You are here: / / PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER...
, ,

PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a complex decision not fully summarized here, determined the provision of the Education Law which allows the appointment of a receiver to take over allegedly failing schools does not violate the Contract Clause of the US Constitution:

… [W]here a statute or regulation impairs a private contract, courts will defer to a legislature’s rationale with regard to its necessity … . Less deference is warranted where the statute or regulation “is self-serving and impairs the obligations of [the state’s] own contracts” because “a [s]tate is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives” … . Less deference may be warranted even where, as here, the state is not a party to an impaired public contract … . “[F]or an impairment to be reasonable and necessary under less deference scrutiny, it must be shown that the state did not (1) consider impairing the contracts on par with other policy alternatives or (2) impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purpose equally well nor (3) act unreasonably in light of the surrounding circumstances” … .

Assuming without deciding that the less deferential standard applies, we find that Education Law § 211-f (8) is reasonable and necessary both on its face and as applied. In context, the receivership agreement was necessary in order to implement available methods to address the immediate issues that were facing the struggling or persistent struggling schools. The statute provides that the Superintendent must act in accordance with the existing CBA [collective bargaining agreement], and, where, as here, a receivership agreement is requested, the statute limits the scope of the agreement — and impairment. No modification or impairment can be unilaterally imposed but instead must be negotiated. As applied, although an agreement was not reached with regard to all issues, the modifications imposed were applicable to the affected schools only for the time limited by the statute. In sum, because the statute and the agreements apply prospectively and limit the scope, application and duration of any modifications to existing agreements, while prohibiting any adverse financial impact, we find that it was reasonably designed and necessary to further the goal of helping students to succeed … . Matter of Buffalo Teachers Fedn., Inc. v Elia, 2018 NY Slip Op 04061, Third Dept 6-7-18

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, CONTRACT LAW, PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT))/FAILING SCHOOLS (PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT))/RECEIVERS (FAILING SCHOOLS, (PROVISION OF THE EDUCATION LAW WHICH ALLOWS THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER ALLEGEDLY FAILING SCHOOLS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION (THIRD DEPT))

You might also like
Revocation of Parole Based Upon Uncharged Assault Okay/Presence of Assault Victim at Revocation Hearing Excused
Interest Paid In Advance Should Not Be Deducted from the Face Amount of the Loan When Determining Interest Rate—Law of Usury Does Not Apply to Interest After the Maturity of the Note (Late Payments)
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LEAVING AN ELEVEN-YEAR-OLD BOY UNSUPERVISED CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE; THE BOY, WHO WAS VISITING HIS 13-YEAR-OLD FRIEND’S HOME, WAS SEVERELY INJURED ATTEMPTING TO DO A FLIP OFF A PICNIC TABLE (THIRD DEPT).
IT IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR DEFENDANT TO NOT BE PRESENT AT A SIDEBAR WHICH RESULTS IN GRANTING A PEREMPTORY OR FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A JUROR, AN ORDER OF PROTECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR A FACT WITNESS WHO DID NOT ACTUALLY SEE THE SHOOTING (THIRD DEPT).
Defendants Ordered to Dismantle and Remove Boathouses Built Without Permits/Immediate Neighbors Had Standing to Bring an Action to Enjoin the Zoning Violations
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AN ACTION TO IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND AN ACTION ALLEGING UNJUST ENRICHMENT EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
OWNERS OF A PARCEL OF LAND WHICH ADJOINS A PARCEL RESTRICTED BY A COVENANT TO REMAIN FOREVER WILD DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO ENFORCE THE COVENANT (THIRD DEPT).
FAMILY COURT RELINQUISHED ITS FACT-FINDING FUNCTION TO THE BIASED FORENSIC EVALUATOR AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE CUSTODY-RELOCATION MODIFICATION FACTORS (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFAMATION AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED,... DURATION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION FOR A BIOLOGICAL GRANDFATHER AND A STEPGRANDFATHER...