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IN THIS SIDEWAIK ICE-AND-SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE MUNICIPALITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, AND THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this sidewalk ice-and-snow slip and fall case, determined; (1) the municipality demonstrated it did not have written notice of the ice-and-snow condition and plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about whether the municipality created the condition or benefitted from a special use; and (2), the abutting property-owner defendants did not demonstrate that they did not create the ice-and-snow condition. Summary judgment was properly granted to the municipality, but should not have been granted to the abutting property owners:

Generally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous condition on a public sidewalk or street is placed on the municipality, and not on the owner or lessee of abutting property … . There is an exception to this general rule, however, where the landowner has affirmatively created the dangerous condition … . The [abutting property-owner defendants] failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that their snow removal efforts around the time of the injured plaintiff’s fall did not create or exacerbate the allegedly dangerous condition on the roadway … . Thompson v Nassau County, 2021 NY Slip Op 06878, Second Dept 12-8-21

 

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