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AN APPELLATE COURT CANNOT DETERMINE A SUPPRESSION MOTION BASED ON TRIAL EVIDENCE; THE TRIAL EVIDENCE REVEALED THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT MAY HAVE BEEN UNLAWFUL; BASED UPON THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT WHEN THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS MADE, THE ALLEGATION THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE PERMISSION TO ENTER WAS ENOUGH TO WARRANT A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING; MATTER REMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pitt, reversing Supreme Court’s denial of a probable cause hearing, determined the evidence revealed for the first time at trial called into serious question whether the search of defendant’s apartment was unlawful. Prior to trial the information provided to defendant gave the impression the apartment was entered and searched pursuant to a warrant. At trial the police testified they entered the apartment two hours before the search warrant was issued. The defendant was convicted of drug possession. The suppression motion stated the police entered the apartment without defendant’s permission. Given the limited and misleading information available to the defendant at the time the suppression motion was made, the allegations in the motion were sufficient to warrant a probable cause hearing. The appeal was held in abeyance and the matter was sent back for the hearing:

… [T]he Appellate Division “may not make its own finding of an independent source based upon trial testimony” … . Thus, we cannot hold that the denial of the Mapp/Dunaway hearing was proper, and the claim unpreserved, due to legal arguments pertaining to the lawfulness of the search and based on evidence adduced at trial, well after the lower court ruled on the motion to suppress.

… [H]ere, the trial testimony is being used solely to determine the context of defendant’s motion, the extent of her lack of access to information …, and the extent of information withheld from the motion court prior to making its decision to summarily deny defendant’s motion. … [W]e find that defendant’s motion should not have been summarily denied pursuant to CPL 710.60, and a hearing should have been conducted to make the necessary findings of fact. People v Esperanza, 2022 NY Slip Op 00383, First Dept 1-25-22

 

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