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INJURED PARTY DID NOT TIMELY NOTIFY INSURER OF HIS CLAIM, INSURER NOT OBLIGATED TO SATISFY DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED.

The Second Department determined the injured party (Glanz) did not timely notify the insurer (New York Marine) of the claim against the insured. Therefore, the insurer was not obligated to satisfy the default judgment entered against the insured:

“Insurance Law § 3420(a)(2) expressly permits an injured party to recover any unsatisfied judgment against an insured, directly from the insurer” … . Insurance Law § 3420(a)(3) requires the injured party to demonstrate that he or she acted diligently in attempting to ascertain the identity of the insurer, and thereafter expeditiously notified the insurer … . “In determining the reasonableness of an injured party’s notice, the notice required is measured less rigidly than that required of the insureds” … . “The injured person’s rights must be judged by the prospects for giving notice that were afforded him [or her], not by those available to the insured” …  “What is reasonably possible for the insured may not be reasonably possible for the person he [or she] has injured. The passage of time does not of itself make delay unreasonable” … .

Here, New York Marine made a prima facie showing that Glanz failed to act diligently in attempting to ascertain New York Marine’s identity and in expeditiously notifying it of his claim … . In opposition, Glanz failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Glanz v New York Mar. & Gen. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 03494, 2nd Dept 5-3-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (INJURED PARTY DID NOT TIMELY NOTIFY INSURER OF HIS CLAIM, INSURER NOT OBLIGATED TO SATISFY DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED)

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