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THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED OR WAS COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN THEY BLOCKED DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WITH THE POLICE VEHICLE, WHICH CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE; PLEA VACATED AND SUPPRESSION MOTION GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s plea and granting defendant’s suppression motion, determined the police did not have probable cause to seize defendant’s vehicle by blocking its exit with the police vehicle:

Police officer testimony at the suppression hearing established that, at the time the officers stopped their vehicle in front of defendant’s vehicle, they had observed defendant’s presence in a vehicle at 1:00 p.m. in the parking lot of an apartment complex known for drug activity and where officers believed defendant did not reside, and they were aware that defendant had a history of drug-related convictions. Such evidence does not provide a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime … . People v King, 2022 NY Slip Op 03595, Fourth Dept 6-3-22

Practice Point: Blocking defendant’s vehicle with a police vehicle is a seizure which requires probable cause to believe defendant has committed or is committing a crime.

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