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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF MORE TIME TO FILE PAPERS OPPOSING...
Civil Procedure

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF MORE TIME TO FILE PAPERS OPPOSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY, THE LACK OF PREJUDICE AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court should not have rejected plaintiff’s request for more time to file opposition papers. On the return date for the motion to dismiss, plaintiff tried to file a stipulation signed by defendant’s (NCAA’s) counsel which allowed plaintiff to adjourn the motion and granted plaintiff more time in which to file the papers. The court rejected the stipulation and marked the motion unopposed. That same evening, plaintiff e-filed the opposing papers:

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CPLR 2004 provides that, “[e]xcept where otherwise expressly prescribed by law, the court may extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown, whether the application for extension is made before or after the expiration of the time fixed.” In considering a motion for an extension of time, “the court may properly consider factors such as the length of the delay, whether the opposing party has been prejudiced by the delay, the reason given for the delay, whether the moving party was in default before seeking the extension, and, if so, the presence or absence of an affidavit of merit” … .

Here, the plaintiff established good cause for an extension of his time to submit opposition papers to the NCAA’s motion given the brief and unintentional delay, the lack of prejudice to the NCAA, the existence of potentially meritorious defenses to the NCAA’s motion, and “the policy favoring the resolution of cases on their merits” … . Calderone v Molloy Coll., 2017 NY Slip Op 05932, Second Dept 8-2-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPLR 2004, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF MORE TIME TO FILE PAPERS OPPOSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY, THE LACK OF PREJUDICE AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2004 (SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF MORE TIME TO FILE PAPERS OPPOSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY, THE LACK OF PREJUDICE AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES (SECOND DEPT))

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August 2, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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