US Const Amend IV), because no facts then known supported a reasonable belief of an emergency. People v Ringel, 2016 NY Slip Op 08887, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED)/SEARCH AND SIEZURE (EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED)/EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (CRIMINAL LAW, EMERGENCY DOCTRINE DID NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY INTO HOME, EXPLOSIVES, DRUGS, GUNS, FORGED CURRENCY SUPPRESSED)

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