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You are here: Home1 / Foreclosure2 / AN ACTION FOR “STRICT FORECLOSURE” PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1352 ALLOWS...
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

AN ACTION FOR “STRICT FORECLOSURE” PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1352 ALLOWS THE PURCHASER OF FORECLOSED PROPERTY TO EXTINGUISH ANY POTENTIAL CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY BY A NECESSARY PARTY NOT INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT). ​

he Second Department explained that an action for “strict foreclosure” pursuant to RPAPL 1352 is properly brought by the purchaser of foreclosed property to extinguish any claim to the property by a necessary party who not named in the foreclosure action:

Where, as here, a necessary party was omitted from a foreclosure action, the purchaser of the foreclosed property may commence a strict foreclosure action pursuant to RPAPL 1352 … . “RPAPL 1352 permits a strict foreclosure action against a person not named in the original foreclosure action, who has either a right of redemption to the subject property or a right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien” … . The statute authorizes the court to issue a judgment that fixes a time period within which any such person must act to redeem or begin a foreclosure action. If the person fails to redeem the property or commence a foreclosure action within the time period fixed by the court, such person “shall be excluded from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title or interest of such person . . . or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien against such property shall thereby be extinguished and terminated” … . “Since RPAPL 1352 operates to dispose of the encumbrances of those whose interests were junior at the time of the original foreclosure but who were not joined as parties to that action, a judgment of strict foreclosure cures a defect in the judgment or sale under the first foreclosure” … . 71-21 Loubet, LLC v Bank of Am., N.A., 2022 NY Slip Op 05012, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Pursuant to RPAPL 1352, the purchaser of foreclosed property can extinguish any potential claim to the property by a necessary party not included in the original foreclosure proceedings.

 

August 24, 2022
Tags: Second Department
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