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ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING OWNER WAS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED ON THE LESSEE’S POLICY, THE INSURER HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SLIP AND FALL IN THE BUILDING PARKING LOT, THE LEASE DID NOT CALL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT BY THE LESSEE.

The Second Department determined the insurer of a lessee had no duty to defend an action by plaintiff who slipped and fell in the parking lot of the building. The lease included no obligation to maintain the parking lot. Although the building owner was an additional insured on the lessee’s policy, the injury was not the result of a bargained-for risk:

An insurer’s duty to defend is “exceedingly broad”… . An additional insured is entitled to the same coverage as if it were a named insured … . “If any of the claims against an insured arguably arise from covered events, the insurer is required to defend the entire action” … . The phrase “arising out of” requires “only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided” … . “[A]n insurer does not wish to be liable for losses arising from risks associated with a premises for which the insurer has not evaluated the risk and received a premium” … . Moreover, “[u]nambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning” … . The interpretation of policy language is a question of law for the courts … .

Here, [the insurer] established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The additional insured endorsement unambiguously provided that [the building owner] was an additional insured for liability “arising out of” the “ownership, maintenance or use” of the “premises leased” to [lessee]. [The lessee] leased only a portion of the building from [the owner], not the parking lot where the accident occurred, and it had no duty to maintain the parking lot. As such, there was no causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage was provided, and [plaintiff’s] injury was not a bargained-for risk … . Atlantic Ave. Sixteen AD, Inc. v Valley Forge Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 04243, 2nd Dept 5-31-17

INSURANCE LAW (ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING OWNER WAS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED ON THE LESSEE’S POLICY, THE INSURER HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SLIP AND FALL IN THE BUILDING PARKING LOT, THE LEASE DID NOT CALL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT BY THE LESSEE)/LANDLORD-TENANT (INSURANCE LAW, ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING OWNER WAS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED ON THE LESSEE’S POLICY, THE INSURER HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SLIP AND FALL IN THE BUILDING PARKING LOT, THE LEASE DID NOT CALL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT BY THE LESSEE)/SLIP AND FALL (INSURANCE LAW, ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING OWNER WAS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED ON THE LESSEE’S POLICY, THE INSURER HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SLIP AND FALL IN THE BUILDING PARKING LOT, THE LEASE DID NOT CALL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT BY THE LESSEE)

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