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CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS PRECLUDED DISMISSAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING THE ALLEGED PREMATURE DISCHARGE OF PLAINTIFF FROM EMERGENCY CARE AFTER SHE EXPERIENCED SYMPTOMS OF A STROKE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s medical malpractice causes of action against the doctor who discharged her from emergency care and the hospital should not have been dismissed because the expert affidavits presented conflicting opinions. Plaintiff experienced symptoms consistent with a stroke and went to the hospital. An MRI was done but plaintiff was released before a final review of the MRI. Evidence of a stroke was ultimately found on the MRI. Plaintiff’s expert opined that the event which caused plaintiff to go to the hospital was a transient ischemic attack (TIA), not a stroke, and that the stroke occurred at the hospital about when the MRI was performed:

… [B]y submitting the affidavit of their expert, [plaintiffs] raised an issue of fact on the issue whether Dr. Kandel deviated from the standard of care … . Dr. Kandel permitted plaintiff to leave the hospital before her brain MRI had undergone a final review by a neuroradiologist. Plaintiffs’ expert opined that discharging plaintiff before a final review of the scans was complete constituted a deviation from the standard of care in light of plaintiff’s medical history, which indicated a significant stroke risk.

… [P]laintiffs raised a question of fact with respect to causation … . The hospital defendants relied upon the affirmation of Dr. Kandel’s medical expert, who opined that any alleged negligence is not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries inasmuch as plaintiff suffered a stroke at or before 3 a.m. on October 27, and that the window in which to administer tPA, an anti-clot medication, had closed long before plaintiff arrived at the hospital for treatment approximately 13 hours later. … [P]laintiffs submitted an expert affidavit asserting … that the symptoms plaintiff experienced on the morning of October 27 were the result of a transient ischemic attack (TIA), which results in temporary stroke-like symptoms but does not result in a blockage, and that she did not experience the actual blockage until sometime later in the day, around the time of her brain MRI. Plaintiffs’ expert further opined that, had plaintiff stayed at the hospital overnight and had the MRI been read correctly, tPA could have been administered when plaintiff’s new symptoms presented. Clark v Rachfal, 2022 NY Slip Op 04472, Fourth Dept 7-8-22

Practice Point: Conflicting expert opinions preclude summary judgment in medical malpractice actions.

 

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