You are here: / / Presumption Vehicle Was Being Driven with the Owner’s Consent (Vehicle...
,

Presumption Vehicle Was Being Driven with the Owner’s Consent (Vehicle & Traffic Law 388) Was Not Overcome by Testimony of Vehicle Owner and Her Daughter—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Awarded on that Ground

The Second Department noted, in the context of a summary judgment motion, the testimony of the vehicle owner, Varela, and her daughter, an interested witness, was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that another was driving the vehicle with Verela’s consent (Vehicle and Traffic Law 388):

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Varela’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her. “Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 creates a strong presumption that the driver of a vehicle is operating it with the owner’s consent, which can only be rebutted by substantial evidence demonstrating that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s express or implied permission” … . ” The uncontradicted testimony of a vehicle owner that the vehicle was operated without his or her permission, does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use'” … . The question of consent is ordinarily one for the jury … . Blassberger v Varela, 2015 NY Slip Op 04796, 2nd Dept 6-10-15

 

You might also like
SIGNALING THE DRIVER TO STOP FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE DRIVER’S DECISION TO BACK UP WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT (SECOND DEPT).
STAY IMPOSED BY A SOUTH CAROLINA COURT AS PART OF THE LIQUIDATION OF A SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CARRIER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN A NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS INSURED BY THE INSOLVENT CARRIER (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH A REFERRING PHYSICIAN CAN NOT BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PHYSICIAN TO WHOM THE PATIENT WAS REFERRED, THE REFERRING PHYSICIAN MAY BE LIABLE FOR HER OWN NEGLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CONFERRING WITH THE OTHER PHYSICIAN ABOUT THEIR DIFFERENT FINDINGS (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Strictly Construing the Policy, Falling Through a Defective Manhole (Located in the Parking Lot) Into the Building’s Septic System Was Not Subject to the “Parking Lot” Exclusion from Coverage—The Claim Did Not Arise from the “Ownership, Maintenance or Use” of the Parking Lot, But Rather Arose from the “Operations Necessary or Incidental” to the Insured Building
PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED.
Children Were Not “Dependent on Court;” They Therefore Did Not Meet Criteria for Statutory Path to Lawful Permanent Residency in US
COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS TO INTERCEPT CELL PHONE CALLS AND TEXT MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED OUTSIDE NEW YORK STATE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Question of Fact Whether a Building Manager Owed a Duty to Plaintiff—Plaintiff,... Because Prior Mortgage Foreclosure Action Had Been Abandoned Plaintiff Was Not...