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Presumption Vehicle Was Being Driven with the Owner’s Consent (Vehicle & Traffic Law 388) Was Not Overcome by Testimony of Vehicle Owner and Her Daughter—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Awarded on that Ground

The Second Department noted, in the context of a summary judgment motion, the testimony of the vehicle owner, Varela, and her daughter, an interested witness, was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that another was driving the vehicle with Verela’s consent (Vehicle and Traffic Law 388):

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Varela’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her. “Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 creates a strong presumption that the driver of a vehicle is operating it with the owner’s consent, which can only be rebutted by substantial evidence demonstrating that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s express or implied permission” … . ” The uncontradicted testimony of a vehicle owner that the vehicle was operated without his or her permission, does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use'” … . The question of consent is ordinarily one for the jury … . Blassberger v Varela, 2015 NY Slip Op 04796, 2nd Dept 6-10-15

 

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