You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS IN A TRENCH WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY THE BUCKET OF AN EXCAVATOR...

PLAINTIFF WAS IN A TRENCH WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY THE BUCKET OF AN EXCAVATOR WHICH WAS ON THE EDGE OF THE TRENCH ABOVE HIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS THE RESULT OF THE USUAL AND ORDINARY DANGERS OF A CONSTRUCTION SITE AS OPPOSED TO A RISK CONTEMPLATED BY THE LABOR LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was in a trench when he was struck by the bucket of an excavator which was on the edge of the trench above him:

Plaintiffs’ own submissions created a triable issue of fact concerning the manner in which the accident occurred … , specifically whether plaintiff was injured due to a risk contemplated by the statute or, alternatively, by ” ‘the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site’ ” … . …

… [T]he court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion with respect to liability on the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action insofar as it is premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-9.4 (c) and 23-9.5 (a). The issue of fact concerning the manner in which the accident occurred precludes a determination as a matter of law whether either of those regulations were violated … . Malvestuto v Town of Lancaster, 2022 NY Slip Op 00577, Fourth Dept 1-28-22

 

You might also like
FIBER OPTIC CABLES NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW.
Law Re: Liquidated Damages Explained
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN NON-COMPETE COVENANT ENFORCEABLE, ATTORNEY’S FEES NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (FOURTH DEPT).
THE LANGUAGE IN THE HIPAA FORM, INDICATING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICIAN MAY BUT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO SPEAK WITH DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WAS PROPERLY APPROVED BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE PAROLE ABSCONDER FOR WHOM THE POLICE HAD AN ARREST WARRANT, THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE PEOPLE PROVED THE POLICE REASONABLY BELIEVED DEFENDANT WAS THE PAROLE ABSCONDER WHEN THEY APPROACHED HIM, WHICH JUSTIFIED THE PURSUIT OF THE DEFENDANT; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE TESTIMONY BY THE OFFICERS WHO FIRST APPROACHED DEFENDANT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE POLICE REASONABLY BELIEVED DEFENDANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE ARREST WARRANT (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF STRUCK BY A LACROSSE BALL THROWN BY A COACH DURING PRACTICE, THE ACTION WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY EITHER THE SIGNED WAIVER OR THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (FOURTH DEPT).
PRIVATE MESSAGES SENT BY THE JUVENILE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A “TERRORISTIC THREAT” (FOURTH DEPT).
THE POLICE OFFICER INJURED IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND THE CITY SEEKING RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS MADE STEMMING FROM THE OFFICER’S INJURY MUST SHARE THE $100,000 “PER PERSON” INSURANCE-POLICY LIMIT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

BECAUSE OF UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTORY LANGUAGE, DEFENDANT’S MICHIGAN CONVICTION... IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW ACTION AGAINST A NURSING HOME,...