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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN AND FAILED TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic-accident case should have been granted:

Plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to partial summary judgment by averring that, at the time of the accident, their vehicle was traveling westbound through an intersection at 91st Avenue in Queens, when defendants’ vehicle failed to stop at a designated stop sign and struck the middle of the driver’s side of plaintiffs’ vehicle … . A presumption of negligence arises from the failure of a driver at a stop sign to yield the right of way to the vehicle on the highway in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 … . …

Defendants’ claim that defendant Bennett stopped at the stop sign, and checked for oncoming traffic but did not see plaintiffs’ vehicle until it suddenly appeared in front of her as she proceeded into the intersection, fails to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from her failure to yield the right of way to plaintiffs’ vehicle, but instead indicates that she was negligent in failing to see what was there to be seen … . Samnath v Lifespire Servs., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02643, First Dept 4-21-22​

Practice Point: Failure to stop at a stop sign raises a presumption of negligence in an intersection traffic-accident case. Proceeding into the intersection and striking a car which has the right-of-way constituted a negligent failure to see what should have been seen.

 

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A SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE SAME BODY “MEMBER” WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT... PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF...