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IN A HYBRID ACTION SEEKING AN ANNULMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 78 AND A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (AND DAMAGES), THE BURDENS TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING ARE DIFFERENT; IN AN ARTICLE 78 THE PETITIONER MUST AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE STANDING; AND IN A DECLARTORY-JUDGMENT/DAMAGES ACTION, THE RESPONDENT (DEFENDANT) MUST DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING AS A MATTER OF LAW TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, explained the different burdens of proof in an Article 78 proceeding and an action seeking declaratory relief and damages. In an Article 78 proceeding, the petitioner has to show standing as part of its prima facie case. In a declaratory judgment/damages action, the respondent (defendant) has to demonstrate the petitioner does not have standing as a matter of law to warrant summary judgment:

The Supreme Court erred in granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding/action based on lack of standing. “‘In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those to recover damages and for declaratory relief, on the other hand'” … . Generally, in an action to recover damages, “[o]n a defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff’s lack of standing. To defeat a defendant’s motion, the plaintiff has no burden of establishing its standing as a matter of law; rather, the motion will be defeated if the plaintiff’s submissions raise a question of fact as to its standing” … . Within the context of a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, “[t]he petitioner ‘has the burden of establishing both an injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute alleged to have been violated'” … . Matter of Crown Castle NG E., LLC v City of Rye, 2022 NY Slip Op 04626, Second Dept 7-20-22

Practice Point: The burdens on the issue of standing are different in an Article 78 proceeding and a declaratory judgment/damages action. Here both were brought in a hybrid proceeding. The petitioner must demonstrate standing in the Article 78 proceeding. The respondent (defendant) must demonstrate petitioner does not have standing as a matter of law to warrant summary judgment in the declaratory judgment/damages action.

 

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