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THE NOTICE OF CLAIM ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PORT AUTHORITY, WHICH IS A BISTATE ENTITY (NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY) CREATED BY COMPACT (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action against the Port Authority was time-barred pursuant to New York and New Jersey law, noting that the Notice of Claim Act does not apply:

… [N]either CPLR 217-a nor New York Unconsolidated Laws § 6412-a — both of which were enacted as part of the Uniform Notice of Claim Act … — extends the time in which an action may be commenced against the Port Authority. CPLR 217-a does not apply to the Port Authority because it is not a “political subdivision of the state, . . . instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision, . . . public authority[,] or . . . public benefit corporation entitled to receive a notice of claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action” within the meaning of the statute; rather, it is a bistate agency … . What is more, New Jersey has not enacted identical legislation … . and bistate entities created by compact are not subject to the unilateral control of any one state … . McKenzie v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2022 NY Slip Op 00378, First Dept 1-25-22

 

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