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THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [P]laintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or proof of mailing by the United States Postal Service evidencing that it properly served the defendants. Instead, the plaintiff relied on the affidavit of Carlos Bernal, an authorized representative of the plaintiff’s loan servicing company. Although Bernal averred to have personal knowledge of the company’s record keeping systems, he did not purport to be familiar with the office procedure for mailing notices once they have been generated, and, therefore, he did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … . Further, the unsigned certified mail receipts, bearing no postmark from the United States Postal Service, do not prove that the notices were actually mailed … , and, in any event, the plaintiff produced no evidence that the notices were mailed by regular first-class mail … . Since the plaintiff failed to provide proof of the actual mailing, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure, the plaintiff failed to establish its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304… . Pennymac Corp. v Levy, 2022 NY Slip Op 04732, Second Dept 7-27-22

Practice Point: The bank in a foreclosure action must demonstrate strict compliance with the requirements for mailing the RPAPL 1304 notice. Failure to demonstrate strict compliance with the mailing requirements with admissible evidence precludes summary judgment.

 

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