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THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS UNTIMELY BECAUSE IT ACCRUED WHEN DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED UPON ARRAIGNMENT, NOT WHEN HE WAS RELEASED UPON COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the false imprisonment cause of action was untimely because it accrued when plaintiff was released upon arraignment, not when he was released after completing his sentence:

Contrary to the motion court’s finding, the statute of limitations began to run not on the date on which plaintiff was released from incarceration, having completed his sentence, but on the date of his arraignment, when he was released on his own recognizance … . False imprisonment consists of detention without legal process and ends once the accused is held pursuant to legal process, such as arraignment … . Plaintiff’s incarceration following his conviction is not part of his false imprisonment claim and thus is not relevant to determining the date of expiration of the limitations period for the claim. Butler v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 00810, First Dept 2-8-22

 

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