You are here: / / NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED,...
, ,

NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined the proof of notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 was insufficient and the bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure proceeding should not have been granted:

​

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Monica I. Montalvo Rivas, its vice president of loan documentation, stating that she had “reviewed the 90 day pre-foreclosure notice sent to Borrower on October 31, 2013 to the last known address of Borrower, which is the residence that is [the] subject of the Mortgage, by first class mail and certified mail.” Annexed to Rivas’s affidavit was a copy of the notice, along with a copy of a “Certified Mail Receipt” containing the defendant’s address and a “Certified Mail Number.” The receipt contained no language indicating that it was issued by the United States Postal Service. “While mailing may be proved by documents meeting the requirements of the business exception records exception to the rule against hearsay,” here, Rivas did not aver that she was familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … . In any event, the plaintiff failed to submit any proof substantiating Rivas’s assertion that the notice was mailed to the defendant by first class mail. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Trupia, 2017 NY Slip Op 03986, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

FORECLOSURE (NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

​

You might also like
ATTORNEYS’ FEES NOT AVAILABLE TO INSURED WHO BRINGS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO SETTLE RIGHTS UNDER A POLICY; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING NOT DUPLICATIVE OF CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
EVEN THOUGH FATHER REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH AN INVESTIGATION RELATED TO HIS PETITION FOR CUSTODY, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED CUSTODY TO MOTHER WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
Mother Did Not Stipulate to Order of Reference; Therefore Referee Only Had Power to Hear and Report
CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY PROPERLY WITHDREW ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES GROUNDS AND WAS ENTITLED TO 95% OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE DESPITE THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT TIME RECORDS (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
“Extreme and Outrageous Conduct” Is Not an Element of “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress”—Elements of Private Nuisance, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Explained in Some Depth—Complaint Should Have Been Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action
BY ARGUING HE DID NOT KNOW THE WEAPON AND AMMUNITION WERE IN THE TRUCK HE WAS DRIVING, DEFENDANT PUT HIS STATE OF MIND IN ISSUE; THEREFORE THE EVIDENCE HE HAD TWICE BEFORE BEEN IN THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, ONCE ON A PLANE AND ONCE IN A VEHICLE, WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW NOT DEMONSTRATED,... PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE...