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THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s assault conviction, determined the jury should not have been instructed that the paramedic defendant was accused of assaulting was a peace officer (thereby negating the justification defense). The paramedic (Cohn) was a member of the NYC Fire Department, and was not authorized to arrest:

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Penal Law § 35.27 provides that “[a] person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a police officer or peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a police officer or peace officer.” CPL 2.10 sets forth the “[p]ersons designated as peace officers,” including, as relevant here, “[a]ll officers and members of the uniformed force of the New York city fire department as set forth and subject to the limitations contained in section 487a-15.0 of the administrative code of the city of New York” (CPL 2.10[28]). The relevant section of the New York City Administrative Code provides, with limited exceptions not applicable here, that “[i]n the performance of their duties, all officers and members of the uniformed force [of the FDNY] . . . shall have the powers and perform the duties of peace officers, but their power to make arrests and to serve process in criminal actions shall be restricted to cases arising under laws relating to fires and the extinguishment thereof, and to fire perils” … .

… EMS personnel are not members of the uniformed force of the FDNY … . Accordingly, Paramedic Cohn was not acting as a peace officer within the meaning of CPL 2.10(28) at the time that the defendant allegedly assaulted him, and the Supreme Court erred when it instructed the jury that Penal Law § 35.27 applied with respect to the charge of assault in the second degree related to Paramedic Cohn. Since the court’s charge effectively removed from the jury’s consideration the defendant’s justification defense, under the circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new trial on count one of the indictment charging her with assault in the second degree relating to Paramedic Cohn … . People v Thomas, 2017 NY Slip Op 09178, Second Dept 12-27-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC) (CRIMINAL LAW, THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, PEACE OFFICERS, THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/PARAMEDICS (CRIMINAL LAW, PEACE OFFICERS, THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/RESISTING ARREST  (THE PARAMEDIC DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF ASSAULTING WAS NOT A PEACE OFFICER AND THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTRUCTED, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NEGATING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))

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