You are here: / / PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO SUE UNDER AN INSTALLMENT CONTRACT...
,

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO SUE UNDER AN INSTALLMENT CONTRACT ALLEGEDLY ASSIGNED TO HIM; THE DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIED DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should not have been granted summary judgment on an installment contract for the purchase of a car which plaintiff alleged was assigned to him. Plaintiff did not demonstrate the documents he relied on for standing fit the criteria for the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

“A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures” … . As a general rule, “the mere filing of papers received from other entities, even if they are retained in the regular course of business, is insufficient to qualify the documents as business records” … . “However, such records may be admitted into evidence if the recipient can establish personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures, or establish that the records provided by the maker were incorporated into the recipient’s own records and routinely relied upon by the recipient in its own business” … .

Here, Dunn [plaintiff’s record manager] failed to attest to her personal knowledge of the business practices of either Baron Auto City, Inc., [the dealer which sold the car] or the entity to which Baron Auto City, Inc., allegedly assigned the installment contract. She also failed to allege that either the installment contract or the initial assignment of the installment contract to the third party were incorporated into the plaintiff’s records and routinely relied upon by the plaintiff in its business. Accordingly, under the circumstances, Dunn’s affidavit was insufficient to lay a proper foundation for either the installment contract or the initial assignment of the installment contract to the third party … . Autovest, LLC v Cassamajor, 2021 NY Slip Op 03570, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

You might also like
Plaintiff’s Failure to Replace Manhole Cover Was Sole Proximate Cause of Injury
Trial Court Has the Discretion to Determine the Best Venue for Consolidated Actions—Here a County Other than the County Where the First Action Was Brought Was Properly Determined to Be the Most Appropriate Venue
ONCE SUPREME COURT FOUND DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE IT WAS REQUIRED TO VACATE THE CONVICTION; DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BECAUSE HE REJECTED A PLEA OFFER WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE COULD BE SUBJECT TO LIFE IN PRISON AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER AFTER TRIAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REINSTATED THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE AFTER FINDING DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (SECOND DEPT).
THE SELLER WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO EXERCISE AN OPTION IN THE RESTRICTED REMEDIES CLAUSE OF THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BECAUSE THE BUYER NEVER DEMANDED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS MOVING A HEAVY COMPRESSOR ON A PLANK OVER A TWO-FOOT-DEEP TRENCH WHEN THE PLANK BROKE; THE INJURY WAS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) AS AN ELEVATION-RELATED INCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).
Relationship of Prenuptial Agreement to Temporary Maintenance and Award of Attorneys Fees
Request for Mugshots and Identifying Information Re: Arrestees for Posting on Petitioner’s Website Denied—Posting of Such Information Would Constitute an Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy
UGELL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED AS A CANDIDATE FOR TOWN SUPERVISOR; THE FACT THAT UGELL IS A TOWN JUSTICE IS NOT DISQUALIFYING; ELECTION FRAUD MUST BE PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, LACKING HERE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS FOUND AT THE BOTTOM OF STAIRS; DEFENDANTS’... LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (SECOND...