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NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, determined the exemption from (New York City) rent stabilization rules for housing units constructed after January 1, 1974, applied to defendant’s post-1974 conversion of a commercial building to residential units:

… [Supreme Court] found that the defendant had made a prima facie showing that the complex was exempt from rent stabilization by demonstrating that its renovations had converted the complex from commercial to residential use, and that it had paid for a majority of the conversion costs. The court further found that the plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the complex was subject to rent stabilization. In this regard, the court reasoned that the 75% requirement of Rent Stabilization Code § 2520.11 did not apply where a commercial building was converted to residential use. We affirm. * * *

The plaintiffs contend that … they raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant failed to replace 75% of the systems … in accordance with section 2520.11(e)(1) of the Rent Stabilization Code… . We disagree. The most natural reading of the … 75% requirement is that it is applicable in situations where an owner purports to substantially rehabilitate an existing residential building, and not in situations where a commercial building is converted to residential use. Bartis v Harbor Tech, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08831, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

LANDLORD-TENANT (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)/RENT STABILIZATION (NYC RENT STABILIZATION RULES DO NOT APPLY TO A BUILDING CONVERTED FROM COMMERCIAL TO RESIDENTIAL USE AFTER 1974)

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