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RARE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY QUESTIONED DEFENDANT ABOUT WHETHER HE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY.

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the facts presented the rare scenario that required the court’s inquiry into whether defendant waived his right to testify. After proof had closed, the defendant made it clear that he wanted to testify and that he and his attorney did not agree on the question:

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Defendant’s request to testify, coupled with his statements that he and defense counsel had disagreed on the issue, gave rise to one of those rare circumstances in which County Court was required to engage in a direct colloquy with defendant so as to discern whether he had been advised that the decision to testify ultimately belonged to him and whether, at the time that the defense rested, defendant’s failure to testify had been a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of that right … . However, County Court failed to engage in the required inquiry so as to ensure that defendant’s constitutional right to testify was protected. While County Court asked whether there was an application to reopen the proof and indicated that it would consider such a request, it directed that question only to defense counsel, even in the face of defendant’s repeated statements that he and defense counsel had differing opinions on the matter. By directing its question solely to defense counsel, County Court demonstrated an apparent misapprehension of longstanding precedent holding that a represented defendant has final decision-making authority over the decision to testify … . People v Morgan, 2017 NY Slip Op 02692, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

CRIMINAL LAW (RARE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY QUESTIONED DEFENDANT ABOUT WHETHER HE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY)/TESTIFY, RIGHT TO (CRIMINAL LAW, RARE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY QUESTIONED DEFENDANT ABOUT WHETHER HE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY)

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AFTER TERMINATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE ON INVOICES NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCHEDULE OF ASSETS.

The Third Department determined plaintiff could not sue on invoices submitted for payment (which was refused) while plaintiff was in bankruptcy proceedings. Causes of action not listed in the bankruptcy proceedings cannot be sued upon after termination of the bankruptcy proceedings:

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“Upon the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition, all property which a debtor owns, including a cause of action, vests in the bankruptcy estate” … . As such, a debtor’s failure to list a legal claim as an asset in its bankruptcy proceeding precludes the debtor from pursuing such claim on its own behalf inasmuch as the claim remains the property of the bankruptcy estate … . “The only property that may revest in the debtor in its individual capacity at the conclusion of the proceeding is property that was dealt with in the bankruptcy or abandoned” … . …

… [T]he claims asserted by plaintiff … accrued prior to the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding … . [T]he omission of these claims from the … schedule of assets in the bankruptcy proceeding precludes plaintiff from pursuing them on its own behalf because they were not “dealt with” in such proceeding … . Lightning Capital Holdings LLC v Erie Painting & Maintenance, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02716, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (AFTER TERMINATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE ON INVOICES NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCHEDULE OF ASSETS)/BANKRUPTCY (AFTER TERMINATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE ON INVOICES NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCHEDULE OF ASSETS)

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INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY, DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN WHICH NON-PARTIES INVOKED THE FIFTH AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READ TO THE JURY.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, determined defendant insurance company was entitled to the fraudulent incorporation defense in support of its refusal to pay no-fault benefits to plaintiff corporation for MRI’s administered by plaintiff corporation. The Business Corporation Law required that plaintiff corporation be run by physicians. There was substantial evidence the corporation was being run by two non-physicians with a physician as a cover. The Second Department found that the jury instructions explaining the criteria for the fraudulent incorporation defense were proper. The Second Department noted that the deposition testimony in which the two non-physician operators of plaintiff corporation refused to answer questions (invoking the Fifth Amendment) should not have been read to the jury because they were non-party witnesses. However, the error was deemed harmless. With respect to the fraudulent incorporation defense, the court wrote:

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… [T]he jury charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the correct legal principles on “fraudulent incorporation” … . The instructions asked the jury to consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff was operating as a proper professional medical corporation in compliance with state regulations or whether, in order to obtain money that insurers were otherwise entitled to deny, the plaintiff was organized under the facially valid cover of [a physician] but was, in actuality, operated and controlled by [two non-physicians] to funnel profits to themselves. Carothers v Progressive Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 02614. 2nd Dept 4-5-17

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)/CORPORATION LAW (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)/EVIDENCE (DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN WHICH NON-PARTIES INVOKED THE FIFTH AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READ TO THE JURY)/FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE  (INSURER’S FRAUDULENT INCORPORATION DEFENSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO PAY NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO A CORPORATION RUN BY NON-PHYSICIANS WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY)

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EVIDENCE A SIDEWALK DEFECT DEVELOPED OVER TIME DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFECT AROSE UPON INSTALLATION, VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined demonstrating that a sidewalk defect developed over time is not sufficient to raise a question of fact whether the defect was there upon installation of the sidewalk:

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Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, evidence suggesting that the defendant actually knew of the alleged defect did not satisfy the requirement in Village of Scarsdale Local Law § 209-1 that prior written notice of the alleged defect be given to the Village Clerk … . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the affirmative negligence exception, as she did not identify any evidence demonstrating that the allegedly defective condition arose immediately upon installation … . The plaintiff’s evidence, which includes an expert affidavit and statements by Village officials, at most established that environmental effects created the alleged defect over time, which is not sufficient to establish the defendant’s liability … . Beiner v Village of Scarsdale, 2017 NY Slip Op 02617, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

Same issues and result in Loghry v Village of Scarsdale, 2017 NY Slip Op 02635, 2nd Dept 4-5

 

NEGLIGENCE (EVIDENCE A SIDEWALK DEFECT DEVELOPED OVER TIME DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFECT AROSE UPON INSTALLATION, VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, EVIDENCE A SIDEWALK DEFECT DEVELOPED OVER TIME DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFECT AROSE UPON INSTALLATION, VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, EVIDENCE A SIDEWALK DEFECT DEVELOPED OVER TIME DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFECT AROSE UPON INSTALLATION, VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, EVIDENCE A SIDEWALK DEFECT DEVELOPED OVER TIME DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFECT AROSE UPON INSTALLATION, VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a surveillance tape which depicted the defendant’s car pulling out into traffic as plaintiff’s (Nesbitt’s) car was closely approaching should have been considered by the motion court and summary judgment should have been awarded to defendant. The tape was sufficiently authenticated by defendant’s statement the tape accurately depicted what happened:

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Here, in support of his motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted, among other things, a surveillance tape that depicted Nesbitt’s vehicle leaving the gas station and entering Middle Country Road as the defendant’s vehicle approached. The Supreme Court refused to consider this evidence on the ground that it was not properly authenticated. The court improvidently exercised its discretion in declining to consider the surveillance tape, because the defendant adequately authenticated the tape by averring that it accurately depicted what had occurred at the time of the accident … .

The surveillance tape and the additional evidence submitted by the defendant in support of his motion established, prima facie, that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was Nesbitt’s conduct in entering the roadway when the defendant’s vehicle was so close … . Nesbitt v Gallant, 2017 NY Slip Op 02665, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/EVIDENCE  (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/SURVEILLANCE TAPE (EVIDENCE, CAR ACCIDENT, SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (SURVEILLANCE TAPE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT WAS PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED BY DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THE TAPE ACCURATELY DEPICTED WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE)

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MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.

The Second Department determined defendant school district’s motion to set aside the verdict in this personal injury case was properly granted. Plaintiff was a matron on a school bus. The bus suddenly stopped when a student grabbed the steering wheel and plaintiff fell. The Second Department explained the criteria for a motion to set aside a verdict as a matter of law and held the school district could not be liable unless there was a special relationship between the plaintiff and the district (no special relationship was demonstrated):

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“To be awarded judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a defendant must show that, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no rational basis by which the jury could find for the plaintiff against the moving defendant” … . “The plaintiff’s evidence must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that can be reasonably drawn therefrom” … . …

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With regard to teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises, a special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed in three ways: “(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” … .

A special relationship based upon a duty voluntarily assumed by the municipality requires proof of the following four elements: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … . Moreover, “[t]he assurance by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by the plaintiff” … . Destefano v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02626, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW  (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF, A SCHOOL BUS MATRON INJURED ON THE BUS, DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCHOOL DISTRICT)

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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT EXACERBATE THE ICY CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property owners did not demonstrate defendant’s snow removal efforts did not create the condition and did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the icy condition of the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. Defendants motion for summary judgment should not, therefore, have been granted:

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Here, in support of their motion, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the snow removal efforts of the defendant Marc V. Antiones preceding the subject accident created the ice condition upon which the plaintiff allegedly fell … . Moreover, the defendants failed to demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the ice condition alleged. While the defendants demonstrated a lack of actual notice of the ice condition alleged, the evidence submitted in support of their motion did not show when the area of the sidewalk where the subject accident occurred was last inspected in relation to when the subject accident occurred … . Rong Wen Wu v Arniotes, 2017 NY Slip Op 02687, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT EXACERBATE THE ICY CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT EXACERBATE THE ICY CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT EXACERBATE THE ICY CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NOTICE (ICY CONDITION, SIDEWALKS, SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT EXACERBATE THE ICY CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK SERVED AS INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR SEVERAL COMMON CARRIERS, NOT SOLELY DEFENDANT COMMON CARRIER.

The Second Department determined defendant common carrier (Long Island Railroad) did not have a duty to keep the sidewalk where plaintiff fell free of ice and snow because the sidewalk served as ingress and egress for several common carriers. The duty to keep the sidewalk clear would apply to defendant only if the sidewalk service as ingress and egress solely for defendant:

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In “areas that serve primarily for ingress and egress to a subway or other similar station that is served by a single carrier,” a common carrier must maintain a safe means of ingress and egress for the use of its passengers, even if the area is owned and maintained by another, so long as the area is constantly and notoriously used by its passengers as a means of approach … . This duty of care “has not been extended to common areas in a multi-carrier facility” … . Mashall v Long Is. R.R., 2017 NY Slip Op 02637, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

NEGLIGENCE (COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK SERVED AS INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR SEVERAL COMMON CARRIERS, NOT SOLELY DEFENDANT COMMON CARRIER)/COMMON CARRIERS (SLIP AND FALL,  (COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK SERVED AS INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR SEVERAL COMMON CARRIERS, NOT SOLELY DEFENDANT COMMON CARRIER)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, COMMON CARRIERS, (COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK SERVED AS INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR SEVERAL COMMON CARRIERS, NOT SOLELY DEFENDANT COMMON CARRIER)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, COMMON CARRIERS, COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK SERVED AS INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR SEVERAL COMMON CARRIERS, NOT SOLELY DEFENDANT COMMON CARRIER)

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PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment in this pedestrian wrongful death case. Plaintiffs’ decedent was crossing the street with the walk signal when she was struck. There was no evidence of the pedestrian’s comparative negligence:

A pedestrian who has the right of way is entitled to anticipate that motorists will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield … . Here, the plaintiffs established, through admissible evidence, that [defendant driver]  failed to yield the right of way to the decedent, who was crossing the street within the crosswalk with the pedestrian “WALK” signal in her favor … . The plaintiffs’ prima facie showing was buttressed by [defendant driver’s] admission that he did not see the decedent and that he struck her … . As neither the plaintiffs’ submissions nor the defendants’ opposition papers revealed any triable issue of fact regarding the decedent’s comparative negligence … , the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability … . Huang v Franco, 2017 NY Slip Op 02629, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

NEGLIGENCE (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/PEDESTRIANS (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/CROSSWALKS  (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)

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DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NO LONGER REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES BEFORE A MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT CAN BE BROUGHT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff-husband’s motion to hold defendant-wife in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s order concerning the couple’s finances and debts should have been granted. Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground plaintiff had not exhausted other enforcement procedures. The Second Department noted that the Domestic Relations Law had been changed to remove the exhaustion requirement:

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Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant violated certain provisions of the separation agreement … . Through his affidavit, the plaintiff demonstrated that when the defendant took over management of [the couple’s business’s] finances following the sale of the marital home, she refused to pay off their joint credit card debt and did not share the proceeds from [the business’s] monthly rental income equally with him, thereby prejudicing his rights under the separation agreement … . Although the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had not met his burden, in part, because he did not exhaust other enforcement remedies before filing the instant motion, we note that Domestic Relations Law § 245 was amended, effective September 29, 2016, to remove the exhaustion requirement (L 2016, ch 365, § 1). The Legislature directed the amendment to “take effect immediately,” and apply “to all actions whenever commenced as well as all judgments or orders previously entered” (id. § 2). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to show that he exhausted other enforcement remedies before seeking to hold the defendant in contempt does not bar him from obtaining that relief. Cassarino v Cassarino, 2017 NY Slip Op 02623, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

FAMILY LAW (DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NO LONGER REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES BEFORE A MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT CAN BE BROUGHT)/CONTEMPT, CIVIL (FAMILY LAW, DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NO LONGER REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES BEFORE A MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT CAN BE BROUGHT)/DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW (DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NO LONGER REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES BEFORE A MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT CAN BE BROUGHT)

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