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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER (ADDING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES) WAS MADE AFTER A TWO-YEAR DELAY, THE DELAY ALONE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICED; THE MOTION TO AMEND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to amend its answer to add additional affirmative defenses should have been granted. The two-year delay was not enough to show plaintiff was prejudiced. Discovery was ongoing:

The court should have granted defendant’s motion to amend its answer to add the four affirmative defenses of RPAPL 1951, adverse possession, mutual breach, and unclean hands, as leave to amend is freely given and plaintiff did not show that it would be prejudiced by the delay in asserting the defenses (CPLR 3025[b] …). While over two years had passed since defendant served its original answer, discovery was still ongoing … . Plaintiff’s claim of significant prejudice is unpersuasive, as all it points to is mere delay, which is insufficient to show prejudice … . Nor did plaintiff rebut defendant’s showing that the proffered amendment is not palpably insufficient or clearly devoid of merit … . Board of Mgrs. of the Porter House Condominium v Delshah 60 Ninth LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03680, First Dept 6-7-22

Practice Point: Here defendant moved to amend its answer by adding affirmative defenses two years after the answer was served. Discovery was still ongoing. The delay alone was not enough to demonstrate the plaintiff was prejudiced. The motion to amend should have been granted.

 

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