You are here: / SECOND DEPT ASKED FOR FURTHER SUBMISSIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PLAINTIFF...

Search Results

/ ,

SECOND DEPT ASKED FOR FURTHER SUBMISSIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department asked for further submissions to determine whether sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal. After a judgment of foreclosure against the mortgagor, the mortgagor deeded the property to plaintiff. Plaintiff then brought a motion to quiet title which was dismissed based upon the foreclosure documents. The plaintiff then appealed, despite having brought identical proceedings in another matter which also had gone up on appeal:

​

Here, as in Carbone v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., a case involving the same plaintiff and almost identical facts, by submitting the judgment of foreclosure and sale and other documents from the prior foreclosure action, the Bank established that it had a defense founded upon documentary evidence; namely, that Carbone took the property subject to a valid judgment of foreclosure and sale, and that the instant action is an improper collateral attack upon the judgment … . Thus, since the Bank established that it had a defense founded upon documentary evidence which conclusively disposed of the plaintiff’s causes of action as a matter of law… , the Supreme Court properly granted the Bank’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint, and properly denied Carbone’s cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

In addition, since the plaintiff has raised arguments on this appeal that appear to be “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]), the appeal may be frivolous… . Accordingly, we direct the submission of affirmations or affidavits on the issue of whether, and in what amount, costs or sanctions in connection with this appeal should or should not be imposed on the plaintiff. Carbone v US Bank N.A., 2017 NY Slip Op 08653, Second Dept 12-13-17

 

APPEALS (SECOND DEPARTMENT ASKED FOR FURTHER SUBMISSIONS TO DETERMINED WHETHER PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))/FRIVOLOUS APPEAL  (SECOND DEPARTMENT ASKED FOR FURTHER SUBMISSIONS TO DETERMINED WHETHER PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL (SECOND DEPT))

/

LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the challenge to the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) allowing construction of a 400 bed residential facility near a school in New York City was properly denied. The petitioners (neighbors and parents of school children) were primarily concerned with lead dust and noise. The court found that the lead agency (Department of Health [DOH]) had taken the requisite “hard look” at the lead dust and noise concerns (which were addressed by mitigation measures). The opinion includes a concise and uncomplicated explanation of the environmental-impact-statement procedures required by the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA):

​

Preventing the migration and inhalation of lead dust was one of the environmental risks the agency specifically set out to measure and mitigate … . In recognition of the risk, DOH imposed a battery of construction protocols to monitor and contain airborne dust. DOH reasonably concluded that these mitigation measures were sufficient to ensure that airborne lead levels remained within acceptable … limits, and explained its assessment fully in the DEIS [Draft Environmental Impact Statement] and FEIS. …

​

DOH conducted a detailed analysis of construction noise, employing assumptions based on reasonable worst case scenarios. In assessing both the dangers of construction noise and the most appropriate mitigation measures, DOH acted within its “considerable latitude in evaluating environmental effects and choosing among alternatives” (id.). The fact that petitioners would have preferred different or additional mitigation measures presents a difference of opinion about the best way to address the environmental impacts that the agency, not the courts, must consider and resolve. In fact, the agency considered the opinions of petitioners’ experts and determined that the lower noise levels for which they advocated were “not often achieved in densely-populated urban locations such as NYC.” DOH also considered that its levels did not exceed the City Manual’s recommendation. Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 2017 NY Slip Op 08621, CtApp 12-12-17

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP))/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP))/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS (LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP))/LEAD DUST (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP))/NOISE (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LEAD AGENCY TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT LEAD DUST AND NOISE CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION NEAR A SCHOOL IN NEW YORK CITY AND, AFTER IMPOSING MITIGATION MEASURES, PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION (CT APP))

/

EVEN WHERE THE CLASS HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED, CPLR 908 REQUIRES THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS BE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a three-judge dissent, determined notice of the settlement or dismissal of a class action lawsuit, where the class has not been certified, must be provided to all members of the putative class pursuant to CPLR 908:

​

CPLR 908 provides that “[a] class action shall not be dismissed, discontinued, or compromised without the approval of the court,” and that “[n]otice of the proposed dismissal, discontinuance, or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.” On this appeal, we must determine whether CPLR 908 applies only to certified class actions, or also to class actions that are settled or dismissed before the class has been certified. We conclude that CPLR 908 applies in the pre-certification context. As a result, notice to putative class members of a proposed dismissal, discontinuance, or compromise must be given. Desrosiers v Perry Ellis Menswear, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08620, CtApp 12-12-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EVEN WHERE THE CLASS HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED, CPLR 908 REQUIRES THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS BE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION (CT APP))/CLASS ACTIONS (NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT OR DISMISSAL EVEN WHERE THE CLASS HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED, CPLR 908 REQUIRES THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS BE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION (CT APP))/CPLR 908 (CLASS ACTIONS, EVEN WHERE THE CLASS HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED, CPLR 908 REQUIRES THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS BE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION (CT APP))

/ ,

MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS) was entitled to a copy of the psychiatric patient’s full medical chart prior to an involuntary-retention hearing under the Mental Hygiene Law. As a preliminary matter, the First Department held MHLS has organizational standing to bring the underlying Article 78 proceeding which was triggered by the Bronx Psychiatric Center’s (BPC’s) refusal to provide the medical record:

​

In order to retain a patient involuntarily for more than 60 days, the hospital must obtain a court order so directing, although the patient may remain hospitalized while the application for such an order is pending … . The hospital must show “that the patient is mentally ill and in need of continued, supervised care and treatment, and that the patient poses a substantial threat of physical harm to himself and/or others”… . On the other hand, MHLS has a duty “[t]o provide legal services and assistance to patients or residents and their families related to the admission, retention, and care and treatment of such persons” … . MHLS further has a duty “[t]o initiate and take any legal action deemed necessary to safeguard the right of any patient or resident to protection from abuse or mistreatment” … .

​

This Court has found organizational standing under exceptional circumstances involving organizations that were dedicated to protecting a class of individuals who suffered injuries which certain statutes were intended to guard against, and who could not otherwise act in their own interests. …

​

We find that MHLS has demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief … . … [W]hen read together, [the] statutory duty and regulatory provisions impose upon BPC a compulsory duty to provide MHLS with a copy of its clients’ complete medical charts before their respective retention hearings under MHL 9.31 and 9.33 are held. Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Daniels, 2017 NY Slip Op 08645, First Dept 12-12-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/STANDING (CIVIL PROCEDURE, ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING (MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COM PLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (INVOLUNTARY RETENTION, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS (INVOLUNTARY RETENTION, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/INVOLUNTARY RETENTION (PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))

/ ,

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RELEVANT CONTRACTS, WHICH MUST BE INTERPRETED TOGETHER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR TERMS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE IN ONE ASPECT OF THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SALE OF ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moskowitz, modifying Supreme Court, in actions stemming from the sale of allegedly defective residential mortgage-backed securities, determined that, according to the terms of the relevant contracts, plaintiff did not have standing to sue in one aspect of the action because a critical assignment had not been accomplished in accordance with the contract. The opinion is fact-specific and too complex to fairly summarize here. With respect to Supreme Court’s failure to interpret the two relevant agreements such that both are given effect, the court explained:

​

In interpreting a contract a court should favor an interpretation that gives effect to all the terms of an agreement rather than ignoring terms or interpreting them unreasonably … . Indeed, “where two seemingly conflicting contract provisions reasonably can be reconciled, a court is required to do so and to give both effect” … . We have also found that “agreements executed at substantially the same time and related to the same subject matter are regarded as contemporaneous writings and must be read together as one” … . Thus, in failing to harmonize the … agreement[s], the motion court essentially read … terms out of existence. U.S. Bank N.A. v GreenPoint Mtge. Funding, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08644, First Dept 12-12-17

 

SECURITIES (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, CONTRACT LAW, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RELEVANT CONTRACTS, WHICH MUST BE INTERPRETED TOGETHER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR TERMS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE IN ONE ASPECT OF THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SALE OF ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, CONTRACT LAW, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RELEVANT CONTRACTS, WHICH MUST BE INTERPRETED TOGETHER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR TERMS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE IN ONE ASPECT OF THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SALE OF ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT))/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (CONTRACT LAW, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RELEVANT CONTRACTS, WHICH MUST BE INTERPRETED TOGETHER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR TERMS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE IN ONE ASPECT OF THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM THE SALE OF ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT))

/ ,

THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined plaintiff trustee (HSBC) was limited to the cure and replurchase remedy described in the contracts for these residential mortgage-backed securities, and could not sue for general contract damages:

​

In these appeals stemming from four residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions, we are asked to decide whether claims for general contract damages based on alleged breaches of a “no untrue statement” provision can withstand a motion to dismiss based on a contract provision mandating cure or repurchase as the sole remedy for breaches of mortgage loan-specific representations and warranties. We hold that, inasmuch as the claims for general contract damages at issue here are grounded in alleged breaches of the mortgage loan-specific representations and warranties to which the limited remedy fashioned by the sophisticated parties applies, plaintiffs’ claims for general contract damages should be dismissed. * * *

​

.. .[I]t is readily apparent from the face of the complaints that the alleged breaches of the No Untrue Statement Provision are, in fact, based upon alleged breaches of the Mortgage Representations. … [T]he sole remedy for breaches of the Mortgage Representations is cure or repurchase. HSBC cannot “subvert this ‘exclusive remedies’ limitation” of liability by simply re-characterizing its claims … . Rather, “[r]eading the [contracts] as a harmonious and integrated whole” …  and honoring “the exclusive remedy that the[se] [sophisticated] parties fashioned” … , we conclude that the Sole Remedy Provision applies, precluding HSBC from seeking general contract damages for the particular claims challenged on this appeal. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08622, CtApp 12-12-17

 

SECURITIES (THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP))/CONTRACT LAW (THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP))/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP))/SOLE REMEDY PROVISIONS (THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP))

/ , ,

SUBSTITUTE TEACHER WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE LABOR LAW, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined a substitute teacher had not been given reasonable assurance of employment following the summer break and should not have been denied unemployment benefits on that ground:

​

This Court has well-established precedent interpreting the identical phrase in Labor Law § 590 (10), “reasonable assurance,” regarding two successive academic years or terms to require “a representation by the employer” as to future employment . This representation often takes the form of a letter from an employer assuring a per diem substitute teacher of future employment opportunities … .

​

Here, it is uncontested that the employer never sent any letter to claimant or provided him with any other form of notice that made a representation regarding claimant’s employment after the recess. Matter of Papapietro (Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 08596, Third Dept 12-7-17

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (TEACHERS, LABOR LAW, SUBSTITUTE TEACHER WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE LABOR LAW, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, LABOR LAW, SUBSTITUTE TEACHER WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE LABOR LAW, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT))/LABOR LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, SUBSTITUTE TEACHER WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE LABOR LAW, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT))/TEACHERS (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, LABOR LAW, SUBSTITUTE TEACHER WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE LABOR LAW, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT))/E

/

CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive decision too detailed to fairly summarize here, determined a club which featured semi-nude dancers was subject to sales tax for the sale of in-house currency (scrips) for access to private-room dances:

​

We find no basis to disturb the Tribunal’s determination that the club’s receipts from the sale of scrip are taxable as admission charges to a place of amusement. As the Tribunal recognizes, the definition of admission charge in Tax Law § 1101 (d) (2), as well as the relevant regulation … , establish that, for the purposes of Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1), an admission charge includes any additional cost for entertainment or amusement that must be paid to gain access to the place of amusement — here, the private room … . * * *

​

… [P]etitioners assert that, even if the sale of scrip is a taxable admission charge under Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1), they are exempt from the amusement tax because the purchase of scrip to pay for private dances qualifies as a charge for admission to a dramatic or musical arts performance. * * *

​

… [W]ith respect to the venue requirement, it was incumbent on petitioners to establish that the private rooms constituted “a theatre, opera house, concert hall or other hall or place of assembly” (Tax Law § 1101 [d] [5]). In our view, the Tribunal properly reasoned that, based on the evidence proffered by petitioners, the private room lacked the common characteristics of the settings described in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1)  …

​

The Tribunal’s determination that “petitioners have failed to credibly depict the private dance experience in sufficient detail to establish that experience as dramatic or choreographic” is rational and supported by substantial evidence. Matter of HDV Manhattan, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of The State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08559, Third Dept 12-7-17

 

TAX LAW (CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT))/SALES TAX (CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT))/ADMISSION CHARGES (SALES TAX, CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT))/CABARETS (SALES TAX, CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT))/SCRIPS (IN-HOUSE CURRENCY, SALES TAX, CLUB FEATURING SEMI-NUDE DANCERS WAS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX FOR SALE OF IN-HOUSE CURRENCY USED FOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE-ROOM DANCES (THIRD DEPT))

/ ,

STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the wrongful death action against state police officers who stopped plaintiff’s decedent (for following too closely) but did not issue a traffic ticket was properly dismissed. Decedent told the officers he had had two drinks, was tired and would call his brother to take him home. The officers left decedent on the side of the road. Decedent was later found dead in his car. Although decedent’s blood alcohol content was above the legal limit, the officers testified they did not see any signs of intoxication when they spoke with decedent. The court found there was no special relationship between the decedent and the officers and the state was therefore immune from suit:

​

Where, as here, a claim arises out of the performance of an act undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to general police powers … , the governmental entity is immune from liability for the negligent performance of that governmental function, unless it owed a special duty to the injured party… . As relevant here, a special duty arises when the governmental entity “voluntarily assumed a duty to the [injured party] beyond what was owed to the public generally” … . To establish a special duty through voluntary assumption, the injured party must demonstrate that the governmental agents assumed, through promises or actions, an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party, that the agents knew that inaction could lead to harm, that there was some form of direct contact between the injured party and the agents and that the injured party justifiably relied on the agents’ affirmative undertaking … . Barnes v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08564, Third Dept 12-7-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/IMMUNITY (STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (NEGLIGENCE, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/POLICE  (NEGLIGENCE, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/WRONGFUL DEATH (POLICE, GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY,  STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/TRAFFIC STOPS (GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, WRONGFUL DEATH, STATE POLICE STOPPED DECEDENT FOR FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION, AND LEFT WITHOUT ISSUING A TICKET, DECEDENT LATER FOUND DEAD IN HIS CAR, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND DECEDENT, STATE IMMUNE FROM SUIT (THIRD DEPT))

/ ,

COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that the defendant county’s motion for summary judgment in this road-defect action by an injured motorcyclist was properly denied. Although the county had a written notice requirement as a prerequisite for an action based upon a road defect, the Highway Law also applies and will impose liability if the county had notice of the defect:

​

The general rule is that if a municipality enacts a prior written notice statute, unless such notice is duly furnished, “a plaintiff may not bring a civil action against a municipality for damages as the result of an injury sustained by reason of a defective . . . highway” … . However, where Highway Law § 139 is applicable — in the case of county roads — “[e]ven if a local law exists requiring prior written notice of a defect, a civil action may be commenced absent such notice against a municipality for injuries resulting from a defect in a highway under its care if the ‘defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition existed for so long a period that the same should have been discovered and remedied in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence'” … . Thus, to establish entitlement to summary judgment, a county must show both that it received no prior written notice of the alleged defect and that it had no actual or constructive notice thereof … . Pasternak v Chenango, 2017 NY Slip Op 08578, Third Dept 12-7-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ROAD DEFECTS, COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (MUNICIPAL LAW, ROAD DEFECTS,  COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT))/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ROAD DEFECTS, COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT))/WRITTEN NOTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, ROAD DEFECTS,  COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, ROAD DEFECTS, WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT, COUNTY WHICH HAS A WRITTEN-NOTICE PREREQUISITE FOR TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT ACTIONS STEMMING FROM ROAD DEFECTS MAY BE STILL BE LIABLE ABSENT WRITTEN NOTICE UNDER THE HIGHWAY LAW IF IT OTHERWISE HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFECTS (THIRD DEPT))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy