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STANDING EVIDENCE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED.

The Second Department determined the bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The bank (Nationstar) did not demonstrate the originator of the mortgage (Aurora) had standing because the relevant evidence did not meet the criteria for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. In addition, the court held that, although there was evidence the notice requirements of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law [RPAPL] were not met by the bank, the bank produced evidence the loan was going to be used by defendants for investment purposes and was not, therefore, a “home loan” to which the notice requirements apply:

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Here, Nationstar failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that Aurora had standing to commence the action. In support of its motion, Nationstar relied on the affidavit of Doris Raimundi, a vice president of Nationstar, who asserted that “pursuant to the business records of Aurora Loan Services, LLC, the original Note was held in its custody since September 23, 2009, prior to commencement of this action,” and that the note had since been delivered to Nationstar. However, Nationstar failed to demonstrate the admissibility of the records relied upon by Raimundi under the business records exception to the hearsay rule … , since Raimundi did not attest that she was personally familiar with Aurora’s record-keeping practices and procedures… . Inasmuch as Nationstar’s motion was based on evidence that was not in admissible form, it failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . * * *

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Nationstar raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the subject loan was a “home loan” … . In particular, in light of certain written statements made by [defendant] when he applied for the loan, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the proceeds of the loan were, in fact, used for “personal, family, or household purposes,” or whether they were used for investment purposes … . Thus, the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Aurora failed to comply with RPAPL 1304. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Komarovsky, 2017 NY Slip Op 05061, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

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FORECLOSURE (STANDING EVIDENCE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED)/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, STANDING EVIDENCE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED)/HOME LOAN (FORECLOSURE, RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED)/NOTICE (FORECLOSURE, RPAPL, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED)

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